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The objective of this dissertation is to understand the role of financial frictions in 
the transmission of shocks and their effect on the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. To accomplish the task, we develop Dynamic Stochastic General 
equilibrium models with financial frictions. 
In the first chapter, we develop a model to analytically determine the appropriate 
price index to target in the presence of financial frictions (where a fraction of 
households are constrained to consume their wage income each period). The analysis 
suggests that in the presence of financial frictions, a welfare-maximizing central bank 
should adopt flexible headline inflation targeting—i.e. a headline inflation target but 
with some weight on the output gap. These results are particularly relevant for 
emerging markets, where the share of food expenditures in total consumption 
expenditures is high and a large proportion of consumers are credit constrained.  
In the second chapter, we develop a small open economy model with macro-
financial linkages. The model includes a financial accelerator - entrepreneurs are 
assumed to partially finance investment using domestic and foreign currency debt - to 
assess the importance of financial frictions in the amplification and propagation of the 
effects of transitory shocks to productivity, interest rates and net worth of firms. We 
use Bayesian estimation techniques to estimate the model using India data. The model 
is used to assess the importance of the financial accelerator in India and to assess the 
 optimality of the current monetary policy rule. 
In the third chapter, we develop a small open economy New Keynesian model 
with financial frictions and an active banking sector for India. We find that the 
presence of a monopolistic banking sector with sticky interest rate setting attenuates 
the shocks. However, if the interest rates are flexible it results in the amplification of 
shocks. We also find that an unexpected reduction in bank capital can have a 
substantial impact on the real economy and particularly on investment. Use of non-
monetary policy tools result in greater volatility as compared to when central banks 
use traditional monetary tightening. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
OPTIMAL PRICE INDICES FOR TARGETING 
INFLATION UNDER INCOMPLETE MARKETS  
1.1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis has led to a vigorous debate about the appropriate 
objectives for monetary policy. For instance, it has been posited that a narrow version 
of inflation targeting (IT) could pose risks if it implies that potential asset bubbles are 
ignored by central banks. The emerging consensus appears to be that the IT 
framework has delivered price stability and should be retained but that central banks 
should use prudential regulation and other policy tools to counteract asset price 
bubbles. Whether or not IT is the chosen framework, central banks around the world 
view low and stable inflation as a primary, if not dominant, objective of monetary 
policy.  
What is the right price index that should be the focus of the inflation objective? 
This is a central operational issue in implementing not just IT but any version of 
monetary policy. Two key issues about the choice of price index are--determining the 
level of inflation that is consistent with the notion of price stability and determining 
the appropriate price index. In this paper, we focus on the task of analytically 
determining the appropriate price index for markets with financial frictions in general 
and emerging markets in particular.  
In the literature, the choice of price index has been guided by the idea that inflation 
is a monetary phenomenon. It has been suggested that core inflation (excluding food, 
energy and other volatile components from headline CPI) is the most appropriate 
measure of inflation (Wynne, 1999). The logic is that fluctuations in food and energy 
prices represent supply shocks and are non-monetary in nature.  Since these shocks are 
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transitory and volatile and do not reflect changes in the underlying rate of inflation, 
they should not be a part of the inflation targeting price index (Mishkin, 2007, 2008).  
Previous authors have used models with price and/or wage stickiness to show that 
the choice of this price index is consistent with a welfare maximization objective. 
Existing models have looked at complete market settings where price stickiness is the 
only source of distortion (besides monopoly power). Infrequent price adjustments 
cause mark-ups to fluctuate and also distort relative prices. In order to restore the 
flexible price equilibrium, central banks should try to minimize these fluctuations by 
targeting sticky prices (Goodfriend and King, 1997, 2001). Using a variant of a New 
Keynesian model, Aoki (2001) has shown that under complete markets targeting 
inflation in the sticky price sector leads to welfare maximization and macroeconomic 
stability. Targeting core inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the aggregate output gap 
as output and inflation move in the same direction under complete markets.  
Appropriateness of the core price index in these models relies heavily on the 
assumption that markets are complete (allowing households to fully insure against 
idiosyncratic risks) so that the central bank only needs to tackle the distortions created 
by price stickiness. However, there is compelling evidence that not all agents in the 
economy may be able to smooth their consumption (Campbell and Mankiw, 1989, 
1990, 1991).1 This observation is also consistent with the findings of a myriad of 
papers rejecting the permanent income hypothesis. It has been shown that, in the 
presence of credit-constrained consumers, policymakers’ welfare objectives are altered 
and the Taylor rule becomes too weak a criterion for stability (Amato and Laubach, 
2003; and Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles, 2004) . 
                                                 
1 Campbell and Mankiw estimate that in the U.S. nearly 50 percent of income accrues to consumers 
who do not smooth their consumption. Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2003) find that about 37 percent 
of consumers are rule-of-thumb consumers and they account for 59 percent of total employment. For 
further evidence on the proportion of credit-constrained consumers in the U.S., see Jappelli (1990), 
Shea (1995), Parker (1999), Souleles (1999), Fuhrer (2000), and Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2003). 
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Our main objective in this paper is to develop a model to study the welfare 
implications of targeting different price indices in an incomplete markets setting and 
to analytically determine the appropriate price index to target. A major contribution of 
this paper is to study the implication of financial frictions (modeled by the presence of 
credit constrained consumers) on the choice of optimal price index.  
Financial frictions that result in credit-constrained consumers have not received 
much attention in models of inflation targeting. To examine the significance of 
financial frictions, we develop a model with heterogeneous agents, where a fraction of 
consumers can not smooth their consumption—that is, they simply consume their 
current labor income.2 When markets are not complete and agents differ in their ability 
to smooth consumption, their welfare depends on the nature of idiosyncratic shocks. 
Thus, this modeling choice also allows us to look at the welfare distribution under 
alternative choices of the price index.  
Under complete markets, the income distribution following a sector-specific shock 
does not matter for the choice of consumption and, hence, welfare. However, under 
incomplete markets, household income, which depends on the nature of shocks and 
the price elasticity of demand for goods, matters for the consumption choice.3 Price 
elasticity of the demand for food, which has not attracted much attention in complete 
market settings, becomes important under incomplete markets. We show that, through 
its impact on household’s income and expenditure, the low price elasticity of the 
demand for food is an important determinant of the optimal choice of price index 
under incomplete markets.4 
                                                 
2 We introduce this friction in a manner similar to that of Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2004).  
3 If demand of one good is very low, following a negative shock its demand will not go down by much 
and the income of net seller of that good will go up. Consequently, the expenditure on that good will go 
up substantially for net buyers. 
4 A survey by the U.S. Department of Agriculture suggests that the average price elasticity of food is -
0.34 in a sample of 114 countries; this estimate is much lower than the elasticity normally used in other 
models. 
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We also incorporate other important features relevant to emerging markets into the 
model. The share of food in total household expenditures is much higher in emerging 
markets, where it constitutes nearly 40-50 percent of household expenditures 
compared to 10-15 percent in advanced economies. Low price and income elasticities 
of food, and low income levels make the welfare of agents in emerging markets more 
sensitive to fluctuations in food prices. Since expenditure on food in total household 
expenditure is high and demand for food is relatively inelastic, agents may factor in 
food price inflation while bargaining over wages. Through this channel, food price 
inflation feeds into inflation expectations. Thus, in emerging markets even inflation 
expectation targeting central banks have to be concerned about food price inflation. 
The key finding of the paper is that in the presence of financial frictions targeting 
core inflation (i.e., inflation in the sticky price sector) may not be optimal. Lack of 
access to financial markets makes the demand of credit-constrained consumers 
insensitive to fluctuations in interest rates. Since their demand depends only on real 
wages, a link is established between aggregate demand and real wages. Thus, in the 
presence of financial frictions, the relative price of the good produced in the flexible 
price sector not only affects aggregate supply but, through its effects on real wages, 
also influences aggregate demand.  
This result is at variance with the prior literature based on complete markets 
settings. For instance, in Aoki’s (2001) model, relative prices of the flexible price 
sector only appear as a shift parameter of inflation in the sticky price sector. Thus, 
under incomplete markets, the central bank cannot ignore fluctuations in the price of 
the good produced in the flexible price sector if it wants to affect aggregate demand. 
Financial frictions break the comovement of inflation and output (as inflation and 
output may now move in opposite directions). Stabilizing core inflation is no longer 
sufficient to stabilize output. Thus, in the presence of financial frictions targeting 
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flexible headline inflation is a better policy choice.  
Since our model exhibits monetary super-neutrality, we limit our analysis to non-
inflationary steady states (long-run price stability) and do not have anything to say 
about the optimal level of inflation. We also do not attempt to define optimal policy 
rules but focus on evaluating welfare outcomes from different policy rules using 
alternative measures of inflation.  
The paper is organized in six sections. In the next section of the paper, we present 
some empirical facts to further motivate the analysis. In Section 3, we develop a two 
sector, two goods model with heterogeneous agents, which forms the basis of further 
analysis. In Section 4 we discuss the main results and in Section 5 we conduct various 
sensitivity experiments to check the robustness of our baseline results and also present 
some extensions of the basic model. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
1.2 Basic Stylized Facts 
We begin by presenting some stylized facts about the share of household 
consumption expenditures on food and also various measures of the elasticity of food 
expenditures. In a cross country comparison, emerging markets and advanced 
countries differ markedly on these measures. Next, we present data on credit 
constraints in emerging markets. We also look at the features of core and headline CPI 
inflation measures in some emerging and advanced economies. 
Engel’s law states that as average household income increases, the average share 
of food expenditure in total household expenditure declines. When this idea is 
extended to countries, we expect poor countries to have a high average share of food 
expenditure in total household expenditure. Figure 1.1 plots the expenditure on food 
(as a percentage of total expenditure) against log real per capital income for the year 
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1996.5 It shows that countries with lower per capita income levels have a higher share 
of expenditure on food in total household expenditure. In order to examine how 
emerging markets differ from advanced countries, in Table 1.1 we present recent data 
on shares of food expenditure in total expenditure for selected emerging and advanced 
economies.6 As expected, expenditure on food is a much larger share of total 
household expenditure in emerging markets relative to advanced economies. 
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Figure 1.1: Share of Expenditure on Food ((as percent of total household 
expenditure), 1996. Expenditure on food includes expenditure on food prepared at 
home and consumed plus beverages and tobacco. Source: WDI and International Food 
Consumption Patterns Dataset, Economic Research Service, USDA.  
 
 
                                                 
5 We use data for 1996 for illustrative purposes since data for a large number of countries were 
available for that year.  
6 We looked at household surveys for each country in this table rather than the weight of food in each 
country’s CPI index since those weights are changed only occasionally. However, data from household 
surveys are available for only a few emerging markets. These data typically cover expenditure on food 
consumed at home and don’t include expenditures on beverages and tobacco.  
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Table 1.1: Share of Food Expenditure in Total Household Expenditure 
 
Emerging Markets  Advanced Economies  
Indonesia 53.0 Japan  14.7 
Vietnam 49.8 Germany  11.5 
India 48.8 Australia  10.8 
China 36.7 Canada  9.3 
Russia 33.2 United Kingdom  8.8 
Malaysia 28.0 USA  5.7 
Average 41.6 Average  10.1 
Data for emerging markets are for 2005 while for advanced economies it is for 2006. 
Expenditure on food includes expenditure on food consumed at home only and does 
not include expenditure on beverages and tobacco. Source: Household Surveys, CEIC, 
International Food Consumption Patterns Dataset, Economic Research Service, USDA 
and authors’ calculations. 
 
Income and price elasticities of the demand for food are important for our analysis. 
Figure 1.2 plots the income elasticity of food against real per capita GDP for the year 
1996. The income elasticity of food is low, suggesting that food is a necessary good. 
Since expenditure on food is not a major share of household expenditure in rich 
countries, the income elasticity of food is much lower.7 We present the income 
elasticity of food for selected emerging market and advanced economies in Table 1.2.  
The income elasticity of food in emerging markets is on average twice as large as in 
advanced economies. 
 
                                                 
7 A low income elasticity of demand also means that, as family income increases, consumption of the 
commodity will not increase by much.  
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Figure 1.2: Income Elasticity of Demand for Food, 1996 
These country-specific income-elasticity values represent the estimated percentage 
change in demand for food if total income increases by 1 percent. Food includes food 
prepared at home and consumed plus beverages and tobacco. Source: WDI and 
International Food Consumption Patterns Dataset, Economic Research   Service, 
USDA. 
 
Figure 1.3 plots, for a large sample of countries, the Slutsky own price elasticity of 
food against the real per capita GDP for the year 1996.8 The price elasticity of food 
demand is nonlinear, decreasing at low income levels, and then increasing, with a 
range from -0.4 to -0.1. We also present data on the Slutsky own-price elasticity of 
food for selected countries in Table 1.2.9  
 
                                                 
8 The Slutsky own price elasticity is estimated by keeping real income constant.  
9 Frisch elasticity values lie between Slutsky and Cournot values and can be considered as an average 
own price elasticity. 
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Figure 1.3: Slutsky Own-Price Elasticity of Demand for Food, 1996 
Country-specific elasticity value represents a percentage change in demand for food if 
food prices increases by 1 percent (keeping real income constant). Food includes food 
prepared at home and consumed plus beverages and tobacco.  Source: WDI and 
International Food Consumption Patterns Dataset, Economic Research Service, 
USDA. 
 
The price elasticity of food is very low (suggesting that the demand for food is 
inelastic). As the share of expenditure on food is high in emerging markets, the price 
elasticity of food is higher in these economies. However, the overall value of price 
elasticity of food is much lower than used in the literature on inflation targeting.  Low 
price and income elasticities of the demand for food have considerable significance for 
the choice of price index.  
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Table 1.2: Income (Expenditure) Elasticity and Slutsky Own-Price Elasticity of 
Food, 1996 
 
Emerging 
Economies 
Income 
Elasticity 
Price 
Elasticity 
Advanced 
Economies 
Income 
Elasticity 
Price 
Elasticity 
Vietnam 0.73 -0.37 New Zealand 0.39 -0.29 
Pakistan 0.72 -0.38 Finland 0.39 -0.29 
Jordan 0.70 -0.39 Sweden 0.36 -0.27 
Indonesia 0.69 -0.39 Netherlands 0.36 -0.27 
Philippines 0.66 -0.39 France 0.33 -0.25 
Peru 0.66 -0.39 United Kingdom 0.33 -0.25 
Thailand 0.65 -0.39 Belgium 0.33 -0.25 
Egypt 0.64 -0.39 Norway 0.32 -0.24 
Brazil 0.62 -0.39 Austria 0.31 -0.24 
Russia 0.62 -0.39 Germany 0.31 -0.23 
Turkey 0.61 -0.39 Australia 0.30 -0.23 
Iran 0.60 -0.39 Japan 0.29 -0.22 
Mexico 0.59 -0.38 Canada 0.28 -0.22 
Chile 0.59 -0.38 Switzerland 0.26 -0.20 
Poland 0.58 -0.38 Denmark 0.25 -0.19 
Hungary 0.54 -0.37 Luxembourg 0.13 -0.10 
Argentina 0.52 -0.36 United States 0.10 -0.08 
Average 0.63 -0.38 Average 0.63 -0.38 
These country-specific income-elasticity values represent the estimated percentage 
change in demand for food if total income increases by 1 percent. Country-specific 
price-elasticity value represents a percentage change in demand for food if food prices 
increases by 1 percent (keeping real income constant). Food includes food prepared at 
home and consumed plus beverages and tobacco. Source: WDI and International Food 
Consumption Patterns Dataset, Economic Research Service, USDA. 
 
In order to examine the extent of credit constraints in emerging markets, in Table 
1.3 we present data on the percentage of the adult population with access to formal 
finance (measured by the share of the population using financial services) in emerging 
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markets. As evident, on average more than half of the population in emerging markets 
does not have access to the formal financial system.  
 
Table 1.3: Composite Measure of Access to Financial Services in Emerging 
Markets 
 
 Percent with access  
Percent with 
access 
Argentina 28 Mexico 25 
Brazil 43 Nigeria 15 
Chile 60 Pakistan 12 
China 42 Peru 26 
Egypt 41 Philippines 26 
India 48 Poland 66 
Indonesia 40 Russia 69 
Iran 31 South Africa 46 
Korea 63 Thailand 59 
Malaysia 60 Turkey 49 
  Average 42 
The composite indicator measures the percentage of the adult population with access 
to an account with a financial intermediary.  Source:  “Finance for All? Policies and 
Pitfalls in Expanding Access,” World Bank, 2008. 
 
Next, we examine the characteristics of core and headline inflation. We plot the 
levels and volatility of inflation for selected advanced and emerging market economies 
(Figure 1.4 – 1.5). Values of average inflation, average volatility and the persistence of 
inflation (for the period March 1991 – September 2009) are reported in Table 1.4. The 
two measures of inflation have very different characteristics in advanced and emerging 
market economies. Average inflation (both headline and core) has been higher in 
emerging market economies during the period. Headline inflation is more volatile than 
core inflation in both advanced and emerging market economies. However, the 
volatility of both inflation measures is much higher in emerging markets. Core 
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inflation has on average been twice as volatile in emerging market economies 
compared to advanced countries. The two measures of inflation exhibit a high degree 
of persistence in both sets of economies. 
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Figure 1.4: Levels and Volatility of Inflation 
Core index for USA is defined as CPI excluding food and energy while for Canada it 
is defined as CPI excluding food, energy and indirect taxes. Inflation is year on year 
inflation calculated using quarterly price index. Volatility is measured as the standard 
deviation of inflation using a rolling 20-quarter (5-years) window. We also computed 
the volatility using 8-years and 10-years window and the results are similar. Source: 
CEIC and authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 1.5: Levels and Volatility of Inflation 
Core index for Korea is defined as CPI excluding agricultural product and oil while 
for Thailand it is defined as CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy. Inflation is 
year on year inflation using quarterly price index. Volatility is measured as the 
standard deviation of inflation using a rolling 20-quarter (5-years) window. We also 
computed the volatility using 8-years and 10-years window and the results are similar. 
Source: CEIC and authors’ calculations. 
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Table 1.4: Average Inflation, Volatility and Persistence of Inflation 
 
Average Inflation Average Volatility Persistence 
 
Headline 
Inflation 
Core 
Inflation 
Headline 
Inflation 
Core 
Inflation 
Headline 
Inflation 
Core 
Inflation 
USA 2.67 2.58 0.80 0.45 0.84*** (0.09) 
0.92*** 
(0.04) 
Canada 1.96 1.78 0.80 0.43 0.75*** (0.13) 
0.77*** 
(0.10) 
Korea 4.23 3.85 1.54 1.32 0.85*** (0.05) 
0.88*** 
(0.03) 
Thailand 3.62 2.87 1.78 1.24 0.90*** (0.06) 
0.95*** 
(0.05) 
Core price index in USA excludes food and energy from the CPI while in Canada it 
excludes indirect taxes also in addition to food and energy. Thailand’s core index 
excludes unprocessed food and energy while in Korea it excludes agricultural products 
and oil. Inflation is a year on year inflation calculated using quarterly price index. 
Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of inflation using a rolling 20 quarter 
(5 years) window. Persistence parameter is the estimated co-efficient from a simple 
AR(1) model. The symbol *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Newey 
West corrected standard errors (with a lag of 3) are reported in brackets. 
a. Data for Canada is for March 1996 – September 2009. 
Source: CEIC and authors’ calculations. 
 
We also look at the evolution of two price indices over time. It is expected that 
they would deviate from each other in the short run (as the core measure is constructed 
to eliminate the fluctuations which do not reflect the underlying inflation 
developments). However, since transitory shocks (shocks to food and energy) do not 
change the underlying trend, headline inflation should return to its original level in a 
short period (Mishkin, 2007). In other words, the headline inflation measure should 
not remain above the core inflation measure for an extended period. 
To verify this, we examine the two measures of inflation for two representative 
core inflation targeting countries – Canada and Thailand.10 In Canada, in the period 
                                                 
10 Canada is an advanced economy that adopted IT in 1991 while Thailand, an emerging market 
economy, adopted IT in 2000. Canada targets core inflation excluding food, energy and indirect taxes. 
Thailand targets core inflation, which excludes food and energy prices.  
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from the spring of 1999 to the fall of 2001, headline inflation remained above core 
inflation for 30 months in succession (Figure 1.4a). In Thailand, headline inflation has 
remained above core inflation for more than 5 consecutive years (Figure 1.5a). The 
core inflation measure excludes a number of expenditure items and hence is less 
representative of the cost of living. Thus, differences in the behavior of headline 
inflation (which is supposed to be more accurate measure of cost of living) and core 
inflation over an extended period may have important welfare implications. 
1.3 The Model 
Our model builds upon a large literature that has developed and analyzed dynamic 
sticky price models (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999; Woodford, 1996; Rotemberg and 
Woodford, 1997, 1999; Aoki, 2001). The model incorporates a fraction of credit 
constrained consumers and subsistence level food consumption added to capture the 
characteristics of emerging market economies. The model has two sectors and two 
goods—one type of flexible price good, food ( FC ), whose prices adjust 
instantaneously, and a continuum of monopolistically produced sticky price goods, 
)1,0(in  indexed )( zzc which we call non-food and whose prices adjust sluggishly.11 
In the subsequent discussion, we interchangeably use the term food sector for the 
flexible price sector and the term non-food sector for the sticky price sector. 
1.3.1 Households 
The economy is populated by a continuum of 1 + λ infinitely lived households, 
where 0 , is the continuum of households in the flexible price sector (food sector). 
Each household owns a firm and produces one good. They provide labor to the firms 
in their respective sector (we assume that labor is immobile across sectors) and 
                                                 
11 We model the sticky price sector by a continuum of monopolistic firms so that these firms have 
market power and they can set prices. This is done to introduce price stickiness in this sector. 
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consume both the flexible price good (food) and all of the differentiated sticky price 
goods (non food).12 The representative consumer, i, is indexed by f (flexible price 
sector) and s (sticky price sector). Household i, maximizes the discounted stream of 
utility  
)],([
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i
t
i
t
t
t NCuE 

          (1)             
 
where )1,0( is the discount factor. The utility function takes the form: 
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where the argument itC , is the composite consumption index of household i of the 
flexible and all of the continuum of the differentiated goods, and is defined as 
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The elasticity of substitution between the flexible price and sticky price goods is 
given by ],0[   and ]1,0[  is the weight on food in the consumption index. The 
parameter θ >1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two differentiated goods, 
i
tn  is the aggregate labor supplied and   is the risk aversion factor (inverse of 
elasticity of inter temporal substitution). The parameter   is the inverse of Frisch 
elasticity and n   is a scaling factor. 
The utility function used here is of a generalized Klein-Rubin form.13 This form is 
selected to model the role of food in the economy. Since food is a necessity, 
                                                 
12 We have assumed the immobility of labor for simplicity and to capture the large inter-sectoral wage 
differential in emerging markets. Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2004) have demonstrated in their 
model that, even with free labor mobility, financial frictions lead to similar results as ours (aggregate 
demand going up even when the central bank raises the policy interest rate). 
13 Expenditure system corresponding to Klein-Rubin utility function is referred to as the Stone-Geary 
linear expenditure system; Stone (1954) and Geary (1949). 
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households must consume a minimum amount, C* of food for survival.14 We assume 
that all households always have enough income to buy the subsistence level of food. 
Even though the subsistence level food consumption does not bind, it plays a vital role 
by altering the elasticity of substitution between food and non-food and the marginal 
utility of food and non-food consumption. 
1.3.1.1 Flexible Price Sector (Food Sector) Households 
Households in the flexible price sector (food sector) do not have access to financial 
markets and they consume their wage income each period.15 So these households are 
akin to the “rule of thumb” consumers. Each household in the sector owns one firm 
and produces food by linear technology in labor, given by 
f
ttftf NAY ,,           (5) 
Af,t is a random productivity shock. Since we are interested in analyzing the effects of 
sector specific shocks, we assume that all the households in the food sector face the 
same shock. 
1.3.1.2 Sticky Price Sector (Non Food Sector) Households 
Households in this sector can buy one period nominal bonds and smooth their 
consumption. Each household owns a firm and provides labor to each firm in the 
sector. They hold one share in each firm of the sector. Each firm uses a linear 
technology in labor given by 
)()( , zNAzY
s
ttst          (6) 
where  )(zYt  is a  sticky price good and )(zN
s
t is the labor used in the firm producing 
                                                 
14 This is also in similar to habit persistence with C* being independent of time. 
15 There is no storage technology in the model. So consumers in the flexible price sector can’t smooth 
their consumption by saving their output. We have made this restrictive assumption to keep the model 
tractable. Table 3 shows that more than 50 percent of individuals in emerging markets lack access to 
formal finance. Basu et al. (2005) have documented that 80 percent of individuals in the agriculture 
sector in India have no access to formal finance. 
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good indexed by z ( where ]1,0[ z ). As,t is a random productivity shock. Since we are 
interested in analyzing sector-specific rather than household-level shocks, we assume 
that the shock is identical for all households in the non-food sector. 
1.3.2 Consumption Decision 
1.3.2.1 Food Sector Households (Credit Constrained Consumers) 
All households in this sector face an identical budget constraint every period (as 
their wage income is the same in every period). A representative household maximizes 
its lifetime utility given by equation (1) subject to the budget constraint 
f
t
f
t
f
tsts
f
tftf NWCPCP  ,,,,  
where f,tP  is the market price of food, tsP , is the price index of non-food (defined 
below) and fWt  is the nominal wage in the sector. The optimal allocation for a given 
level of spending between food and all of the differentiated goods leads to a Dixit-
Stiglitz demand relation. The total expenditure to attain a consumption index ftC  is 
given by fttCP  where tP  is defined as 
      111,1, ))(1()( tstft PPP       (7) 
The budget constraint can be written as: 
*
, CPNWCP tf
f
t
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f
tt         (8) 
Demand for the flexible price good is given by 
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P
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Demand for the sticky price good is given by 
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where tsP ,  is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index defined as  
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)(zX t is the price of differentiated good indexed on z at time t. Demand for each 
differentiated good is given by 
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The labor supply decision is given by the usual first order condition with respect to 
f
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1.3.2.2 Non Food Sector households (Unconstrained Consumers) 
Each household in this sector provides labor to each one of the firms in the sector 
and also holds one share in each firm. This setting is the one followed by Woodford 
(2003).16 In this set up each household faces the same budget constraint each period 
and hence chooses the same consumption stream. A representative household 
maximizes the lifetime utility given by equation (1) subject to the following budget 
constraint 
*
,11
1
0
1
0
)1()()()( CPBidzzdzzNzWBCP tfttt
s
t
s
tt
s
tt     (14) 
where tB represent the quantity of one period nominal riskless discount bond bought 
in period t  and maturing in period t+1, where ti  is the nominal interest rate between 
period t and t+1. )(zW st  and )(zN
s
t  represent respectively the nominal wage prevalent 
in firm z and the amount of labor supplied to firm z by the household respectively. 
)(zt  is the profit of firm z. Maximization with respect to stC yields the Euler 
                                                 
16 Alternatively, we could have used the other set up specified in Woodford (2003) in which each 
household produces one of the differentiated products and there exist a complete range of securities 
through which they can insure fully against idiosyncratic risks. In that formulation also each household 
will choose the same consumption stream and therefore the analysis will be the same as in the present 
setting. 
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PP  is headline inflation. The labor supply decision of the household 
to a firm indexed by z is given by 
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Demand for the flexible price good is given by 
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Demand for the sticky price good is given by 
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and the demand for each differentiated good is given by 
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1.3.3 Firms 
1.3.3.1 Firms in the Flexible Price Sector (Food Sector) 
Firms are assumed to be price takers. Given a market price tfP ,  they set their price 
such that 
tf
f
t
tf A
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,           (20) 
The supply function for the flexible price firm--obtained by combining equations 5, 13 
and 20 is given by: 
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The market-clearing condition for food implies 
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where we have defined tt
s
t
f
t YCCC       (23) 
It can be considered as the total composite demand and hence equal to supply in 
equilibrium. 
1.3.3.2 Firms in the Sticky Price Sector 
We follow Calvo (1983) and Woodford (1996) in modeling price stickiness. A 
fraction )1,0(  of firms cannot change their price in each period. Firms are free to 
change the price at time t; they choose a price tX  to maximize the following objective 
function: 
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where we have made use of the market clearing conditions  
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The sticky sector price index is expressed by 
      11111,, )()1()( zXPP ttsts      (28) 
The price tX  solves the following first order condition 
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and 
1
  is the constant markup over the marginal cost. 
Equations (7), (8), (15), (21), (22), (27), (28), (29) and (30), coupled with a monetary 
policy rule to choose the nominal interest rate, jointly determine the equilibrium path 
of consumption, output and price index in both the sectors. 
1.3.4 Inflation and Relative Prices 
We define the relative prices as follows: 
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relative price charged by firms which are free to choose the price in time t. We define 
the gross headline inflation as 
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 . The relationship between headline and core inflation (inflation in the 
sticky price sector) is given by: 
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The system of equations in terms of stationary variables is presented in Appendix I.  
1.3.5 Steady State 
We characterize the steady state with constant prices (zero inflation) and no price 
                                                 
17 Since the technology is linear, MCt,t+i = MCt+i That is, marginal cost is independent of the level of 
production. 
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stickiness in the economy.18 This implies that 1 and 1 ,  tst  for all t. Under 
symmetric equilibrium, each firm faces the same demand and set the same price.  
Thus, 1  and ,  ttst xPX .  Therefore, rtts MCx 1,  
  . In the steady state, all firms 
set a price which is a constant markup over the real marginal cost.19  
We assume that productivity is the same in both the sectors and normalize it to one. 
1.3.6 Monetary Policy Rule 
We assume that the monetary authority sets the short term nominal interest ( tR ) 
according to a simple Taylor (1993) type rule of the following form 
)/log()/log()/log()/log(
___
1
_
YYRRRR tyttit        (32) 
where 
___
 and , RY   are the steady state values of output, inflation and nominal interest 
rate. i  represents the Central Banker’s preference for interest rate smoothing.   
and y  are the weights on inflation and output gap assigned by the policy makers.20 
We characterize core inflation as the inflation in the sticky price sector, ts , , and 
headline inflation as the over all inflation, t , for our policy experiments. 
We evaluate our model under the following monetary policy regimes: 
Strict Core Inflation Targeting: The central bank cares only about interest rate 
smoothing and stabilizing inflation in the sticky price sector. 
)/log()/log()/log(
_
,
_
1
_
ststit RRRR        (33) 
Strict Headline Inflation Targeting: The central bank cares only about interest rate 
                                                 
18 Our model exhibits monetary super-neutrality. Therefore, the level of steady state inflation does not 
affect steady state values of real variables.  
19 We also compute the welfare gains when the steady state involves a tax rate which is set such that the 
steady state level of output in the sticky price sector is efficient. All our results go through under this 
alternative characterization of steady state. 
20 We include an interest rate smoothing parameter in our monetary policy rule as the benefits of such 
smoothing are well documented in the literature (see, e.g., Lowe and Ellis, 1997; Sack and Wieland, 
1999). Various authors have argued that moving interest rates in small steps increases its impact on the 
long-term interest rate; it also reduces the risks of policy mistakes and prevents large capital losses and 
systemic financial risks. Mohanty and Klau (2004) find that all emerging market central banks put 
substantial weight on interest rate smoothing. Clarida et al.(1998) find that central banks of advanced 
economies also put a large weight on interest rate smoothing. 
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smoothing and stabilizing headline inflation. 
 )/log()/log()/log(
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_   ttit RRRR      (34) 
Flexible Core Inflation Targeting: The central bank cares about interest rate 
smoothing and in addition to stabilizing sticky price inflation also tries to stabilize 
output by assigning a weight to the output gap (deviation of output from trend). 
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Flexible Headline Inflation Targeting: The central bank cares about interest rate 
smoothing and in addition to stabilizing sticky price inflation also tries to stabilize 
output. 
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1.3.7 Exogenous Shock Process 
We assume that the productivity in the flexible price sector and sticky price sector 
follow AR(1) processes 
ttfaftf AA   ,1,  , t ~ i.i.d. (0, af )     (37) 
ttsasts AA   ,1,  , t ~ i.i.d. (0, as )     (38) 
In the literature, exclusion of food prices from the price index has been justified on the 
ground that shocks to food (and energy) prices represent supply shocks. In order to 
compare our model with those in the prior literature and also to highlight the role of 
adverse supply shocks on the choice of price index, we focus on productivity shocks. 
1.3.8 Competitive Equilibrium 
A stationary competitive equilibrium is a set of processes 
tttttstf,ttstf
s
t
f mcxRyyyxxCC
t
 , , , , , , , , , , , ,ts,,,   for t = 0,1,… that remain bounded in 
some neighborhood around the deterministic steady state and satisfy equations (1) – 
(11) of Appendix I, given the exogenous stochastic processes tfA ,  , tsA ,  and the 
monetary policy rule given by equation (32). 
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1.3.9 Complete Markets Specification 
We follow the setting of Aoki (2001) to study the choice of price index under 
complete markets. In this setting each household can insure one another against 
idiosyncratic income risks. It implies that given same initial wealth each household 
will choose an identical consumption sequence.21 Thus, under this complete markets 
setting 
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YCCC        (39) 
and aggregate demand is given by 
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where tR  is the gross nominal interest rate. Equations (2), (4)-(10) of Appendix I and 
(39)-(40) define the system of equations that combined with the monetary policy rule 
and exogenous stochastic processes for tfA ,  and tsA ,  determine the equilibrium path of 
the economy in the complete markets setting. 
1.3.10 Welfare Evaluations 
We are interested in the choice of policy rule that yields the highest level of lifetime 
utility within the class of policy rules considered.22 In particular, we evaluate policy 
rules according to the amount of lifetime utility:  
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   for i = f,s      (41) 
We compute the total welfare of the economy as a weighted sum of households’ 
welfare 
                                                 
21 Insurance contracts are assumed to be written before households know which sector they are assigned 
to. The insurance contracts make the marginal utility of nominal income identical across the households 
at any time t. 
22 We study the policy rule which is implementable and optimal as defined by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
(2007). Implementability refers to the local uniqueness of rational expectations equilibrium while 
optimality means that it yields the highest lifetime utility within the class of policy rules considered.  
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s
t
f
ttotal VVV  * . Formally, we compute totalV  associated with each policy rule and 
look for a policy rule that yields the highest value of totalV . 
1.3.11 Solution Method  
Following Kydland and Prescott (1982) and King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), it 
has become commonplace to characterize the solution of nonlinear models using 
approximation methods, with first-order approximation techniques being the norm. 
However, it is now widely accepted that first-order approximation techniques are ill-
suited for the comparison of different policy environments using aggregate utility as a 
welfare criterion.23 To enable accurate welfare comparisons across alternative policy 
environments, we need at least a second-order approximation of the equilibrium 
welfare function (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004; Woodford, 2003).24  
In recent years, scholars have come up with various methods to produce second-
order accurate approximation to the solutions of DSGE models. Jin and Judd (2002), 
Collard and Juillard (2000) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) have used the 
perturbation method for second and higher order approximations. Kim and Kim 
(2003) and Sutherland (2002) have developed the bias correction method that 
produces similar results as the second order perturbation method. 
We compute the second-order accurate consumer welfare measure with different 
monetary policy regimes as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). To produce an 
accurate second-order approximation of the welfare function, we use a second-order 
approximation to the policy function. The policy function is approximated using the 
perturbation method by employing a scale parameter for the standard deviations of the 
                                                 
23 Up to a first-order approximation, lifetime utility, Vt, is equal to its non-stochastic steady state value. 
Hence, given the same non-stochastic steady state, all policy rules yield the same amount of welfare to a 
first-order approximation (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007).  
24See Kim and Kim (2003). However, if one is sure that nonlinearity is small in certain dimensions one 
can justify using a first-order approximation by making specific assumptions, Woodford (2003). 
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exogenous shocks as an argument of the policy function and taking a second-order 
Taylor expansion with respect to the state variables as well as the scale parameter. We 
use an approximation algorithm developed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) with 
suitable modifications. 
1.3.12 Measuring Welfare Gains 
Strict core inflation targeting is regarded as the welfare maximizing policy rule in 
the literature. Therefore, we evaluate the welfare gains associated with a particular 
policy regime by comparing it to the strict core inflation targeting rule allocation. Let 
the strict core inflation targeting rule allocation be denoted by r, and an alternative 
policy regime be denoted by a.  We define the welfare associated with the core 
allocation conditional on the economy being at its non-stochastic steady state at time 
zero: 
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where rtC  and 
r
tN  are the consumption and hours under the strict core inflation 
targeting policy rule. Similarly, the conditional welfare under the alternative regime a 
is defined as 
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The use of the conditional rather than unconditional expectation is consistent with 
the approach followed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) and Kollman (2004). The 
use of the conditional expectation is preferable in our framework given that different 
policy regimes will typically have different stochastic steady states even though their 
non-stochastic states are identical. Hence, as pointed out by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
(2007), the unconditional expectation of utility ignores the transitional dynamics 
leading to the stochastic steady state. As a result, we follow the procedure of 
conditioning our calculation of expected utility on the fact that the economy starts 
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from its non-stochastic steady state. 
In order to evaluate the welfare implications of a particular policy regime, we 
calculate the fraction of a consumer’s consumption that would make them indifferent 
between regimes. Let  be the welfare gain of adopting an alternative policy rule 
other than strict core inflation targeting. We define   as a fraction of additional strict 
core inflation targeting regime’s consumption process that would make a household as 
well off under regime a as under strict core inflation targeting regime. Then 
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                                                                    (43) 
Under this specification, a positive value of   means that welfare is higher under the 
alternative policy rule.  Rearranging equation (43), the welfare gain   is given by 
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A value of  *100 = 1, represents a one percentage point of permanent consumption 
gain under the alternate policy regime.  
We study the choice of the optimal price index under two market settings–(i) 
complete markets (similar to Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; Aoki, 2001) and (ii) an 
incomplete market structure characterized by the presence of ‘rule of thumb’ 
consumers (similar to Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles, 2004).  We compute the welfare 
gains associated with the four monetary policy regimes defined by equations (33)-
(36). 
1.3.13 Parameter Selection 
Parameter selection for the model is a challenging task. There is no consensus on 
the values of some parameters. Moreover, most of the parameters used in the literature 
are based on micro data from advanced countries. Hence, our approach will be to pick 
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baseline parameters from the existing literature and to then do extensive sensitivity 
analysis with respect to the choice of key parameters.  
We choose  =0.9902, which amounts to an annual interest rate of 4% (Prescott, 
1986). We assume that  =1 (that is, we have one representative consumer in each 
sector, similar to Aoki, 2001). We use  =2 as the baseline value of the risk aversion 
parameter, (i.e., the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 0.5). This is in the range 
of values usually assumed in RBC studies and is also the most common value used in 
the literature on emerging markets (Aguair and Gopinath, 2005; Schmitt-Grohe and 
Uribe, 2006; Devereux, Lane and Xu, 2004).25 
Following Chari, Kehoe and MacGrattan (1999), Basu and Fernald (1994, 1995), 
Basu and Kimball (1997) and Basu (1996) we choose  =10 (elasticity of substitution 
between different differentiated goods), which implies a markup of 11 percent. Next, 
we set the probability that a price does not adjust in a given period ( ) at 0.66 
(Ferrero, Gertler, Svensson, 2008; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). This implies that 
prices remain fixed for a mean duration of 3 quarters, which is consistent with the 
micro evidence. 
The appropriate value of the Frisch elasticity ( 1 ) is both important and 
controversial. The range of values used in the literature goes from 0.25 to 1.26 For our 
benchmark case we assume it to be 0.33 ( =3). We choose the scaling parameter n  
such that in steady state the average hours worked is 0.38. The elasticity of 
substitution between food and non food,  , is another parameter for which we don’t 
have a good approximation. As the demand for food is inelastic, we choose the value 
                                                 
25 Friend and Blume (1975) present empirical evidence suggesting that its value is around 2 for 
industrial countries. Other estimates for these countries suggests that it lies between 0 and 5 (e.g., 
Hansen and Singleton, 1983; Dunn and Singleton, 1986).  
26 Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) estimate it to be 0.25 while Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1997) estimate it to be 0.40. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) estimate the intertemporal elasticity of 
labor supply to be in the range of [0.5, 1]. 
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of  = 0.6 for the baseline case.27 
One important feature of emerging markets is the high share of expenditure on 
food in total household expenditure.  Based on the household surveys from emerging 
markets, the average expenditure on food is around 42 percent (see Table 2.1). In 
addition, we assume that on average half of the households’ steady state food 
consumption is required for subsistence.28 To match these values in the baseline model 
we choose subsistence level food consumption parameter, *C =0.1013 and the weight 
on food in the utility function,  equal to 0.3050 so that in steady state the average 
household expenditure on food is 42%. For the monetary policy parameters, we follow 
Woodford (2003), Gali et al. (2004) and Mohanty and Klau (2004) and choose i = 
0.7,  = 2 and Y = 0.5.  
The major argument about leaving out food from the core price index is that the 
shocks in that sector are seasonal and transient. We choose the value of AR(1) 
coefficient of the food sector shock at 0.25 (implying that the shock lasts for four 
quarters, which seems reasonable given the heavy dependence of agriculture on 
weather conditions in emerging markets). Following the literature, we set the value of 
the AR(1) coefficient of the non food sector shock at 0.95 (Aguair and Gopinath, 
2007; Schmitt-Grohe  and Uribe, 2006). Volatility of productivity shocks in emerging 
markets is higher than in advanced countries (Robe 2002, Aguair and Gopinath, 2007). 
We choose the standard deviation of food productivity shock, af =0.03 and the 
standard deviation of non-food productivity shock, as =0.02.29 Table 1.5 shows a full 
set of baseline parameter values for the calibrations. 
 
                                                 
27 With the subsistence level of food consumption, this parameter choice implies a price elasticity of 
demand for food of about -0.3 in the steady state, which is close to the USDA estimate.  
28 Naik and Moore (1996) find that about 50 percent of current consumption is due to habit formation in 
food consumption.  
29 For advanced countries like the U.S., the values typically used in the literature are in the range of 
0.005 to 0.009.  
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Table 1.5: Parameter Calibration – Baseline Model 
 
Parameters Definitions Values 
  Risk aversion 2 
  Subjective discount factor 0.9902 
  Inverse of Frisch elasticity 3 
  Probability of firm not changing price 0.66 
  Elasticity of substitution between food 
and non-food 0.60 
  Weight on food in the price index 0.3050 
  Household with credit constraint 1 
  Elasticity of substitution between different non-food goods 10 
Y  Weight on output gap in Taylor rule 0.5 
  Weight on inflation gap in Taylor rule 2 
i  Weight on interest rate smoothing in Taylor rule 0.70 
af  Persistence of food productivity shock 0.25 
as  Persistence of non-food productivity shock 0.95 
af  Standard deviation of food productivity shock 0.03 
as  Standard deviation of non-food productivity shock 0.02 
1.4 Baseline Results 
We present the results in terms of the conditional welfare gains associated with 
each policy choice. Welfare gains are defined as additional lifetime consumption 
needed to make the level of welfare under strict core inflation targeting identical to 
that under the evaluated policy. Thus, a positive number indicates that welfare is 
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higher under the alternative policy than under strict core inflation targeting policy. The 
choice of strict core inflation targeting as a benchmark for comparison is motivated by 
the fact that in the literature it is considered the optimal policy choice for maximizing 
welfare.  We present the results for three alternative policy regimes – strict headline 
inflation targeting, flexible headline inflation targeting and flexible core inflation 
targeting as defined by equations (33)-(36). 
Table 1.6 shows the welfare gains from targeting different price indices under 
complete and incomplete market settings. Under complete markets, the choice of 
targeting strict core inflation is the best policy.  
Table 1.6: Welfare Gains of Various Inflation Targeting Rules 
 
Complete Markets Incomplete Markets  
Strict 
Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible 
Headline 
Targeting
Flexible 
Core 
Targeting
Strict 
Headline 
Targeting
Flexible 
Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible 
Core 
Targeting
Welfare gain 
(in % of strict 
core inflation 
targeting 
consumption) 
-0.07 -0.22 -0.19 3.21 4.18 1.58 
Welfare gain here represents the welfare gain associated with each policy choice. 
Welfare gains ( *100) are defined as the percent increase in the strict core inflation 
targeting consumption process necessary to make the level of welfare under strict core 
inflation targeting policy identical to that under the evaluated policy. Thus, a positive 
number indicates that welfare is higher under alternative policy than under the strict 
core inflation targeting policy. Targeting policy rules are defined in equations (33) - 
(36).  
 
Figure 1.6 plots the impulse responses of various macroeconomic variables to a 
one percent negative food productivity shock under complete markets. Each variable’s 
response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state level. Impulse 
responses under strict core inflation targeting rule are shown in red. The dashed lines 
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(in blue) are impulse responses under the strict headline inflation targeting rule.30  
 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Impulse Responses to a 1% Negative Food Productivity Shock 
(Complete Markets, with subsistence level food consumption) 
Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state 
level. Strict core inflation targeting means that central bank follows the policy regime 
given by equation (33). Strict headline inflation targeting means that central bank 
follows the policy regime given by equation (34). 
 
As evident, strict headline inflation targeting regime results in a higher volatility of 
consumption and output. Also, the policy response is more aggressive under strict 
headline inflation targeting which leads to a further decline in output. These results are 
similar to the ones documented in the existing literature on inflation targeting.  
                                                 
30 We only plot the impulse responses under strict core inflation targeting and strict headline inflation 
targeting rules as the welfare losses are much higher under other two policy regimes (Table 6). 
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Following an increase in inflation, the central bank raises interest rates, reducing 
aggregate demand (as consumers postpone their consumption following an increase in 
interest rates) and, thus, inflation. So, under complete markets, inflation and output 
move in the same direction and therefore stabilizing inflation is equivalent to 
stabilizing output (Aoki, 2001). It also implies that there are no additional welfare 
gains by adopting flexible inflation targeting. Thus, under complete markets, strict 
core inflation targeting is the welfare maximizing policy choice for the central bank.  
However, in the presence of credit constrained consumers, flexible headline 
inflation targeting appears to be a better policy choice. Figure 1.7 plots the impulse 
responses of various macroeconomic variables to a one percent negative food 
productivity shock.31 As evident, aggregate demand responds differently to monetary 
tightening under the two policy regimes. The central bank is able to reduce aggregate 
demand by increasing interest rates only when it targets headline inflation. Aggregate 
demand, instead of going down, goes up if central bank follows strict core inflation 
targeting. Thus, headline inflation targeting outperforms strict core inflation targeting. 
Since in the presence of financial frictions inflation and output may move in opposite 
directions in response to interest rate changes, stabilizing output results in welfare 
gains. Thus, flexible headline inflation targeting is the optimal policy choice when 
markets are not complete. 
 
                                                 
31 We only plot the impulse responses under strict core inflation targeting and flexible headline inflation 
targeting rules as the welfare losses are much higher under the other two policy rules (Table 2.6). 
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Figure 1.7: Impulse Responses to a 1% Negative Food Productivity Shock 
(Incomplete Markets, with subsistence level food consumption) 
Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state 
level. Strict core inflation targeting means that central bank follows the policy regime 
given by equation (33). Flexible headline inflation targeting means that central bank 
follows the policy regime given by equation (36). 
 
In order to examine the mechanics behind this result, we look at the properties of 
aggregate demand under incomplete markets. In the presence of financial frictions, the 
consumption choices of different households vary (as opposed to complete markets, 
where the consumption choice of all households is identical). While consumption 
demand of unconstrained households is responsive to interest rates (as they optimize 
inter-temporally), consumption demand of credit-constrained households is 
independent of interest rate changes (their horizon is static and they consume their 
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entire income each period) and depends only on their current period wage income. 
Since only a fraction of aggregate demand is influenced by interest rate changes, a 
monetary tightening does not automatically result in the decline of aggregate demand. 
The response of aggregate demand crucially depends on the behavior of credit-
constrained households. 
Figure 1.7 shows that, following a negative shock to food productivity, the central 
bank raises the interest rate which lowers the demand of unconstrained households (as 
it is optimal for them to postpone consumption). However, it has no bearing on the 
demand of credit-constrained consumers. An increase in the relative price of food 
following a negative food productivity shock increases the wage income and, 
therefore, consumption demand of credit-constrained households. Thus, the demand of 
the two types of households moves in the opposite direction following a negative 
shock to food productivity. Which of the two demands dominate is determined by the 
policy regime. Since core inflation targeting ignores the increase in food price 
inflation, the increase in food prices (and, therefore, the wage income of the food 
sector households) is higher than under headline inflation targeting. This higher wage 
income translates into higher consumption demand by credit-constrained consumers 
(as they consume all of their current wage income), which more than compensates for 
the lower consumption demand of unconstrained consumers. Consequently, aggregate 
demand rises. By contrast, when the central bank targets headline inflation, price 
increases in the food sector are much lower and the rise in income and, therefore, the 
increase in consumption demand in that sector is not enough to compensate for the 
decline in the demand of unconstrained consumers. Thus, monetary intervention is 
effective in achieving its objective of reducing aggregate demand only when central 
bank targets flexible headline inflation.   
To formalize the above arguments, we examine the log-linearized aggregate demand 
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equation, which is given by32 
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and tftf
f
t axw ,,          (46) 
Equations (45) and (46) suggest that, in the presence of credit-constrained consumers, 
a link is established between aggregate demand and the relative price of food. Thus, in 
the presence of financial frictions, relative prices affect aggregate demand in addition 
to the aggregate supply.33 Thus, in the presence of financial frictions, managing 
aggregate demand requires the central bank to choose a policy regime which would 
contain the rise in wages of credit-constrained consumers (and, therefore, the increase 
in their demand).  
1.4.1 Welfare distribution 
The focus of our paper is on average welfare but the incomplete market setting 
                                                 
32 Aggregate demand is the sum of the log-linearized consumption demand of food and non-food 
households.  
33 Under complete markets, relative prices only affect aggregate supply (Aoki, 2001). 
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allows us to look at the welfare distribution in the economy. We find that in our model 
flexible headline inflation targeting is better for both the credit-constrained households 
and unconstrained households. However, we find that the welfare gains are higher for 
unconstrained consumers when central bank targets flexible headline inflation. Since 
there is no tradeoff involved in terms of welfare, the central bank is not likely to face 
any political pressures in implementing this policy. 
1.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
Our main result is that in the presence of financial frictions flexible headline 
inflation targeting is the welfare-maximizing policy choice. In this section, we 
evaluate the robustness of this result to changes in some of the key parameters – the 
elasticity of substitution between food and non-food goods ( ), inverse of Frisch 
elasticity ( ), price stickiness ( ), mark-up in the sticky price sector ( ), and the 
proportion of credit-constrained households in the economy ( ). We do additional 
sensitivity analysis with respect to the persistence and volatility of the food 
productivity shock and Taylor rule coefficients. When interpreting the results it is 
worth noting that since the steady state values of the models differ, it is only possible 
to make a comparison across regimes and not across different models.  
Our key results are driven by the behavior of credit-constrained consumers. Since 
the wage income of constrained consumers depends crucially on the price elasticity of 
the demand for food, we first conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to parameters 
influencing the price elasticity of demand. The presence of a subsistence level for food 
expenditures affects the marginal utility of food and non-food consumption. It also 
lowers the elasticity of substitution between food and non-food. The demand for food 
is given by equation (22), which is the sum of an iso-elastic term ttf Cx
 )( ,  and a 
price inelastic term *)1( C . Thus, the price elasticity of demand is a weighted sum 
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of these two terms (the weights are   and zero, respectively). Thus, the presence of 
subsistence food consumption lowers the price elasticity of the demand for food. Table 
1.7 shows welfare gains from different policy rules in the absence of a subsistence 
level of food consumption. Clearly, our main result does not depend on the presence 
of subsistence level of food consumption.  
 
Table 1.7: Welfare Gains Associated with Different Inflation Targeting Rules 
without Subsistence Level Food  
 
Welfare gain( in % of strict core inflation targeting consumption) 
 Complete Markets Incomplete Markets 
Elasticity 
of 
Substitution 
Strict 
Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible 
Headline 
Targeting
Flexible 
Core 
Targeting
Strict 
Headline 
Targeting
Flexible 
Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible 
Core 
Targeting
0.4 -0.10 -0.16 -0.12 1.15 1.42 0.77 
0.5 -0.10 -0.16 -0.13 0.12 0.24 0.16 
0.6a -0.09 -0.16 -0.14 -0.03 0.02 0.02 
See notes to table 1.6. 
a. This is the baseline value of this parameter. 
 
Next we examine the sensitivity of the results to the elasticity of substitution 
between food and non-food,   (Table 1.8). Under complete markets, core inflation 
targeting is the most appropriate policy choice for any value of the elasticity of 
substitution. However, under incomplete markets, flexible headline inflation targeting 
continues to dominate other policies for values of the elasticity as high as   = 0.8. For 
higher values of this elasticity, strict core inflation targeting seems to do marginally 
better than strict headline inflation targeting. The difference between strict core 
inflation targeting and strict headline inflation targeting is almost negligible for higher 
values of this elasticity.  
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Table 1.8: Welfare Gains of Various Inflation Targeting Rules for Different 
Values of Elasticity of Substitution ( ) 
 
Welfare gain( in % of strict core inflation targeting consumption) 
 
Complete Markets Incomplete Markets 
Elasticity of 
Substitution 
Strict 
Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible 
Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible 
Core 
Targeting 
Strict 
Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible 
Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible 
Core 
Targeting 
0.6a  -0.07 -0.22 -0.19 3.21 4.18 2.10 
0.7 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.22 -0.20 0.19 0.54 0.23 
0.8 -0.06 -0.22 -0.20 -0.02 0.09 0.02 
0.9 -0.05 -0.22 -0.20 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 
1.5 -0.03 -0.22 -0.22 -0.01 -0.11 -0.11 
2.0 -0.02 -0.22 -0.22 0.00 -0.12 -0.12 
See notes to table 1.6. 
a. This is the baseline value of this parameter. 
 
The price elasticity of food demand is an important parameter determining the 
income of credit-constrained households. For low values of the elasticity of 
substitution, following a negative shock to productivity of food  the demand for food 
does not go down substantially and leads to a large increase in the wage income of 
food-producing (credit-constrained) households. Increased demand of credit-
constrained consumers is enough to counteract the decline in the demand of 
unconstrained households. However, when the elasticity of substitution is high, 
demand for food goes down substantially and the increase in the income and demand 
of credit-constrained households is no longer sufficient to compensate for the decline 
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in the demand of unconstrained households. In fact, for sufficiently high values of the 
elasticity of substitution, the wage income of credit-constrained households may even 
go down.  
Again, even though we cannot strictly compare the impulse responses, it is 
instructive to plot them for different values of the elasticity of substitution to 
understand how varying the elasticity of substitution affects various macroeconomic 
variables. Figure 1.8 shows the impulse responses of various macroeconomic variables 
to a 1 percent negative food productivity shock under flexible headline inflation 
targeting for a high value of the elasticity of substitution (  = 2 ) and also a low value 
(  = 0.6).  For low values of the elasticity of substitution, a positive deviation (from 
the respective steady state) in the food price and wage of credit-constrained 
households is large. When the elasticity of substitution is high, the wage of credit-
constrained consumers in fact declines relative to the steady state value (as the 
increase in the price of food is significantly lower).  
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Figure 1.8: Impulse Responses to a 1% Negative Food Productivity Shock under 
Flexible Headline Inflation Targeting Rule (Incomplete Markets with different 
elasticity of substitution of food). 
Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state 
level. These impulse responses are generated with central bank following the flexible 
headline inflation targeting given by equation (36).  
 
In Table 1.9 – 1.12, we present the results of sensitivity analysis with respect to the 
inverse of the Frisch elasticity ( ), price stickiness ( ), fraction of credit-constrained 
households ( ) and the mark-up in the sticky price sector ( ). We have selected the 
most common values of these parameters used in the literature to carry out the 
sensitivity experiments. As evident, our results are robust to the selection of parameter 
values around their baseline values.  
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Table 1.9: Welfare Gains for Different Parameter Values of Inverse of Frisch 
Elasticity, ( ) 
 
Inverse of Frisch 
Elasticity 
Strict Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible Core 
Targeting 
2 0.00 0.38 0.38 
3a 3.21 4.18 1.58 
4 1.32 2.12 1.01 
See notes to table 1.6. Parameter value of 2 implies labor elasticity of 0.5 while 
parameter value of 4 implies labor elasticity of 0.25. 
a. This is the baseline value of this parameter. 
 
Table 1.10: Welfare Gains for Different Parameter Values of Price Rigidity, ( ) 
 
Probability of 
firms not 
changing prices 
Strict Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible Core 
Targeting 
0.50 2.30 2.90 1.24 
0.66a 3.21 4.18 1.58 
0.75 3.64 5.24 2.89 
See notes to table 1.6.Parameter value of 0.5 implies that the mean duration prices 
remain fixed is 2 quarters while value of 0.75 implies the mean duration prices remain 
fixed is 4 quarters. 
a. This is the baseline value of this parameter. 
 
Table 1.11: Welfare Gains for Different Parameter Values of Credit Constraint 
Consumers, ( ) 
 
Credit 
constrained 
consumers 
Strict Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible Core 
Targeting 
1.00a 3.21 4.18 1.58 
2.00 0.05 0.89 0.73 
3.00 -0.03 0.75 0.73 
See notes to table 1.6. Parameter value of 2 implies that 66% of households are in 
flexible price sector and   credit constrained. Value of 3 implies that 75% of 
households are in flexible price sector are credit constrained. 
a. This is the baseline value of this parameter. 
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Table 1.12: Welfare Gains for Different Parameter Values of Elasticity of 
Substitution Between different Non-Food Goods, ( ) 
 
Elasticity of 
substitution 
between food and 
non- food goods 
Strict Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible Core 
Targeting 
5 2.65 3.27 1.55 
10a 3.21 4.18 1.58 
15 3.36 4.85 2.54 
See notes to table 1.6. , also determines the mark up in the sticky price sector. Value         
of 5 implies a mark up of 25% and value of 15 implies a mark up of 7%. 
a. This is the baseline value of this parameter. 
 
Following Gali et al. (2004), we conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to the 
coefficients of the Taylor rule (Table 1.13 – 1.15). Flexible headline inflation targeting 
performs better than other regimes irrespective of the choice of Taylor rule 
coefficients. We also compute the Taylor rule parameters associated with optimal 
strict core inflation targeting under the baseline case and compare the welfare gains 
associated with adopting flexible headline inflation targeting.34We find that the 
welfare gains are still positive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 For computing optimal parameters, we restrict our search to [0, 3] for  and [0, 1] for i . We find 
that the best rule requires  = 3 and i = 0.95. The value of  is the largest value that we allow for in 
our search. If we left this parameter unconstrained, then optimal policy would call for an arbitrarily 
large coefficient on inflation. The reason is that in that case, under the optimal policy, inflation would in 
effect be forever constant so that the economy would be characterized by zero inflation volatility 
(Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007). 
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Table 1.13: Welfare Gains of Changing Coefficient on Inflation Gap in Taylor 
rule, (  ) 
 
Weight on 
inflation gap 
Strict Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible Core 
Targeting 
0.50 -2.74 5.32 3.76 
1.00 2.40 4.94 2.95 
1.50 3.12 4.53 2.45 
2.00a 3.21 4.18 1.58 
2.50 3.15 3.87 1.84 
3.00 3.04 3.62 1.65 
See notes to table 1.6. Other Taylor rule parameters have been kept at their baseline      
value ( i =0.7,  =2) 
a. This is the baseline value of this parameter. 
 
Table 1.14: Welfare Gains of Changing Coefficient on Output Gap in Taylor 
rule, ( Y ) 
 
Weight on output 
gap 
Strict Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible Core 
Targeting 
0.00 3.21   
0.50a  4.18 1.58 
1.00  4.25 2.72 
1.50  2.26 3.03 
2.00  4.25 3.23 
2.50  4.25 3.36 
See notes to table 1.6. Other Taylor rule parameters have been kept at their baseline      
value ( i =0.7,  =2).  
a. This is the baseline value of this parameter. 
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Table 1.15: Welfare Gains of Changing Interest Smoothing Parameter in Taylor 
rule, ( i ) 
 
Weight interest 
rate smoothing 
Strict Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible Headline 
Targeting 
Flexible Core 
Targeting 
0.00 -5.58 3.79 2.73 
0.10 -3.11 4.01 2.71 
0.20 -1.20 4.16 2.66 
0.30 0.26 4.25 2.59 
0. 40 1.36 4.28 2.48 
0.50 2.18 4.27 2.36 
0.60 2.78 4.23 2.23 
0.70a 3.21 4.18 2.10 
0.80 3.52 4.11 1.97 
0.90 3.73 4.05 1.86 
See notes to table 1.6. Other Taylor rule parameters have been kept at their baseline 
value (  =2, Y =0.5). 
a. This is the baseline value of this parameter. 
 
Shocks to productivity in the food sector are regarded as transitory and highly 
volatile. So we do additional sensitivity analysis for various combinations of the 
degrees of persistence and volatility of these shocks. From the results shown in Table 
1.16, it is evident that our results are robust to various combinations and also that 
welfare gains from adopting flexible headline targeting is even higher if shocks are 
less persistent and highly volatile. Of course, in the case of an advanced economy like 
the U.S. where the volatility of these shocks is an order of magnitude smaller than in 
typical emerging markets, the potential welfare gains are considerably smaller.  
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Table 1.16: Welfare Gains of Flexible Headline Inflation Targeting for Different 
Combinations of Persistence and Volatility of Food Productivity Shock 
 
Volatility of Shocks 
 
0.02 0.03 0.04 
0.10 2.27 4.62 7.99 
0.25 2.08 4.18 7.18 
0.50 1.81 3.55 6.04 
Pe
rs
is
te
nc
e 
0.95 0.77 1.19 1.75 
See notes to table 1.6. Persistence of food productivity is the co-efficient of AR(1) 
process in equation (32). Volatility of food productivity shock is the standard error of 
random shock to the productivity. Persistence and volatility of non-food shock is held 
constant at 0.95 and 0.02 respectively in the above welfare cost calculations 
1.5.1 Extensions of the Model 
We consider two extensions of our baseline model.35 The first extension looks at 
an alternative characterization of complete markets.36 Most existing models with 
complete markets assume that agents can insure against income risks ex ante. This 
assumption implies that, given the same initial wealth, consumers will choose 
identical consumption stream. A more realistic way of characterizing complete 
markets is to assume that consumers can insure against income risks but only ex post. 
This means that they can only insure against fluctuations in their income. Under this 
alternate market structure, each type of household chooses consumption streams to 
maximize its lifetime utility subject to its idiosyncratic budget constraint. Under this 
scenario, we present in Table 1.17 the welfare gains under flexible headline inflation 
targeting. It appears that for our baseline model, flexible headline inflation targeting 
does better than strict core inflation targeting. However for higher values of elasticity 
                                                 
35 See Appendix III for details. 
36 One could regard this as a complete market setting, conditional on worker assignment to sectors, 
which is determined ex-ante. In Aoki (2001), complete markets are characterized by worker assignment 
to sectors ex-post. 
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of substitution, strict core inflation targeting is an optimal policy choice.  
Table 1.17: Welfare Gains under Alternate Complete Market Structure 
 
Elasticity of Substitution Flexible Headline Inflation Targeting 
0.6a 0.24 
0.7 0.05 
0.8 -0.02 
See notes to table 1.6. 
a. This is the baseline value of this parameter 
 
A second extension of our baseline model looks at a more general case where 
agents in both sectors can be credit constrained. We assume that a fraction 01   and 
02   of households in the flexible price sector and sticky price sector, respectively, 
can insure against income risks ex post.37 We look at combinations of 1 and 2 such 
that 50 percent of the households in the economy are credit constrained.38 Table 1.18 
presents the welfare gains of pursuing flexible headline inflation targeting for some 
possible combinations of 1 and 2 . It is clear that even under this general setting 
targeting flexible headline inflation outperforms a strict core inflation targeting rule. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 This implies that )(1 21   fraction of households are credit constrained. 
38 This is consistent with the empirical evidence that only about 42 percent of households in emerging 
markets have access to formal finance (Table 3). 
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Table 1.18: Welfare Gains under General Model 
 
Fraction of households in 
sticky price sector with 
access to formal finance 
Fraction of households in 
flexible price sector with 
access to formal finance 
Welfare gains of flexible 
headline inflation 
targeting 
0.10 0.90 0.38 
0.20 0.80 0.22 
0.30 0.70 0.21 
0.40 0.60 0.22 
0.50 0.50 0.24 
0.60 0.40 0.26 
0.70 0.30 0.28 
0.80 0.20 0.29 
0.90 0.10 0.30 
See notes to table 1.6.We have chosen the combination 1 and 2 such that overall               
50% of households in the economy are credit constrained. 
1.6 Concluding Remarks 
Inflation targeting, which had become widely popular in both advanced and 
emerging market economies over the last two decades, has come under attack after the 
global financial crisis as it is believed to leave no room for central bankers to pay 
attention to asset price bubbles. Whatever the outcome of that broader debate, the 
reality is that the primary objective of most central banks, whether or not they 
explicitly target inflation, is still to keep inflation low and stable. To achieve this 
objective, the choice of the appropriate price index to measure inflation remains a key 
operational issue. Previous research has indicated that central banks should only focus 
on stabilizing core inflation. However, these results rely heavily on the assumption 
that markets are complete and that price stickiness is the only source of distortion in 
the economy.  
In this paper, we have developed a more realistic model with the following key 
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features –incomplete markets, characterized by the presence of credit-constrained 
consumers; households requiring a minimum subsistence level of food to survive; low 
price elasticity of demand for food items and a high share of expenditure on food in 
households’ total expenditure. These features, particularly the last one, are especially 
relevant for emerging market economies.  
We show that, in the presence of credit-constrained consumers, targeting core 
inflation is no longer welfare maximizing. Also, stabilizing inflation is not sufficient 
to stabilize output when markets are not complete. Under these conditions, flexible 
headline inflation targeting—which involves targeting headline inflation and putting 
some weight on the output gap--is the optimal monetary policy rule.  
Our results differ from those of traditional models due to the presence of financial 
frictions in the economy. Lack of access to finance makes the demand of credit-
constrained households insensitive to interest rate fluctuations. Their demand is 
determined by real wages, which depend on prices in the flexible price sector. Thus, if 
the central bank ignores the fluctuations in the flexible price sector, aggregate demand 
may in fact move in the opposite direction to what is intended by the monetary policy 
intervention. To have the desired effect on aggregate demand, the central bank has to 
target a price index that would dampen the response of credit-constrained consumers. 
In our setting, this means that the central bank should target headline inflation.  
 Our results have special significance for central banks in emerging markets, where 
food consumption remains a major component of household consumption 
expenditures and the share of the population that is credit-constrained is large. While 
our model is a simple one, it amply highlights the significance of financial frictions for 
the choice of optimal price index and the optimal monetary policy rule. The widely-
accepted result of focusing on core CPI in order to stabilize inflation and output needs 
a careful re-examination in the presence of financial frictions. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix I 
This appendix gives the system of equations (in terms of stationary variables) 
characterizing the competitive equilibrium under the incomplete market settings. 
Demand equation for flexible price sector household  
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Relation between headline and sticky price index 
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Appendix II 
Derivation of welfare gains associated with different policy regimes- 
Welfare gain is given by 
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Appendix III 
Alternate Complete Market Structure 
Most of the traditional models with complete markets assume that agents can insure 
against income risks ex ante. This assumption implies that given the same initial 
wealth, consumers will choose identical consumption stream. A more realistic 
alternate way of characterising complete markets is to assume that consumers can only 
insure against income risks ex post. This means that they can only insure against the 
fluctuations in their income. Under this alternate market structure, each type of 
household chooses consumption streams to maximize their lifetime utility subject to 
their idiosyncratic budget constraint.  
Flexible Price Sector Household 
A representative household in flexible price sector maximizes the lifetime utility given 
by equation (1) subject to the following budget constraint39  
  *,12 1)1(2 CPBiNWBBBCP tfftftftfftftftt t      (46) 
where ftB represent the quantity of one period nominal riskless discount bond bought 
in period t  and maturing in period t+1.  
Maximization with respect to ftC yields the Euler equation 
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Sticky Price Sector Household 
Whereas a representative household in sticky price sector maximizes the lifetime 
                                                 
39 In order to solve the model by linearizing it around the steady state with available techniques we 
assume that households face a small quadratic adjustment cost,  2
2
ff
t BB  , where   is a 
parameter and fB  is the steady state value of the bond holding. 
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utility given by equation (1) subject to the following budget constraint40 
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where stB represent the quantity of one period nominal riskless discount bond bought in 
period t  and maturing in period t+1.  
Maximization with respect to stC yields the Euler equation 
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Bond markets clear: 0 stft BB       (50) 
Equations (2), (4)-(11) of Appendix I and (46)-(50) expressed in terms of stationary 
variables define the system of equations that combined with the monetary policy rule 
and exogenous stochastic processes for tfA ,  and tsA ,  determine the equilibrium path of 
the economy under this setting. 
General Case 
We consider a more general case where households in each sector can be credit 
constraint. Let 01   and 02   be the fraction of households who have access to 
financial markets in the flexible price sector and in the sticky price sector respectively. 
So in this general setting there are four different kinds of agents in the economy based 
on the sector of economy and access to financial markets. Here again we assume that 
households with an access to financial markets can only insure against the income 
risks ex post. 
 
 
                                                 
40 In order to solve the model by linearizing it around the steady state with available techniques we 
assume that households face a small quadratic adjustment costs,  2
2
ss
t BB  , where   is a 
parameter and sB  is the steady state value of the bond holding. 
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Flexible Price Sector Household 
Unconstrained Household 
A representative who has access to financial markets in the flexible price sector 
maximizes the lifetime utility given by equation (1) subject to the following budget 
constraint41 
  *,1121 1)1(2 CPBiNWBBBCP tfftftftfftftftt t      (51) 
Maximization with respect to ftC1 yields the Euler equation 
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Labor supply decision of the household is given by 
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Constrained Households   
A representative credit constrained consumer in the flexible price sector maximizes 
the lifetime utility given by equation (1) subject to the following budget constraint 
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Labor supply decision of the household is given by 
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Sticky Price Sector Household 
Unconstrained Household 
A representative who has access to financial markets in the sticky price sector 
maximizes the lifetime utility given by equation (1) subject to the following budget 
                                                 
41 In order to solve the model by linearizing it around the steady state with available techniques we 
assume that households face a small quadratic adjustment cost,  2
2
ff
t BB  , where   is a 
parameter and fB  is the steady state value of the bond holding. 
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constraint42 
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Maximization with respect to stC1 yields the Euler equation 
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Labor supply decision of the household to a firm indexed by z is given by 
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Constrained Household 
A representative credit constrained household in the sticky price sector maximizes the 
lifetime utility given by equation (1) subject to the following budget constraint 
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Labor supply decision of the household to a firm indexed by z is given by 
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Firms  
Flexible Price Sector 
Firms in the flexible price sector are price taking and therefore price of flexible price 
good is given by equation (16). Combining with the labor supply decision of 
households given by equations (53) and (55) and recognizing that 
f
ttftf
f
ttftf NAYNAY 2,,21,,1  and   the supply function of firms in flexible price sector 
are given by 
                                                 
42 In order to solve the model by linearizing it around the steady state with available techniques we 
assume that households face a small quadratic adjustment costs,  2
2
ss
t BB  , where   is a 
parameter and sB  is the steady state value of the bond holding. 
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Sticky Price Sector 
Since firms are symmetric, in equilibrium they will all choose the same price.43 
Marginal cost of firms held by unconstrained and constrained households is therefore 
given by  
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Where we have used the fact that )()( and (z))( 2,21,1 zNAzYNAzY
s
ttst
s
ttst   
Aggregation 
Demand for flexible price and sticky price good by households is given by expressions 
similar to equation (9), (10), (17) and (18) with ftC  and 
s
tC  replaced by 
f
itC  and 
s
itC  
where i =1, 2. 
Total demand for flexible price good is given by 
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And the total demand for sticky price good is given by 
                                                 
43 Those who can change prices will choose the same price while others will continue with the prices 
fixed earlier.  
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Markets Clear 
Market for flexible price good clears 
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Bond market clears 
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Equations (4), (5), (9), (10) of Appendix I and (51), (52), (54), (56), (57), (59), (61)-
(64), (68) and (70) expressed in terms of stationary variables define the system of 
equations that combined with the monetary policy rule and exogenous stochastic 
processes for tfA ,  and tsA ,  determine the equilibrium path of the economy under this 
general setting. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
AN ESTIMATED MODEL WITH 
MACROFINANCIAL LINKAGES FOR INDIA* 
2.1 Introduction 
Among macroeconomic practitioners there is growing recognition of the linkages 
between the financial sector and the real economy and, in particular, the role that 
balance sheets play in the transmissions of shocks to the economy. These linkages 
were highlighted during the September 2008 global financial crisis and the resulting 
slowdown on the global economy. In particular, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) showed 
in a seminal paper that the presence of asymmetric information in credit markets and 
monitoring costs would make the external finance premium faced by borrowers 
dependent on the strength of their balance sheets (their net worth). Moreover, because 
of the procyclical nature of net worth, this premium would tend to fall during booms 
and rise during recessions. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999, BGG hereafter), 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and others have since 
demonstrated that these financial frictions may significantly amplify both real and 
nominal shocks to the economy. In the literature, this link between the cost of 
borrowing and net worth has become known as the "financial accelerator". 
In addition, Krugman (1999), Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001) and others 
have argued that exchange rate and interest rate fluctuations - through their effect on 
balance sheets - are likely to have more serious consequences in emerging market 
economies that in industrialized countries.  
 
* Anand, Rahul, Peiris, J., Shanaka, and Magnus Saxegaard, 2010, “An Estimated Model with 
Macrofinancial Linkages for India,” IMF Working Paper No. 10/21. International Monetary 
Fund. 
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A contributing factor to this is - as noted by Elekdag, Justiniano, and Tchakarov 
(2005) - that borrowers in emerging market economies tend to rely more on foreign 
currency borrowing. In this setting, a depreciation could trigger a deterioration in the 
balance sheets of borrowers with a negative net open foreign exchange position, 
eroding their net worth and increasing the cost of borrowing. By reducing the demand 
for capital, this erodes the value of borrowers' existing capital stock and their net 
worth, putting further upward pressure on borrowing costs. Papers exploring the 
importance of the financial accelerator for emerging market economies dependent on 
foreign currency borrowing include Elekdag, Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2005) and 
Batini, Levine and Pearlman (2009). 
In this paper, we develop and estimate a small open-economy Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model that incorporates the financial accelerator 
mechanism proposed by BGG in a setting where firms are able to borrow in both 
domestic and foreign currency. The model is estimated on post-1996 Indian data using 
Bayesian estimation techniques. This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt at 
estimating a DSGE model for India. 
India provides an interesting backdrop for our analysis. India's monetary policy 
framework has evolved considerably over the past decades (RBI, 2009). In particular, 
the opening up of the economy in the early 1990s and financial sector liberalization 
has been reflected in changes in the nature of monetary management (Mohan, 2004). 
The basic objectives of monetary policy - maintaining price stability and ensuring 
sufficient credit to support growth - have remained unchanged. However, the opening 
up of the capital account - while necessary for providing sufficient capital for 
investment purposes and for reducing the cost of borrowing - exposes the economy to 
sudden stops in capital flows. In particular, volatile capital flows and its impact on the 
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exchange rate have implications not only for domestic demand and inflation, but for 
financial stability, with the result that maintenance of financial stability is of 
increasing concern to the Reserve Bank of India (Mohan, 2004). In order to meet these 
multiple challenges, the RBI has switched from a more traditional monetary targeting 
framework to a indicator based approach which seeks to strike a balance between price 
stability and reducing exchange rate volatility. However, as noted in the Rajan report 
on financial sector reform (Rajan, 2008), further refinements to the monetary policy 
framework may be necessary to cope with the rise in capital inflows. 
Over the last 5 years capital inflows have more than quadrupled, amounting to 
nearly 10 percent of GDP in 2007 and far exceeding the current account deficit. There 
has also been significant volatility as highlighted by the sharp outflows during the last 
quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 and the subsequent dramatic recovery. These 
sharp swings in capital flows makes it difficult for the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to 
strike a balance between its different objectives, resulting in spurts of exchange rate 
volatility when a particular level of the exchange rate becomes too difficult to sustain, 
either because of inflationary pressures or because sterilization operations become too 
costly or harder to manage (Rajan, 2008). 
The trade-offs policymakers face in the conduct of monetary policy will largely be 
determined by type of shocks hitting the economy and the strength of macro-financial 
linkages--in particular the role that capital flows and balance sheets play in the 
transmissions of shocks to the economy (WEO, 2009). Given the key role played by 
the corporate sector - fuelled to a large extent by bank credit and increasingly external 
commercial borrowing (ECB) denominated in foreign currency - in India's rapid 
economic growth in recent years (Oura, 2008), these macrofinancial linkages have 
likely grown in importance. In particular, the importance of bank credit as a source of 
financing increases the importance of corporates' net worth as a tool to mitigate 
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asymmetric information in credit markets while rising ECBs makes the balance sheet 
of corporates more sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations. 
At the same time, India is equipped with a large equity market whose development 
has to a large extent been fuelled by large inflows from foreign institutional investors 
(FIIs). IMF (forthcoming) shows that stock market capitalization - an commonly used 
indicator of corporates' net worth (see e.g. Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno, 2007) - is 
one of the key determinants of the flow of ECBs. As a result, equity market 
developments--including the amount of inflows from FIIs--are likely to have a direct 
bearing on the cost of financing for corporates in India, further increasing the 
importance of macrofinancial linkages in the economy. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the main 
components of the model. Section 3 briefly describes the data and the estimation 
methodology before we present the results of the estimation in Section 4. In section 5 
we employ the estimated model to analyze the optimality of monetary policy in India 
before a final section concludes. 
2.2 The Model 
 
The model is an expanded version of the small open-economy DSGE model 
outlined in Saxegaard (2006a). The augmented model features a financial accelerator 
mechanism similar to that proposed by BGG to study the effect of financial frictions 
on the real economy. The model incorporates financial frictions by assuming that 
firms have to borrow at a premium over domestic and foreign interest rates to finance 
part of their capital acquisition cost as in Christensen and Dib (2006), and Gertler, 
Gilchrist, and, Natalucci (2007). Under this framework, information asymmetry 
between lenders and borrowers creates the financial friction by establishing a link 
between the cost of borrowing and the financial health of the firms. The external 
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finance premium, in turn, is inversely related to the net worth of the entrepreneurs. 
Figure 2.1 provides a visual representation of the estimated model. 
The basic structure of model consists of four kinds of agents – households, 
entrepreneurs, capital producers and retailers. Households consume a composite of 
domestic and imported goods and provide labor. They have access to foreign capital 
markets and make deposits which are used by the entrepreneurs to purchase capital. 
Entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods using labor and capital purchased from 
capital producers. They finance the acquisition of capital partly through their net worth 
and partly through borrowing domestically and from abroad. Entrepreneurs produce 
intermediate goods under perfect competition and sell their product to retailers who 
differentiate them at no cost and sell them either in domestic market or export 
overseas. Retailers operate in a monopolistically competitive environment and face a 
quadratic adjustment costs in changing prices á la Rotemberg (1982). Capital 
producers use a combination of existing capital stock and investment good purchased 
from retailers and abroad to produce capital. The market for capital, labor and 
domestic loans are competitive. The model is completed with a description of the 
fiscal and monetary authority. Our model differs from BGG in its characterization of 
monetary policy using a modified Taylor-type rule. We assume that the Reserve Bank 
of India adjusts short-term interest rates in response to inflation, output and nominal 
exchange rate changes. 
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Figure 2.1: Flow Chart of the Model 
 
In order to provide a rationale for monetary stabilization policy, three sources of 
inefficiencies are included in the model: (a) monopolistically competitive retail 
market; (b) sluggish price adjustment in retail sector and (c) capital adjustment costs. 
While relatively simple, the framework captures many of the rigidities which previous 
studies have found are important to describe the dynamics in data and serves as useful 
starting point for developing a DSGE model for India. 
2.2.1 Household 
The economy is populated with a continuum of infinitely lived households with 
preferences defined over consumption, )( jCt  and labor effort )( jLt . The objective of 
household is to maximize the expected value of a discounted sum of period utility 
function given by 
))(),((
0
0 jLjCUE tt
t
t

        (1) 
)1,0( is the discount factor and U is a period utility function. We include the habit 
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persistence according to the following specification 


 )())(ln()1())(),(( ,1, jLbCjCbjLjCU ttLtttctt      (2) 
where 1tC   is lagged aggregate consumption and )1,0(b . tC ,  and tL,  are 
preference shocks to the marginal utility of consumption and the supply of labor 
respectively. Note that in symmetric steady-state 1)(  tt CjC , the marginal utility of 
consumption is independent of the habit persistence parameter b. The aggregate 
consumption bundle )( jCt  consists of domestically produced goods, )(, jC tH  and an 
imported foreign good, )(, jC tF and is given by 
      11,11,1 )(1)()(  


 





  jCjCjC tFtHt     (3) 
where )(, jC tH is an index of consumption of domestic goods given by the constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function 
1
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

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

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
dssCjC tHtH        (4) 
where ]1,0[s denotes the variety of the domestic good. Parameter ],0[   is the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and 1t  is the 
elasticity of substitution between the verities produced within the country. ]1,0[  
can be interpreted as a measure of home bias. 
We assume that households have an access to foreign financial markets or nominal 
contingent claims that span all relevant household specific uncertainty about future 
income and prices, interest rates, exchange rates and so on. As a result each household 
face the same intertemporal budget constraint 
tjDPi
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11  (5) 
Where ftB is the net holding of foreign currency one period bond that matures in 
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period t, paying an interest rate of fti . Households make deposit tD with financial 
intermediary and earn an interest of ti . dss
r
t
)(
1
0
  represents nominal profit from the 
ownership of domestic retail firms. t  is the lump sum tax in the economy and tW  is 
the nominal wage rate. tP  is the CPI index given by 
         111,1, )1( tFtHt PPP       (6) 
where tHP , is the domestic price index given by 
t
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and  tFP , is the price of the imported goods.
44 
Households choose the paths of   01 )(),(),(),( tftttt jBjDjLjC to maximize 
expected lifetime utility given by equation (1) subject to the sequence of constraints 
given by equation (5) and the initial value of ftB .  
Ruling out Ponzi type schemes, we get the following first order conditions 
tt
tt
tC P
bCjC
b  

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,
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)1(
        (8) 
ttttL WjL   1, )(         (9) 
where t  is the lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. Given the 
well documented departures from uncovered interest parity (UIP), we follow Kollman 
(2002) and introduce an exogenous shock into the consumers first order condition for 
foreign currency bond holdings. The first order conditions are given by 
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44 We assume that the price of imported goods is set in the same manner as the domestic prices in the 
exporting country i.e. the price of imports adjust sluggishly and is given by an equation similar to 
equation (45). 
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where 
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 is the stochastic discount factor and t  is  
a shock to the UIP. Up to a log-linear approximation equations (11) and (12) imply 
  fttttt iieeE  /ln 1 .  The optimum allocation of expenditure between domestic and 
imported goods is given by 
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and the demand for each variety of domestic goods is given by 
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2.2.2 Production Sector 
2.2.2.1 Entrepreneurs 
We model the behavior of entrepreneurs as proposed by Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1999). We follow the modeling framework of Gertler, Gilchrist and 
Natalucci (2007) and Elekdag, Justiniano and Tchakarov (2005) while introducing 
financial accelerator in an open economy context. Entrepreneurs combine labor hired 
from households with capital purchased from the capital producers, to produce 
intermediate goods in a perfectly competitive setting. They are risk neutral and have a 
finite horizon for planning purposes. The probability that an entrepreneur will  
survive until the next period is t , so that the expected live horizon is
t1
1 .45  
The number of new entrepreneurs entering the market each period is equal to the 
number of entrepreneurs exiting, implying a stationary population. To get started, new 
                                                 
45 This assumption ensures that entrepreneur’s net worth (the firm equity) will never be enough to fully 
finance the new capital acquisition. 
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entrepreneurs receive a small transfer of funds from exiting entrepreneurs.  
At the end of each period t, entrepreneurs purchase capital 1tK  , to be used in the 
subsequent period at a price tq . They finance capital acquisition partly through their 
net worth available at the end of period t, 1tn , and partly through borrowing 
domestically and through raising foreign currency denominated debt.  Total borrowing 
tB is given by  
11   tttt nKqB         (27) 
where tq is the real price per unit of capital. Fraction of loan raised domestically 
d
tB is 
exogenous to the model and is given by . Thus,  
)( 11   tttdt nKqB   and ))(1( 11   tttat nKqB  where atB is the amount of loans 
raised abroad. Entrepreneurs use units of tK capital and tL  units of labor to produce 
output WtY  , using a constant returns to scale technology 
  1tttWt LKY ,  )1,0(      (28) 
where t  is a stochastic disturbance to total factor productivity. Entrepreneur 
maximizes profits by choosing tK  and tL  subject to the production function given by 
equation (28). First order conditions for this optimization problem are 
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where WtHP , is the price of the wholesale good and tKr ,  is the marginal productivity of 
capital.46 The expected marginal real return on capital acquired at t and used in t+1 
yields the expected gross return )1( 1
k
tt rE  , where 
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and  is the rate of depreciation of capital and 1, tKr  is the marginal productivity of 
                                                 
46 Since the firms are perfectly competitive, Wt
W
tH MCP , . 
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capital at t+1. 
Following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), we assume that there exists an 
agency problem which makes external finance more expensive than internal funds. 
While entrepreneurs costlessly observe their output, which is subject to random 
outcomes, lenders can not verify output outcomes costlessly. After observing the 
outcome, entrepreneurs decide whether to repay their debt or to default. If they 
default, lenders audit the loan and recover the outcome less the monitoring costs. This 
agency problem makes loans riskier and lenders charge a premium over the risk free 
rate. Thus, enterpreneurs’ marginal external financing cost is the product of the gross 
premium and the gross real opportunity cost of funds (the risk free interest rate) that 
would arise in the absence of capital market frictions. 
Therefore, the expected marginal cost of borrowing, 1tt fE  is given by 
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0'  and 1)1(   
where   is the gross finance premium which depends on the size of the borrower’s 
equity stake in the project (or, alternatively, the borrowers’ leverage ratio).  
t  is the shock to the cost of borrowing ,
1

t
t
t P
P ,  is the gross domestic inflation 
and *
*
*
1

t
t
P
P
t  , is the gross world inflation. tRER is the real exchange rate defined as 
t
tt
t P
PeRER
*
 .47 
We characterize the risk premium by  by 
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, where   represents the 
elasticity of external finance premium with respect to a change in the leverage position  
of entrepreneurs. As 
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n falls, entrepreneur relies on uncollateralized borrowing 
                                                 
47 We assume that law of one price holds for each of the differentiated goods. 
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(higher leverage) to a larger extent to fund his project. Since this increases the  
incentive to misreport the outcome of the project, the loan becomes riskier and the cost 
of borrowing rises. Entrepreneurs’ demand for capital depends on the expected 
marginal return and the expected cost of borrowing. Thus, demand for capital satisfies 
the following optimality condition 
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Above equation provides the foundation for the financial accelerator. It links 
entrepreneurs’ financial position to the marginal cost of funds and, hence to the 
demand for capital. Also, movements in the price of capital, tq , may have significant 
effects on the leverage ratio. In this way the model captures the link between asset 
price movements and collateral stressed in the theory of credit cycles (Kiyotaki and 
Moore, 1997).48 At the beginning of each period, entrepreneurs collect their returns on 
capital and honor their debt obligations. Aggregate entrepreneurial net worth evolves 
according to 
ttttt HVn )1(1           (34) 
where tV  is the net worth of the surviving entrepreneurs carried over from the 
previous period, t1  is the fraction of new entrepreneurs entering and tH (which is 
exogenous in the model) are the transfers from exiting to newly entering 
entrepreneurs. tV  is given by 
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48 Though the behavior described above is true for an individual entrepreneur, we appeal to the 
assumptions in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) that permit us to write it as an aggregate 
condition. See Bernanke et.al (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) for details. It implies that gross 
finance premium may be expressed as a function of aggregate leverage ratio, i.e. it is not entrepreneur 
specific. 
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As equations (34) and (35) suggest, the principal source of movements in net 
worth stems from unanticipated movements in returns and borrowing costs. In this 
regard, unforecastable variations in asset prices, tq , is the main source of fluctuations 
in )1( ktr . On the cost side, unexpected movements in inflation and exchange rates 
are the major sources of fluctuations in net worth. An unexpected deflation or 
depreciation, for example, reduces entrepreneurial net worth, thus enhancing the 
financial accelerator mechanism. Entrepreneurs going out of business at time t 
consume and transfer some funds to new entrepreneurs out of the residual 
equity tt V)1(  . Thus consumption by entrepreneurs are given by 
 tttet HVC  )1(          (36) 
2.2.2.2 Capital Producers 
Capital producers combine the existing capital stock, tK , leased from the 
entrepreneurs to transform an input tI , gross investment, into new capital 1tK using a 
linear technology.49 We assume that capital producers face a quadratic adjustment 
costs given by  
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where  is the capital adjustment cost parameter. The aggregate capital stock evolves 
according to 
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where tI , is a shock to the marginal efficiency of investment (Greenwood et al. 1988).  
Gross investment consists of domestic and foreign final good and we assume that it is 
in the same proportion as in the consumption basket 
                                                 
49 This set up follows Bernanke et al. (1999) and assumes that capital producers rent the capital stock 
from entrepreneurs and use it to produce new capital. Since this takes place within the period we 
assume that the rental rate is zero. 
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Optimal demand for domestic and imported investment is given by 
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Price of investment is the same as the domestic price index given by equation (6). 
Capital producing firms maximize expected profits 
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and the first order condition for the supply of capital is given by 
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2.2.2.3 Retailers 
There is a continuum of retailers ]1,0[s . They purchase wholesale goods at a 
price equal to the nominal marginal costs, WtMC (the marginal cost in the 
entrepreneurs’ sector) and differentiate them at no cost.50 They sell their product in a 
monopolistically competitive domestic and export market. Final domestic good, WtY , is 
a CES composite of individual retail goods 
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Corresponding price of the composite consumption good, tHP , , is given by equation 
                                                 
50 Entrepreneurs sell their goods in a perfectly competitive market so Wt
W
tH MCP , . Retail sector is 
defined only to introduce nominal rigidity into the economy. Since they differentiate goods costlessly, 
the marginal cost of producing final goods is same as WtMC . 
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(7). Demand facing each retailer can be written as 
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For simplicity we assume that the aggregate export demand function is given by  
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where tHtX ePP ,,   is the price of exports, *tP is the world price index and XtQ is total 
exports. t , is the price elasticity of exports. 
2.2.2.4 Price Setting by Retailers 
Following Ireland (2001) and Rotemberg (1982), there is sluggish price 
adjustment to make the intermediate goods pricing decision dynamic. This ensures 
that monetary policy has real effects on the economy. Following Julliard et al. (2004), 
we assume that retailers face an explicit cost of price adjustment measured in terms of 
intermediate goods and is given by 
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where dtQ is the total domestic demand, 0d is the parameter determining the cost of 
price adjustment relative to last period’s price level and   is the steady state inflation. 
Following Saxegaard (2006b), real profits are given by 
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where te is the nominal exchange rate, expressed as the domestic currency price of 
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foreign currency.51 Note also that we allow for a shock to the elasticity of substitution 
between differentiated goods t , which determines the size of the markup of 
intermediate good firms. Alternatively, the shock to t can be interpreted as a cost-
push shock of the kind introduced into the New Keynesian model by Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler (1999). 
The optimal price setting equation for domestic good (non-tradable good) can then 
be written as52 
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where 1,,,  tHtHtH PP , is the domestic price inflation. 
Where we have used the fact that all retailer firms are alike to impose symmetry 
and we assume that the law of one price holds in the export market so that 
ttHtX ePP ,,  . Above equation reduces to the well known result that prices are set as 
a markup over marginal costs if the cost of price adjustment, 0d . In general 
however, the goods price will follow a dynamic process and the firm’s actual markup 
will differ from, but gravitate towards the desired markup. Profits from retail activity 
are rebated lump-sum to households (i.e. households are the ultimate owners of retail 
outlets). 
2.2.3 The Government 
The fiscal authority is assumed to purchase an exogenous stream of the final good 
tG  which is financed by levying a lump-sum tax on households. For simplicity we 
                                                 
51 An increase in te  implies depreciation of the domestic currency. 
52 We assume that price of imported goods are set in the similar function. So the price setting equation 
for the price of imported good is given by a similar expression with 
. of placein   and  of placein  inflation, priceimport  , ,, dmtHtM   
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assume that the fiscal authority has no access to international capital markets. Its 
period by period budget constraint is given by 
ttG            (46) 
Government buys both domestic and foreign final goods and we assume that it is in 
the same proportion as the consumers 
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Optimal demand for governments’ domestic and imported consumption is given by 
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In choosing a specification for the monetary policy reaction function, we assume a 
simple Taylor rule type function given by: 
titqttYitit eeYYiii ,1 )log()log()log()1(      (50) 
where   , Y  are q   the weights on inflation, output gap and nominal exchange rate 
depreciation assigned by the policy makers.53 i  represents the Central Banker’s 
preference for interest rate smoothing. eiY  and ,,  are the steady state values of 
output, inflation, nominal interest rate and nominal exchange rate depreciation. ti,  is a 
monetary policy shock to capture unanticipated increase in the nominal interest rate. 
Equation (51) is essentially a simple Taylor rule with partial adjustment. We interpret 
this rule as being a form of flexible inflation targeting in the sense of Bernanke and 
                                                 
53 We include an interest rate smoothing parameter in our monetary policy rule as the benefits of such 
smoothing are well documented in the literature (see, e.g., Lowe and Ellis, 1997; Sack and Wieland, 
1999). Various authors have argued that moving interest rates in small steps increases its impact on the 
long-term interest rate; it also reduces the risks of policy mistakes and prevents large capital losses and 
systemic financial risks. Mohanty and Klau (2004) find that all emerging market central banks put 
substantial weight on interest rate smoothing. Clarida et al. (1998) find that central banks of advanced 
economies also put a large weight on interest rate smoothing. 
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Mishkin (1997). 
2.2.4 Market Clearing and Aggregation 
Domestic households, exiting entrepreneurs, capital producers, government and 
rest of the world buy final goods from retailers. The economy wide resource constraint 
is given by54 
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The national income accounting equation is given by 
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where MtQ is the total imports and tZZ  is the real GDP. Markets for loan and deposits 
clear –  
d
tt BD           (53) 
The model allows for non-zero holdings of foreign currency bonds by households 
and foreign currency denominated debt by entrepreneurs. In particular, it is well 
known (see inter alia Schimtt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003) that unless adjustments are 
made to the standard model, the steady state of an small open-economy model with 
foreign currency bonds will depend upon initial conditions and will display dynamics 
with random walk properties. In particular, if the domestic discount rate exceeds the 
real rate of return on foreign currency bonds, then domestic holdings of foreign 
currency bonds will increase perpetually. Beyond the obvious conceptual problems of 
such an outcome our analysis is constrained by the fact that the available techniques 
used to solve non-linear business cycle models of the type considered here are only 
valid locally around a stationary path. 
                                                 
54 Following Bernanke et al. (1999) we ignore monitoring costs in the general equilibrium. 
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Fortunately, a number of modifications to the standard model are available which 
enable us to overcome this issue. In this paper, we follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
(2003) and specify a foreign debt elastic risk-premium whereby holders of foreign 
debt are assumed to face an interest rate that is increasing in the country's net foreign 
debt. In particular, fti , the interest rate at which households and entrepreneurs can 
borrow foreign currency equals the exogenous world interest rate plus a spread that is 
a decreasing function of economy's net foreign asset position: 
          ***)1()1( PLBPLBii ftfttdtft   (54) 
where d is a parameter which captures the degree of capital mobility in the market 
for foreign-currency borrowing and lending by households and Ω is the steady-state 
value of exports. As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) we include the steady-state 
level of debt so that the risk-premium is nil in steady state. Note that under perfect 
capital mobility ( d =0), the country would face an infinite supply or demand of 
foreign capital and the model would not have a well-defined steady state. As 
Kollmann (2002) points out, the model in this case becomes a version of the 
permanent income theory of consumption, with non-stationary consumption and net 
assets. 
2.2.5 Specification of Stochastic Processes 
We include a number of shocks in order to ensure that the model is not 
stochastically singular and in order to be better able to reproduce the dynamics in the 
data. In particular, the number of exogenous shocks must be at least as large as the 
number of observed variables in order to estimate the model using classical Maximum 
Likelihood or Bayesian methods. Our model includes thirteen structural shocks: three 
shocks to technology and preferences ( t , tC , , tL, ), three foreign shocks to world 
interest rates, world inflation, and the price elasticity of exports ( t* , *ti t ),  two 
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shocks to investment efficiency and firms' markup ( tI , , t ), two financial shocks to 
the cost of borrowing by entrepreneurs and the survival rate of entrepreneurs ( t , t ), a 
monetary policy shock, a government spending shock ( ti, , tG ), and a UIP shock ( t ). 
With the exception of the monetary policy shock, which is assumed to be a white 
noise processes, all shocks are assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive 
process.55 
2.3 Data and Estimation Strategy 
We estimate the model using the Bayesian estimation module in DYNARE  
(Juillard, 2001). Bayesian inference has a number of benefits. First, it formalizes the 
use of prior empirical or theoretical knowledge about the parameters of interest. 
Second, Bayesian inference provides a natural framework for parameterizing and 
evaluating simple macroeconomic models that are likely to be fundamentally mis-
specified. Thus, as pointed out by Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2004) 
and Schorfheide (2000), the inference problem is not to determine whether the model 
is `true' or the `true' value of a particular parameter, but rather to determine which set 
of parameter values maximize the ability of the model to summarize the regular 
features of the data. Finally, Bayesian inference provides a simple method for 
comparing and choosing between different mis-specified models that may not be 
nested on the basis of the marginal likelihood or the posterior probability of the model. 
In particular, Geweke (1998) shows that the marginal likelihood is directly related to 
the predictive performance of the model which provides a natural benchmark for 
assessing the usefulness of economic models for policy analysis and forecasting. 
Bayesian estimation requires construction of the posterior density of the 
                                                 
55 In addition to our thirtheen structural shocks, we follow the approach adopted in Juillard, Karam, 
Laxton, and Pesenti (2004) of allowing for measurement errors in the data. 
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parameters of interest given the data. If we denote the set of parameters to be 
estimated as   using observations on a set of variables X, the posterior density can be 
written as  Xp | . The posterior density is thus the probability distribution of θ, 
conditional on having observed the data X. It forms the basis for inference in the 
Bayesian framework. Following Bayes law, the posterior density is proportional to the 
product of the prior density of the parameters  p and the distribution of the data 
given the parameter set  |Xf : 
 
      Xf
XfpXp  ||   
where  Xf is the marginal distribution of the data. The conditional distribution 
function of the data given the parameter set  |Xf is equivalent to the likelihood 
function of the set of parameters given the data  XL | .The likelihood function can 
be calculated from the state-space representation of the model using the Kalman filter 
(see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) for details). Bayesian inference therefore requires 
(i) the choice of prior densities for the parameters of interest, and (ii) construction of 
the posterior from the prior densities and the likelihood function. The remainder of 
this section discusses briefly how to construct the posterior distribution. The choice of 
prior is discussed later, together with the estimation results. 
Given the likelihood function and a set of prior distributions, an approximation to 
the posterior mode of the parameters of interest can be calculated using a Laplace 
approximation. The posterior mode obtained in this way is used as the starting value 
for the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (see Bauwens, Lubrano, and Richard (1999) for 
details). This algorithm allows us to generate draws from the posterior 
density  Xp | . At each iteration a proposal density (a normal distribution with mean 
equal to the previously accepted draw) is used to generate a new draw which is 
accepted as a draw from the posterior density  Xp | with probability p. The 
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probability p depends on the value of the posterior and the proposal density at the 
candidate draw, relative to the previously accepted draw. We generate 100000 draws 
in 4 chains in this manner, discarding the first 50000 draws to reduce the importance 
of the starting values. 
2.3.1 Data 
To estimate the model we use information on ten key macroeconomic variables for 
India running from 1996Q2 to 2007Q4: GDP, private consumption expenditure, 
investment, exports, imports (all expressed in constant prices), the real exchange rate, 
the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, wholesale price inflation, the 
nominal interest rate, and the Bombay Stock Exchange SENSEX Index.56 
The 3-month Treasury Bill rate is used as a proxy of the nominal interest rate and 
the real effective exchange rate calculated by the IMF is used as proxy for the real 
exchange rate. As in Christiano, Motto, and, Rostagno (2009) we use the value of the 
stock exchange index (deflated using the wholesale price index) to proxy the net worth 
of entrepreneurs. All variables are expressed as deviations from a Hodrick-Prescott 
time trend and, with the exception of the real and nominal exchange rates, the nominal 
interest rate, and the SENSEX, are seasonally adjusted using the X12 filter. All data 
are taken from the CEIC database. 
2.3.2 Calibration of Steady State Parameters 
As in Saxegaard (2006a), we calibrate the parameters in the model that determine 
the steady state based on findings from previous studies and the data. We then 
estimate the parameters that determine the dynamic properties of the model away from 
the steady-state. The list of calibrated parameters include the rate of time 
                                                 
56 More recent data is not included given the increased volatility associated with the global financial 
crisis. 
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preference, , the depreciation rate of capital,  , the cost share of capital,  , the 
price elasticity of aggregate non-tradables and imports,  , the price elasticity of 
exports,  , the share of non-tradables in the WPI,  , the steady-state markup for 
retailers,  1 , in addition to several steady-state ratios which are set so as to 
replicate the average in the data.  
The substitution elasticity between imported and domestically produced goods is 
set at 1.5, close to the value used by Saxegaard (2006a) for the Philippines, while the 
elasticity of substitution of exports, , is set to 4.89, a value consistent with the steady 
state export to GDP ratio. With the share of non-tradables in the WPI, , set at 0.8, 
this corresponds to a steady state export to GDP ratio of 19 percent and a steady state 
import to GDP ratio of 21 percent. The share of government expenditure in GDP is set 
at 11 percent as in the data. The capital share in the production   and the capital 
depreciation rate, , are set to 0.33 and 0.025, respectively; values commonly used in 
the literature. The steady-state markup factor is set to 9 percent so that  =12. Share of 
domestic loans to total loans, , is set to 0.8 (IMF country report, 2009). 
We set the steady-state annual nominal interest rate at 7 percent which corresponds 
to the annualized average quarterly rate of bank rate for the period we have data on. 
Similarly, steady-state inflation is set equal to 4.5 percent which corresponds to the 
average seasonally adjusted quarterly WPI inflation over the period on an annualized 
basis. Intertemporal optimization by consumers implies that the subjective discount 
rate,  , is set equal to 0.994 which is the inverse of the quarterly real steady-state 
interest rate. We set world inflation equal to 2.5 percent on an annual basis which 
implies a steady-state depreciation rate of the nominal exchange rate of 2 percent on 
an annual basis and a world interest rate of 5 percent per annum. The calibrated 
parameter values and the implied steady-state ratios are summarized in Table 2.1. 
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2.3.3 Prior Distribution of Estimated Parameters 
Our choice of prior distributions for the estimated parameters is guided both by 
theoretical considerations and empirical evidence. Given the lack of significant 
empirical evidence, however, we choose relatively diffuse priors that cover a wide 
range of parameter values. For the structural parameters, we choose either gamma 
distributions or beta distributions in the case when a parameter - such as the 
autoregressive shock processes - is restricted by theoretical considerations to lie 
between zero and one. Given the lack of evidence regarding the policy reaction 
function of the Reserve Bank of India, we use uniform distributions for the parameters  
of the monetary policy rule. Finally, as in much of the literature the inverted gamma 
distribution is used for the standard errors of the shock processes. This distribution 
guarantees a positive variance but with a large domain. The choice of priors for the 
parameters to be estimated is summarized in Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.1: Calibrated Parameters 
 
 
Parameters Definitions Values 
  Domestic inflation 4/1045.1
*  World inflation 4/1025.1  
i Policy rate 4/1070.1  
*i  World interest rate 4/105.1  
e Nominal exchange rate depreciation 2 % 
  Subjective discount factor 0.994 
  Inverse of Frisch elasticity 1.5 
  Price elasticity of non-tradable and imports 1.5 
  Elasticity of substitution between different domestic goods 12 
  Share of non-tradable in CPI 0.8 
  Price elasticity of exports 2.4 
  Share of capital in production 0.33 
  Quarterly depreciation rate of capital 0.025 
  Share of domestic loans in total loans 0.8 
  Probability of entrepreneurial survival 0.98 
d  Degree of capital mobility 0.0019 
H Transfer from exiting to new entrepreneurs 0.01 
Steady- state Ratio 
Variables Definitions Values 
G/Y Government spending to GDP 0.11 
YQ X  Exports to GDP 0.19 
YQM  Import to GDP 0.21 
K/N Capital to entrepreneurs’ net worth 2 
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 Table 2.2: Parameter Priors and Posterior Estimates 
 
Prior Posterior 
Parameter Description Density 
Mean S.D. Mean 90% Interval 
i  Interest Rate Smoothing Beta 0.7 0.2 0.829 0.647 0.999 
  Inflation Stabilization Uniform 0 3 0.890 0.002 1.737 
Y  Output Stabilization Uniform -1 1 -0.017 -0.049 0.014 
q  
Exchange 
Rate 
Stabilization 
Uniform 0 3 2.438 1.852 3.000 
b  Habit Persistence Beta 0.5 0.2 0.499 0.150 
 
0.885 
 
d  
Cost of Non-
tradable 
Goods Price 
Adjustment 
Gamma 100 20 118.220 84.184 151.489
m  
Cost of 
Imported 
Goods Price 
Adjustment 
Gamma 100 20 100.043 67.992 151.489
  
Capital Stock 
Adjustment 
Costs 
Gamma 12 2 23.008 19.430 26.462 
  
Elasticity of 
External 
Finance 
Premium 
Beta 0.07 0.02 0.057 0.038 0.074 
 
As mentioned previously, we assume that firms incur a quadratic cost of price 
adjustment, measured in terms of current inflation, relative to the previous period’s 
inflation rate. We use the gamma distribution to restrict the adjustment cost 
parameters ( d , m ) to the positive manifold and, given the lack of evidence on the 
degree of nominal rigidity in emerging markets, specify a mean of 100 with a standard 
deviation of 20. As noted by Gali and Gertler (1999) an adjustment cost of 100 
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corresponds approximately to the assumption that firms change prices (or inflation) 
every 3.74 quarters. There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the appropriate 
value of the capital cost adjustment cost parameter ( ) in the model. While Kollmann 
(2002) finds a value of 1.43 in their model, Ireland (2001) and Ireland (2003) find 
values above 30. The mean of the prior on the capital adjustment cost parameter ( ) is 
set at 15 (as in Kollmann (2002)) with a gamma distribution. 
Our choice of prior distributions for the parameters of the monetary policy reaction 
function is based on the fact that there is little evidence regarding the Reserve Bank of 
India's interest rate setting behavior.57 As a result, we choose uniform priors for the 
feedback parameters on inflation, output, and the rate of exchange rate depreciation in 
the policy rule with a relatively large domain. In particular, we choose uniform prior 
distributions with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 3 for the feedback parameter on 
WPI inflation (  ) and the rate of exchange rate depreciation ( q ). This encompasses 
the estimates found by Mohanty and Klau (2004). For the feedback parameter on the 
output gap ( Y ), we choose a uniform distribution with a minimum of -1 and a 
maximum of 1. This is consistent with the finding in Mohanty and Klau (2004) that 
several emerging market central banks do not base their policy response on 
movements in the output gap in a systematic fashion. The lagged interest rate prior 
( i ) follows a beta distribution with mean 0.7 and standard deviation of 0.2. This is 
consistent with the estimate in Mohanty and Klau (2004).  
The prior on the habit persistence parameter (b) is assumed to follow a beta 
distribution to ensure that it remains bounded between 0 and 1. We assume a mean of 
0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.2 for the prior distribution. The mean of our prior is 
lower than the values used inter alia by Julliard, Karam, Laxton and Pesenti (2004) 
                                                 
57 A notable exception is Mohanty and Klau (2004) who finds that the parameters of the monetary 
policy reaction function in India are much lower than in other countries in Asia. A more detailed 
comparison between their results and ours is done in the next section. 
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and Smets and Wouters (2003) reflecting the assumption that a higher share of 
consumers in India is likely to be cash-constrained and thus unable to smooth 
consumption. However, the relatively large standard deviation implies that the prior 
distribution is relatively diffuse and covers a broad range of estimates. 
As in Dib, Mendicino, and Zhang (2008), we choose a prior with a gamma 
distribution for the elasticity of the external finance premium. We assume a mean of 
0.07 which is consistent with previous findings in the literature (see inter alia Elekdag, 
Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2005), Christensen and Dib (2006), and Dib, Mendicino, 
and Zhang (2008) and a standard deviation of 0.02. For the risk premium on foreign-
currency borrowing ( d ) we use a gamma distribution with a mean of 0.0019, as in 
Saxegaard (2006b), and a standard error of 0.002. 
Finally, for the priors of the autoregressive parameters and the standard errors of 
the stochastic processes, we follow the same procedure as in Smets and Wouters 
(2005) and Julliard, Karam, Laxton and Pesenti (2004). The persistence parameters are 
given a prior with a beta distribution to restrict the domain between 0 and 1. The mean 
of the distribution for each of the autoregressive parameters is set at 0.8. For the 
standard errors, we use the inverted gamma distribution with a diffuse prior. The 
inverted gamma distribution is commonly used for standard errors as it gives support 
to all positive values of the parameter and has characteristics which ease the 
computational burden of the estimation processes. In order to specify the precise mean 
of the prior distribution for the standard errors of the structural shocks, we have relied 
on the variance decomposition of the model. In other words, we experimented with 
different sized shocks until we arrived at a specification which entailed a reasonable 
contribution of each of the structural shocks to the total variability of our observed 
variables. This approach was preferred to relying on previous studies given that the 
importance of shocks cannot be directly inferred from the size of their standard errors 
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due to normalization issues.58 In any case, the use of a diffuse prior reduces the 
importance of the mean of the prior distribution on the outcome of the estimation. 
2.4 Empirical Results 
Table 2.3 reports the estimated posterior model together with the 90 percentile of 
the posterior distribution. Figure 2.2 provides a visual representation of this 
information by plotting the prior and posterior distribution for each parameter that is 
estimated, together with the posterior mode. These plots allow us to make some 
statements about the relative importance of the prior and the data in the construction of 
the posterior distribution. Overall, our model yields plausible parameter estimates for 
the parameters of the model which are broadly in line with results from previous 
studies. 
The estimate of the elasticity of the external finance premium with respect to firm 
leverage σ is equal to 0.057. This is slightly below the estimate of 0.066 for Korea in 
Elekdag, Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2005) and somewhat higher than estimate in Dib, 
Mendicino, and Zhang (2008) using Canadian data. The investment adjustment cost 
parameter   is estimated at 23.0, significantly higher than the prior mean. As pointed 
out by Christensen and Dib (2006), capital adjustment costs have an important 
interaction with the financial accelerator. If capital adjustment costs are high, the price 
of capital will tend to be more volatile. As net worth responds directly to the price of 
capital (through capital gains and losses), it affects the external finance premium faced 
by corporates, leading to increased investment volatility. 
 
                                                 
58 See Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) for details. 
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Figure 2.2: Prior and Posterior Distributions. 
The marginal posterior densities are based on 4 chains, each with 100,000 draws 
Metropolis algorithm discarding the first 50000 draws.  
 
The habit persistence parameter (b) is estimated at 0.499, implying that there are 
significant delays in the effect of interest rate changes on aggregate expenditure, and 
consumption in particular. As we expected, these estimates are somewhat lower than 
found in other studies including Saxegaard (2006b) and Smets and Wouters (2005) 
given the higher share of cash-constrained consumers in India. With regards to the 
cost of price adjustment, our estimates suggest that domestic prices are more sluggish 
relatively to what is typically found in the literature. Moreover, the plots of the 
posterior in Figure 2 suggest that the data is quite informative about this parameter. 
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Our estimate of the cost of adjusting import prices, however, is close to the prior, 
which is not surprising given that we do not include data on import prices in our 
sample. 
With regards to the estimates of the policy rule parameters, our results indicate that 
the Reserve Bank of India places a relatively high weight on controlling the rate of 
depreciation of nominal exchange rate. In particular the estimate of q , the coefficient 
that measures the response of monetary policy to exchange rate movements, is 3 times 
higher than  , the coefficient on inflation. Moreover, the results suggest that output 
stabilization does not play a significant part in the conduct of monetary policy, with 
the estimate of Y  insignificantly different from zero. Because the model is estimated 
in levels, a simple transformation is necessary to be able to interpret these numbers. In 
particular, they imply that annual nominal interest rate increase by 0.9 percentage 
points if annual inflation is 1 percentage point above its equilibrium value. Similarly, 
annual interest rates increase by 1 percentage point if the nominal exchange rate 
depreciates by 1 percent more than the equilibrium rate of depreciation. Interestingly, 
these estimates are significantly higher than the estimates found by Mohanty and Klau 
(2004) in their study of the monetary policy reaction function for India. Their results 
suggest a 0.13 percentage point increase in annual interest rates if annual inflation 
increases by 1 percentage point, while a 0.18 percentage point increase in annual 
interest rates if the real exchange rate depreciations by 1 percent. While the fact that 
Mohanty and Klau (2004) is a partial equilibrium study means that their results are not 
directly comparable to ours, it is noteworthy that they also find a relatively strong 
response to movements in the exchange rate in India. 
Finally, our estimates of the shock processes suggest that the shock to the markup 
and the price elasticity of exports are the most persistent stochastic processes. The 
persistence of the shock to uncovered interest parity suggests that departures from 
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uncovered interest parity are pervasive in the data. Our estimates of the standard errors 
of the structural shocks are also reported in Table 2.3 – 2.4Table 2.4. However, as 
pointed out by Lubik and Schorfheide (2005), the interpretation of these is not 
straightforward and is dependent on the scale of the variables.  
 
Table 2.3: Parameter Priors and Posterior Estimates 
 
Prior Posterior 
Parameter Description Density
Mean S.D. Mean 90% Interval 
  Technology Shock Persistence Beta 0.8 0.1 0.808 0.658 0.959
*i  Foreign Interest Rate Shock Persistence Beta 0.8 0.1 0.831 0.718 0.945
*  Foreign Inflation Shock Persistence Beta 0.8 0.1 0.785 0.643 0.948
t  Markup Shock Persistence Beta 0.8 0.1 0.860 0.731 0.978
  UIP Shock Persistence Beta 0.8 0.1 0.794 0.654 0.931
L  Labor Supply Shock Persistence Beta 0.8 0.1 0.806 0.650 0.966
C  Marginal Utility Shock Persistence Beta 0.8 0.1 0.810 0.658 0.959
I  
Investment 
Efficiency Shock 
Persistence 
Beta 0.8 0.1 0.785 0.640 0.947
t  Export Elasticity Shock Persistence Beta 0.8 0.1 0.857 0.759 0.916
G  
Government 
Spending Shock 
Persistence 
Beta 0.8 0.1 0.640 0.465 0.821
  Borrowing Cost Shock Persistence Beta 0.8 0.1 0.809 0.675 0.958
  Survival Rate Shock Persistence Beta 0.8 0.1 0.805 0.656 0.958
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Table 2.4: Parameter Priors and Posterior Estimates 
 
Prior Posterior 
Parameter Description Density 
Mean S.D. Mean 90% Interval 
  
Size of 
Technology 
Shock 
InvGamma 0.005 Inf 0.005 0.001 0.009
*i  
Size of Foreign 
Interest Rate 
Shock 
InvGamma 0.001 Inf 0.001 0.000 0.002
*  Size of Foreign Inflation Shock InvGamma 0.001 Inf 0.001 0.000 0.002
t  Size of Markup Shock InvGamma 1 Inf 1.198 0.270 2.219
  Size of UIP Shock InvGamma 0.001 Inf 0.001 0.000 0.002
L  Size of Labor Supply Shock InvGamma 0.01 Inf 0.010 0.002 0.021
C  Size Marginal Utility Shock InvGamma 0.01 Inf 0.016 0.003 0.028
i  Size of Monetary Policy  Shock InvGamma 0.005 Inf 0.004 0.002 0.007
I  
Size of 
Investment 
Efficiency Shock 
InvGamma 0.05 Inf 0.048 0.012 0.092
t  Size of Export Elasticity  Shock InvGamma 0.1 Inf 0.320 0.190 0.454
G  
Size of 
Government 
Spending Shock 
 
InvGamma
 
0.01 
 
Inf 
 
0.068 
 
0.052 
 
0.083
  
Size of 
Borrowing Cost 
Shock 
InvGamma 0.001 Inf 0.002 0.000 0.004
  Size of Survival Shock InvGamma 0.001 Inf 0.002 0.000 0.004
2.4.1 Cross Validation with Alternative Models 
As suggested by Christensen and Dib (2006) we compare the fit of our model, the 
Estimated FA model, against an alternative model without a financial accelerator. The 
alternative model, which we call the Estimated No-FA model, is identical to the FA 
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model with the exception that the parameter that captures the elasticity of the external 
finance premium with respect to firm leverage is constrained to equal zero. In 
addition, as suggested by Schorfheide (2000), we compare the fit our estimated model 
against a less restrictive non-structural reduced form Bayesian vector auto regression 
(BVAR) estimated using the popular Litterman prior (Sims and Zha, 1998). This 
provides a stringent test of the ability of our model to replicate the dynamics in the 
data and thus of its usefulness as a tool for policy analysis. Indeed, it is partly evidence 
suggesting that empirical DSGE models with a sufficient number of structural shocks 
compare favorably with BVARs which has prompted the increased interest in DSGE 
models in policy making.59 
Bayesian econometrics provides a natural framework for assessing the empirical 
performance of different mis-specified models. Using Bayes Law again we can write 
the posterior probability of a model iM as: 
    Xf
XMLMpXMp iii
|)(
|   
where  iMp is the prior belief attached to model i and  XML i | is the likelihood of 
the model given the data. Bayesian model selection is based on the posterior odds ratio 
of a particular model 1M against another model 2M  which is given by:  
 
   
   XMLMp
XMLMp
XMp
XMp
|
|
|
|
22
11
2
1   
 
where   XML
XML
|
|
2
1 - the ratio of marginal likelihoods for different models--represents a  
summary measure of the evidence provided by the data for choosing between two 
competing models. 
Table 2.5 reports the marginal likelihood of the Estimated FA model, the 
                                                 
59 See inter alia Smets and Wouters (2005), Julliard, Karam, Laxton, and Pesenti (2004) and Lubik and 
Schorfheide (2005). 
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Estimated No-FA model, and BVARs estimated on the same data set at lags 1 to 4. 
The higher marginal likelihood in the Estimated FA model relative to the Estimated 
No-FA Model suggests that the introduction of a financial accelerator mechanism does 
improve the model's ability to capture the movements observed in the data. As in 
Elekdag, Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2005), however, the Estimated FA model does 
not compare favorably to a BVAR with one lag although it dominates BVARs with 
more lags. This is not surprising as the marginal likelihood falls with increasing model 
complexity and increases with model fit. The improved fit of our Estimated FA model 
relative to a BVAR with one lag does not compensate for its higher complexity. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the Estimated FA model outperforms BVARs with more 
than one lag does provide some evidence in support of the Estimated FA model as a 
tool of policy analysis. 
 
Table 2.5: Model Comparison 
 
 Marginal Likelihood 
Estimated FA model 876.49 
Estimated no-FA model 873.64 
BVAR(1) 1148.54 
BVAR(2) 420.19 
BVAR(3) 673.25 
BVAR(4) 743.61 
2.4.2 Impulse Responses 
A useful way to illustrate the dynamics of the estimated model and the importance 
of the financial accelerator is to consider the impulse response functions when the 
financial accelerator is present and when it is not. The response of some key 
macroeconomic variables to a 100 bps increase in the nominal interest rate are shown 
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in Figure 3.3, to a positive technology shock in Figure 3.4, and to a shock to 
borrowing costs in Figure 3.5. Each variable's response is expressed as the percentage 
deviation from its steady-state level, with the exception of the rate variables, which are 
in percentage points. In Figure 2.3 – 2.5Figure 2.5 the impulse responses generated in 
the estimated FA model are shown in black. The impulse responses generated when 
the financial accelerator is not present are shown in green. As in Christensen and Dib 
(2006), we generate these impulse responses by setting the elasticity of the external 
finance premium with respect to firm leverage equal to zero, but keeping all the other 
parameter estimates from the estimated FA model. The difference between the black 
and the green lines should give an indication of the impact of the financial accelerator 
on a particular variable after a given shock. 
Figure 2.3 shows that the presence of a financial accelerator amplifies and 
propagates the impact of a contractionary monetary policy shock. In both models, the 
increase in the nominal interest rate raises the cost of domestic borrowing for 
consumers and thus leads to a contraction in consumption. It also raises the demand 
for domestic bonds and thus appreciates the domestic currency, while the net worth of 
entrepreneurs declines because of the declining return to capital and higher real 
interest costs associated with existing debt (the debt-deflation effect). Output contracts 
both as a result of decreased domestic demand and a result of decreased 
competitiveness following the appreciation of the real exchange rate. The contraction 
in demand in turn leads to a fall in inflation. In the presence of the financial 
accelerator, the external finance premium increases as a result of the decline in net 
worth and rising leverage. This pushes up the real borrowing cost for entrepreneurs, 
putting downward pressure on investment and the price of capital which further 
reduces net worth. This reduction in net worth leads to a further increase in the cost of 
borrowing (the premium goes up), thus reducing capital, investment and output further 
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(second round effects). This mechanism amplifies the magnitude and the persistence 
of transitory monetary policy shocks as evident from the impulse responses. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The Economy’s Response to a 100 Bps Contractionary Monetary 
Policy Shock. 
The impulse responses are computed using the mode of the posterior distribution of 
the model. Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its 
steady state level. Interest rates are shown as absolute deviation from steady state. No 
Financial Accelerator model is obtained by setting the elasticity of the external finance 
premium with respect to firm leverage equal to zero, but keeping all other parameters 
same as in the baseline model. 
 
Figure 2.4 shows that the financial accelerator has less of an impact following a 
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positive shock to technology. The technology shock increases the return to capital and 
thus leads to an increase in investment and output. At the same time, the improvement 
in technology reduces firms' marginal costs and thus reduces inflation. The higher 
return to capital and lower inflation have opposite effects on net worth but in our 
model the positive impact of the higher return to capital dominates. This is partly due 
to the endogenous response of monetary policy which pushes up nominal interest 
rates, thereby reducing the amount of deflation. When the financial accelerator is 
active, the rise in net worth pushes down the risk premium faced by entrepreneurs and 
leads to a larger response of investment and capital. While output is somewhat more 
volatile when the financial accelerator is present, the impact if significantly less than 
following a shock to monetary policy. 
Figure 2.5 also shows that the financial accelerator amplifies the effects of a 
financial shock such as a shock to the borrowing costs faced by entrepreneurs. In both 
models, the higher borrowing cost depresses the demand for new capital and thus 
lowers investment, output, and inflation. The decline in absorption, in turn, reduces 
the demand for non-tradables and causes real exchange rate depreciation. The 
exchange rate depreciation (which raises the external borrowing cost of 
entrepreneurs), together with the decline in inflation, reduces entrepreneurs' net worth. 
In the presence of the financial accelerator, this increases the entrepreneurs' risk 
premium and reduces the demand for capital further. As a result, the decline in 
investment and output is much larger when the financial accelerator is present. 
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Figure 2.4: The Economy’s Response to a 1 Percent Improvement in Technology 
see notes to figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.5: The Economy’s Response to a 1 Percent Increase in Entrepreneur’s 
Borrowing Cost 
see notes to figure 2.3. 
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As in previous studies, therefore, the financial accelerator amplifies and 
propagates the impact of shocks on investment. The impact of the financial accelerator 
on other variables including output and inflation depends, however, on the type of 
shock. Following a contractionary monetary policy shock and a shock to 
entrepreneurs' cost of borrowing, output and inflation volatility increases when the 
financial accelerator is present. The financial accelerator has much less of an impact, 
however, on the economy following a shock to technology. This is consistent with the 
results in other studies including Christensen and Dib (2006). 
2.5 Optimal Policy 
How does the estimated monetary policy rule compare to a policy rule which 
maximizes consumer welfare? To answer this question we search for the parameters of 
the monetary policy reaction function in equation 45 that maximizes a second-order 
approximation of consumer welfare.60 The results of this exercise are presented in 
Table 2.6, while the volatility implied by the different rules and the resulting 
consumer welfare is presented in Table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.6: Parameters of an Optimal Policy Rule 
 
 i    Y  q  
Estimated 
Policy Rule 0.83 0.89 0.02 2.44 
Optimal 
Policy Rule 0.995 5.75 0.00 1.05 
 
                                                 
60 In the non-stochastic flexible-price equilibrium or steady-state, monetary policy is neutral in the sense 
that all the monetary rules we consider imply the same non-stochastic steady-state for the economy. 
Furthermore, given that up to a first-order (Taylor series) approximation consumer welfare is equal to 
its non-stochastic steady-state value, changes in the monetary policy regime will only have second-
order (or higher) effects on welfare. As a result, we follow the majority of the literature in 
approximating welfare using a second-order Taylor series approximation to expected utility. This 
method leads to a loss-function similar to that widely assumed in the earlier literature on monetary 
policy evaluation. 
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Table 2.7:  Standard Deviation of Key Macroeconomic Variables 
 
 
The parameters of a policy rule that maximizes welfare differs significantly from 
the parameters of the estimated policy rule. Our results suggest that the estimated 
policy rule places too little emphasis on inflation stabilization and too much emphasis 
on stabilizing the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. The lower than 
optimal weight on inflation stabilization in the estimated policy rule, coupled with a 
significantly higher than optimal weight on exchange rate stabilization, suggests that 
the RBI places more emphasis on stabilizing the rate of depreciation than on reducing 
inflation volatility. As a result, inflation volatility is higher under the estimated policy 
rule than under the optimal rule, while exchange rate volatility is lower. Both the 
estimated rule and the optimal rule feature significant interest-rate inertia, which 
implies that the authorities react to inflation much more aggressively in the long run 
 GDP Consumption Investment
Nominal  
Exchange 
Rate 
Real 
Exchange 
Rate 
Estimated 
Policy 
Rule 
 
0.1100 0.0547 0.0520 0.0020 0.0126 
Optimal 
Policy 
Rule 
 
0.0971 0.0537 0.0485 0.0064 0.0134 
 WPI Inflation Net Worth Premium Welfare 
Consumption
Cost 
Estimated 
Policy 
Rule 
 
0.0036 1.6081 0.0059 -120.00 0.004 
Optimal 
Policy 
Rule 
 
0.0013 1.4621 0.005 -119.66 -- 
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than in the short run.61 
At the same, time the emphasis on stabilizing the rate of depreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate in the estimated policy rule comes at the expense of higher 
volatility in the real economy (despite the fact that the weight on output stabilization is 
broadly similar in both rules), while the volatility of financial sector variables - in 
particular borrowing costs and net worth - is also higher. 
We calculate a second-order accurate measure of consumer welfare associated 
with different monetary policy regimes as in Schmitt Grohe and Uribe (2004). In 
particular, we calculate the expectation of lifetime utility as of time zero, 0V , 
associated with a particular monetary regime, denoted with the superscript, r: 
),(
0
00
r
t
r
t
t
tr NCUEV 

         (55) 
conditional on the economy being at its non-stochastic steady-state at time zero. 
In order to evaluate the cost of the estimated monetary policy rule relative to the 
welfare optimizing rule, we follow Schmitt Grohe and Uribe (2004) and calculate the 
fraction of a consumer's consumption that would make them indifferent between 
different regimes. In particular,   is defined as the fraction of the household's 
consumption under the optimal policy rule that consumers would have to give up to be 
as well off under the empirical policy rule as under the optimal policy rule so that a 
value of  *100 = 1 represents a one percentage point of permanent consumption gain 
under the alternate policy regime. Formally   is defined as: 
),)1((
0
00
opt
t
opt
t
t
test NCUEV   

      (56) 
where estV0 denotes the expectation of lifetime utility as of time zero under the 
estimated policy rule while optL0  and 
optC0  refer to the amount of labor and 
                                                 
61 Interest rate inertia is in fact somewhat higher in the optimal rule reflecting possibly the impact 
interest rate volatility has on the volatility of net worth and thus the real economy. 
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consumption under the optimal rule. For the particular functional form in our model 
this implies: 
 
 


 


optest
tC
VV
be
00
, )1(
1
1 

        (57) 
where optV0 denotes the expectation of lifetime utility as of time zero under the optimal 
policy rule. From Table 2.7 we see that the welfare loss under the sub-optimal 
estimated policy rule is equivalent to a not insignificant 0.4 percent of permanent 
consumption.62 This is close to the welfare gain found by Kollmann (2002) but lower 
than that found by Ambler, Dib, and Rebei (2004). 
It is useful to compare our results to those in Schmitt Grohe and Uribe (2007) who 
calculate welfare maximizing policy rules using a closed-economy model calibrated 
using U.S. data and to those in Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi (2009) who analyze the 
welfare maximizing policy rule under different degrees of habit persistence. We also 
compare our results to those in Ambler, Dib, and Rebei (2004) who look at an open-
economy model estimated using Canadian and U.S. data, although their results are not 
directly comparable to ours given the inclusion of money growth in the policy rule and 
the absence of interest rate smoothing. Both  Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi (2009) and 
Schmitt Grohe and Uribe (2007) find that a significant degree of interest rate 
smoothing--albeit less than in our model--is optimal and contributes to substantially 
lower macroeconomic volatility. Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi (2009) and Schmitt 
Grohe and Uribe (2007) also find that a high weight on inflation stabilization, and a 
zero weight on output stabilization is optimal. Schmitt Grohe and Uribe (2007) restrict 
the weight on inflation stabilization to be less than 3 on the grounds that higher values 
may not be implementable. However, they note than in the absence of such a 
                                                 
62 In other words, consumption in every period over the life time of a consumer would be 0.4 percent 
lower under the estimated rule than under the optimal rule. 
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restriction the optimal weight is 332. Similarly, Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi (2009) 
find that an estimate around 30 is optimal for the amount of habit persistence we 
estimate in our model. Ambler, Dib, and Rebei (2004) on the other hand, find a much 
lower optimal weight on inflation (1.2) and a higher weight on output stabilization 
(0.2). 
Figure 2.6 illustrates our results by simulating the path of output, inflation, the rate 
of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, and the nominal interest rate under the 
estimated policy rule and the optimal policy rule, using the estimated path of the 
stochastic shocks in the model. These plots confirm that inflation volatility would 
have been lower if monetary policy had been conducted according to the optimal 
policy rule. This was particularly true toward the end of 2004 (WPI inflation increased 
to 8.1 percent y.o.y. in the third quarter of 2004) and in 2006-07. At the same time, the 
rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate displays a significantly higher 
amount of volatility during the whole sample period under the optimal rule. Finally, 
the simulation of the nominal interest rate suggest that interest rates would have been 
higher toward the end of the sample - given the relatively high inflation--if monetary 
policy had been conducted according to the optimal policy rule. 
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Figure 2.6: Path of Key Macroeconomic Variables Under Different Policy Rules 
These plots are generated using the estimated path of the stochastic shocks in the 
model. 
 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this paper has been to estimate a DSGE model with macrofinancial 
linkages for India and to use it to analyze the conduct of monetary policy. The DSGE 
model used is an extension of the model developed in Saxegaard (2006a) augmented 
to include a financial accelerator mechanism similar to that proposed by BGG to study 
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the effect of financial frictions on the real economy. 
As is increasingly common in this literature, the model was estimated using 
Bayesian estimation techniques. Bayesian estimation techniques provide a natural 
framework for evaluating macroeconomic models that are bound to be mis-specified 
along several dimensions. Our results yielded plausible estimates for the model 
parameters, although an examination of the posterior distributions suggested that the 
data was not informative about a number of parameters. In addition, the cross 
validation tests suggest that the introduction of a financial accelerator mechanism does 
improve the model's ability to capture the dynamics observed in the data. Furthermore, 
we provide evidence that our model with the financial accelerator provides a fit of the 
data that outperforms a BVAR at more than one lag. 
Our results when using the model to examine the conduct of monetary policy - 
using consumer welfare as the benchmark against which to analyze alternative policies 
- suggest that the RBI puts a higher than optimal weight on stabilizing the rate of 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate and a lower than optimal weight on 
inflation stabilization even in the presence of financial accelerator effects. This comes 
at the expense of higher inflation volatility as well as higher volatility in the real 
economy and in financial sector variables. However, exchange rate volatility is 
substantially lower under the monetary policy reaction function implied by the data 
relative to the welfare optimizing policy rule. In welfare terms, our analysis suggests 
that the optimal policy rule entails a welfare gain equivalent to 0.4 percent of 
permanent consumption relative to the empirical policy rule. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
A CREDIT AND BANKING MODEL FOR INDIA 
3.1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis has amply demonstrated that the performance of the real 
side of the economy is closely linked to the disturbances in the financial sector. 
Shocks originating in the credit markets have resulted in substantial loss of output and 
large-scale unemployment. One of the discerning features of this crisis has been a 
complete meltdown of financial intermediation activity. Inter-bank markets froze; 
credit became extremely costly, and at times totally unavailable. Tighter credit 
conditions not only exacerbated, but also protracted the crisis. Realizing that the 
recovery of the real economy depends crucially on the smooth functioning of the 
financial sector, central banks have taken substantive measures to unclog the credit 
markets. This crisis has made it amply clear that the banking sector can considerably 
affect the developments in the real economy, and to analyze and understand these 
linkages better, it is imperative to develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model with macro-financial linkages and an active banking sector.  
The importance of financial shocks in terms of how they affect the real economy 
has long been realized (Fisher, 1933), but most of the general equilibrium models 
developed to study macro-financial linkages have focused only on the demand side of 
the credit markets.63 These models have abstracted from modeling the banking sector 
explicitly, and assume that credit transactions take place through the market (thereby 
not assigning any role to financial intermediaries such as banks). The growing 
importance of banks in the modern financial system and the current crisis has 
                                                 
63 Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Iacoviello (2005) have introduced credit and collateral 
requirements to analyze the transmission and amplification of financial shocks. 
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demonstrated that the role of financial intermediation cannot be overlooked, and we 
need to model the supply of credit to understand business cycle fluctuations better. 
Also, modeling credit supply is essential to study the transmission of shocks 
originating in the credit markets. 
The objective of this paper is to develop a small open economy New Keynesian 
model with financial frictions and an active banking sector for India, in order to 
understand the role of banking intermediation in the transmission of monetary 
impulses, and to analyze how shocks that originate in credit markets are transmitted to 
the real economy. The model developed is used to analyze issues related to monetary 
transmission and financial stability. We specifically look at (1) the monetary 
transmission mechanism in the presence of banking sector and financial frictions; (2) 
the role of banks in propagation of macroeconomic shocks; (3) the effects of a 
tightening of credit conditions; and (4) the effects of non-standard monetary policy 
tools. 
Anand et al. (2010) have shown that a model with financial frictions, modeled 
with a financial accelerator mechanism similar to Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1999), improves the model’s ability to capture the dynamics observed in the Indian 
data. We extend their basic model to include an active banking sector on the lines of 
Gerali et al. (2010). The banking sector is modified to include the non-monetary tools 
frequently used by the central bank in India. We depart from Iocaviello (2005) and 
Gerali et al. (2010) in modeling financial frictions, that we only introduce the balance 
sheet effects for firms. Though such frictions may be an important feature of 
households’ balance sheets in advanced economies, they have played a relatively 
secondary role in the present crisis in India.  
We introduce a banking sector which operates under a monopolistically 
competitive environment. Banks are modeled as comprising of three parts, two “retail 
  121
branches” and one “wholesale” unit. The two retail branches provide differentiated 
loans to entrepreneurs (loan branch) and raise differentiated deposits from households 
(deposit branch). These branches set rates in a monopolistic competitive fashion, 
subject to adjustment costs. The wholesale unit manages the capital position of the 
group and, in addition, raises wholesale loans and wholesale deposits. Banks combine 
deposits from the household and borrowing at interbank market with the bank capital 
to produce loans. While using deposits to make loans, banks observe cash reserve ratio 
(keeping a fraction of deposits in liquid form, which do not earn any interest) and 
statutory liquidity ratio (investing a fraction of deposits in government t-bills) imposed 
by the central bank. Cash reserve ratio requirements leave banks with fewer resources 
to lend, while the statutory liquidity ratio requirements force them to extend credit to 
governments at rates lower than the market rates. Both these factors increase the 
marginal cost of producing loans and affect the real side of the economy, through the 
borrowing costs of the firms. Bank capital is accumulated in each period out of 
retained earnings, and banks pay a quadratic cost if they deviate from the capital/loan 
requirement set by the central bank. Accumulation of bank capital from retained 
earnings creates a feedback loop between the real and the banking sector in the 
economy. As macroeconomic conditions deteriorate, profits of banks are affected 
negatively, and this weakens the ability of banks to raise new capital. Depending on 
the nature of the shock, this may force banks to cut down lending, or demand a higher 
price for credit, giving rise to the “credit cycle” observed in the recent recession 
episodes. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first open economy model with an explicit 
banking sector. Considering that borrowers in emerging market economies tend to rely 
more on foreign currency borrowing, exchange rate and world interest rate 
fluctuations through their effect on balance sheets play an important role in these 
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economies(Krugman, 1999, Aghion et al., 2001). A small open economy model 
provides an opportunity to analyze these channels. Another major contribution of this 
paper is to incorporate features to study the transmission mechanism of non-
conventional monetary policy tools. Unlike most models available in the literature, 
this paper calibrates the model to an emerging economy (Indian data) which we think 
is a basic first step towards better understanding of monetary policy frameworks in 
emerging economies. 
The analysis delivers the following results. First, the presence of financial frictions 
amplifies the magnitude and the persistence of transitory shocks. Second, market 
power of monopolistic banking sector amplifies the business cycle. However when 
interest rates are sticky, banking system attenuate the response to shocks. Third, the 
tightening of credit markets (modeled by a persistent negative shock to bank capital) 
can have substantive effects on the economy. Fourth, when the central bank resorts to 
using non-monetary tools, there is a larger contraction in output and consumption as 
compared to traditional monetary tightening (operating through nominal interest rate 
changes).  
These results are driven by the two channels through which the financial sector 
interacts with the real economy – the financial accelerator channel, which establishes a 
link between the balance sheet of the firms (borrowers) and the real economy; and the 
banking sector channel, which creates a feedback loop between the real and the 
financial side of the economy through the bank’s balance sheet.  
In the present paper we only explore the role of banks and financial frictions in 
transmitting shocks, and how they affect the monetary transmission mechanism. 
However, this baseline model can be used to analyze several issues related to the 
financial sector and financial stability. It can be used to study the welfare costs of 
various financial frictions, as well as financial under-development. Also, estimating 
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the parameters of the model will enable it to be used to study the optimality of 
monetary policy. 
The paper is organized in five sections. In the next section, we present some 
empirical facts to further motivate the analysis, and also review the relevant literature. 
In Section 3, we develop a small open economy New Keynesian model with financial 
frictions and an active banking sector, which forms the basis of further analysis. In 
Section 4 we analyze the impulse responses. Section 5 concludes.  
3.2 Stylized Facts and Related Literature 
We begin by presenting some basic stylized facts about the growing importance of 
macro-financial linkages and the banking sector in the Indian economy and then look 
at the monetary policy practices in India. We also review the recent attempts at 
introducing banking sector in traditional DSGE models. 
Banks have played an important role in the growth of the Indian economy. Figure 
3.1 plots the domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP 
(for the period 2001 – 2008). It is evident that the bank’s role in providing credit has 
increased in the last decade. To see how the credit supply conditions changed during 
the present crisis, we plot the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) repo rate, reverse repo rate 
and call rate (Figure 3.2) for the period Jan 2008 – Jan 2010. Sharp peaks in the call 
money market rate, well above RBI’s policy repo rate during the crisis period provides 
a clear indication of the credit crunch associated with the crisis. Thus, growing 
importance of banks and a close link between bank’s credit supply and the real 
economy is clearly evident in India. 
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Figure 3.1: Domestic Credit Provided by Banking Sector (as percent of GDP) 
Source: World Development Indicator, World Bank. 
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Figure 3.2: Interest Rates During the Crisis 
Source: CEIC 
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Next, we look at the data on the source of corporate financing in India. While 
Indian companies finance the majority of their investment using retained earnings, 
Oura (2008) finds that they had been increasing their use of external funds (including 
domestic bank and capital market financing as well as overseas financing) to finance 
considerably larger investment during the recent period of 9 percent economic growth. 
As a result, India’s corporate sector is increasingly exposed to global financing 
conditions. External funds have been a major source of funding for the Indian 
corporate sector in the last decade. In 2005 – 06 the median share of external funds to 
total funds in corporate financing was 64%. Firms which are younger (age < 5 years) 
have relied more heavily on external financing (median share of external funds to total 
funds for them was 86% in 2005-06).64  If we look only at the core external fund (long 
term debt and equity only) then also corporate reliance on core external funds to total 
funds has been growing and stood at 16% in 2005-06.  Again the younger firms (age < 
5 yrs) rely more on core external funds (their median was 49% in 2005-06).65  Also the 
use of foreign borrowing has increased.  The ratio of average foreign borrowing to 
assets has gone up to 1.6 in 2005-2006 (as compared to 0.4 in 2001-02).66 Greater 
reliance of corporations on external funds and foreign borrowing suggests that macro-
financial linkages have likely grown in importance. Banks have been an important 
source of external financing for the corporate sector in India. In 2008-09 bank credit 
accounted for 21.6 percent of financing for corporates, second only to retained 
earnings (IMF Country Report, 2009). Table 3.1 presents the share of bank credit as a 
percent of total funding.  
 
                                                 
64 Oura, 2008. External fund is defined as long term debt, equity and trade credits. The average median 
share of external funds to total funds is 70% over the period 1993-2006.  
65 Oura, 2008.  Average median share of core external funds to total funds is 28% over the period 1993-
2006. 
66 Oura, 2008.  
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Table 3.1: Source of Corporate Financing in India 
 
 In percent of total funds 
 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
Foreign 
Borrowing 
Equity 
Issuance 
Bank 
Credit 
Retained 
Earnings 
2003-04 11.8 -7.9 13.8 10.4 71.8 
2004-05 6.8 5.9 7.2 27.9 52.3 
2005-06 8.3 2.4 5.8 26.9 56.6 
2006-07 14.7 10.8 5.0 21.8 47.7 
2007-08 15.4 10.5 10.2 20.6 43.3 
Source: India Staff Report, IMF, 2009. 
 
India's monetary policy framework has evolved considerably over the past decades 
(RBI, 2009). In particular, the opening up of the economy in the early 1990s and 
financial sector liberalization has been reflected in changes in the nature of monetary 
management (Mohan, 2004). The basic objectives of monetary policy - maintaining 
price stability and ensuring sufficient credit to support growth - have remained 
unchanged. However, the opening up of the capital account - while necessary for 
providing sufficient capital for investment purposes and for reducing the cost of 
borrowing - exposes the economy to sudden stops in capital flows. In particular, 
volatile capital flows and its impact on the exchange rate have implications not only 
for domestic demand and inflation, but for financial stability, with the result that 
maintenance of financial stability is of increasing concern to the Reserve Bank of 
India (Mohan, 2004). In order to meet these multiple challenges, the RBI has switched 
from a more traditional monetary targeting framework to an indicator based approach 
which seeks to strike a balance between price stability and reducing exchange rate 
volatility.  
RBI seems to rely on a number of instruments to achieve its ultimate objective of 
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price stability and growth. Table 3.2 shows the movement in key policy rates and 
reserve requirements during the period 2004 – 2009.  
Even though the short term interest rate have emerged as the key instrument all 
over the world, it is evident that RBI still relies heavily on non-traditional monetary 
policy tools to carry out monetary policy operations.67  
Choice of policy instrument depends largely on the stage of macro-economic and 
financial sector development and is an evolutionary process (Mohan, 2006). Use of 
short term interest rate as an effective policy tool requires an efficient monetary 
transmission mechanism, which in turn, requires well developed financial markets as 
well as absence of interest rate distortions. In India, although the money market, 
government debt and forex market have developed in recent years, they still lack the 
depth and sophistication. On the other hand corporate debt market is still to develop. 
Moreover, a number of administered interest rates continue to exist. Jha (2008) has 
found that the short-term interest rate, the principal policy tool used to affect inflation 
in countries working with inflation targeting, does not have a significant effect on 
inflation in India. Thus, it appears that the weak monetary transmission mechanism in 
India has necessitated the use of this rather crude tool by the RBI.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 International experience suggests that the use of open market operations has become more 
widespread in various countries, and reserve requirements have been lowered in many. It is generally 
being used in circumstances where bank liquidity needs to be adjusted rapidly in markets that are thin, 
and where the central bank needs to give clear, swift and unambiguous signals on the need for 
expansion or contraction of money supply. 
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Table 3.2: Movements in Key Policy Rates and Reserve Requirements (in 
percent) 
 
Effective since Reverse Repo Rate Repo Rate 
Cash Reserve 
Ratio 
Statuary  
Liquidity  
Ratio 
Jan 6, 2007 6.00 7.25 5.50(+0.25) 25 
Jan31, 2007 6.00 7.50(+0.25) 5.50 25 
Feb 17, 2007 6.00 7.50 5.75(+0.25) 25 
Mar 3, 2007 6.00 7.50 6.00(+0.25) 25 
Mar 30, 2007 6.00 7.75(+0.25) 6.00 25 
Apr 14, 2007 6.00 7.75 6.25(+0.25) 25 
Apr 28, 2007 6.00 7.75 6.50(+0.25) 25 
Aug 4, 2007  6.00 7.75 7.00(+0.50) 25 
Nov 10, 2007 6.00 7.75 7.50(+0.50) 25 
Apr 26, 2008 6.00 7.75 7.75(+0.25) 25 
May 10, 2008 6.00 7.75 8.00(+0.25) 25 
May 24, 2008 6.00 7.75 8.25(+0.25) 25 
Jun 11, 2008 6.00 8.00(+0.25) 8.25 25 
Jun 25, 2008 6.00 8.50(0.50) 8.25 25 
Jul 5, 2008 6.00 8.50 8.50(+0.25) 25 
Jul 19, 2008 6.00 8.50 8.75(+0.25) 25 
Jul 30, 2008 6.00 9.00(+0.50) 8.75 25 
Aug 30, 2008 6.00 9.00 9.00(+0.25) 25 
Oct11, 2008 6.00 9.00 6.50(-2.50) 25 
Oct 20, 2008 6.00 8.00(-1.00) 6.50 25 
Oct25, 2008 6.00 8.00 6.00(-0.50) 25 
Nov 03, 2008 6.00 7.50(-0.50) 6.00 25 
Nov 08, 2008 6.00 7.50 5.50(-0.50) 24(-1.00) 
Dec 08, 2008 5.00(-1.00) 6.50(-1.00) 5.50 24 
Jan 05, 2009 4.00(-1.00) 5.50(-1.00) 5.50 24 
Jan 17, 2009 4.00 5.50 5.00(-0.50) 24 
Mar 05, 2009 3.50(-0.50) 5.00(-0.50) 5.00 24 
Apr 21, 2009 3.25(-0.25) 4.75(-0.25) 5.00 24 
Oct 27, 2009 3.25 4.75 5.00 25(+1.00) 
Jan 30, 2010a 3.25 4.75 5.75(+0.75) 25 
Mar 19, 2010 3.50(+0.25) 5.00(+0.25) 5.75 25 
Source: Reserve Bank of India 
Notes: Reverse repo indicates absorptions of liquidity and repo signifies injection of 
liquidity. Figures in parentheses indicate changes in policy rates/ratios.  
a. Implemented in two stages – 0.5 increase from Feb 13 and 0.25 increase from Feb 
27, 2010. 
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Despite their relevance for policy making, most of the general equilibrium models 
generally lack interaction between financial markets and the real economy. Though a 
long tradition in economics starting from Irving Fishers’ (1933) debt deflation 
explanation of the Great Depression; most of the theoretical works focused on partial 
equilibrium analysis till the seminal paper by Bernanke and Gertler (1989). They used 
information asymmetry in credit markets and monitoring costs to establish a link 
between the financial sector and the real economy. They showed that in such a setting, 
the borrowing costs of firms depend on the strength of their balance sheets (net 
worth).68  Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and 
Carlstrom and Furest (1997) have demonstrated that the presence of financial frictions 
amplify the magnitude and the persistence of macroeconomic shocks. Gertler, 
Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007) and Eleckdag, Justiniano and Tchakarov (2005) 
extended the framework to small open economies. Iocaviello (2005) introduced the 
collateral constraints tied to real estate values of the firms and household level 
nominal debt to study the linkages between financial frictions and real economy. 
However all these models have used financial frictions on the firm/household side (or 
demand side of the credit market). All these models assume that credit transactions 
take place through markets, and do not assign any role to financial intermediaries such 
as banks.  Also, they do not include the credit supply channel. 
Recently there has been increasing interest in introducing a banking sector in 
dynamic models. The present crisis has underscored the need to model the supply side 
of credit markets to understand better the linkages between the financial sector and the 
real economy. In order to introduce the supply side of credit markets, researchers have 
followed three major approaches to model banking sector - (i) Perfectly competitive 
banks with banking costs; (ii) Monopolistically competitive banks and; (iii) Risky 
                                                 
68 It is commonly referred to in the literature as a “Financial Accelerator”. 
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banks with inter-bank lending. All these models try to generate a spread between the 
lending and deposit rates which adjusts along the cycle, establishing a link between 
the banking activity and the real economy. 
In models with perfectly competitive banks, banking (producing loans, deposits, 
bank equity etc.) is a costly activity which requires resources. Costs of banking 
activities create a spread between lending and deposit rates (Edward and Vegh, 1997; 
Benes et al., 2009; Curdia and Woodford, 2009; Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007; and 
Christiano et al., 2009). Models with monopolistically competitive banks use the 
market power of banks to generate a spread between the deposit and lending rates, 
which adjusts along the cycle, thus affecting the real side of the economy (Gerali et 
al., 2010; Huelsewig and Wollmershauser, 2009; and Sudo and Ternishi, 2009). Risky 
banks and inter-bank lending models assume that banks operate under perfectly 
competitive markets and the production of loans is separate from the production of 
deposits. Banks rely on inter-bank lending and there is an endogenous probability of 
default by firms and banks. This probability of default induces a financial accelerator 
in these models as the rate of default is countercyclical (de Walque et al., 2009; and 
Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2009). 
In this paper we follow Gerali et al. (2010) to introduce the banking sector in a 
model with financial frictions. Banks in our model operate in a monopolistically 
competitive environment and set deposit and lending rates. A wedge is created 
between the two rates as a result of the market power of banks. We model financial 
frictions a la Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). 
3.3 Model 
We build on the model of Anand et al. (2010) and include a banking sector on the 
lines of Gerali et al. (2010). The basic structure of model consists of four kinds of 
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agents – households, entrepreneurs, capital producers and retailers. Households 
consume a composite of domestic and imported goods and provide labor. They have 
access to foreign capital markets and make deposits with the banks. Households are 
the owner of banks and retail units. Entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods using 
labor and capital purchased from the capital producers. They finance the acquisition of 
capital partly through their net worth and partly through borrowing domestically (from 
banks) and from abroad. Banks raise deposits from households and give out loans to 
entrepreneurs. They operate in a monopolistically competitive environment – setting 
interest rates on deposits and loans to maximize profits. Banks combine deposits from 
the household and borrowing at inter-bank market with the reinvested profits (bank 
capital) to make loans to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs operate under perfect 
competition and sell their product to retailers who differentiate them at no cost and sell 
them either in domestic market or export overseas. Retailers operate in a 
monopolistically competitive environment and face a quadratic adjustment costs in 
changing prices á la Rotemberg (1982). Capital producers use a combination of 
existing capital stock and investment good purchased from retailers and abroad to 
produce capital. The market for capital, labor and domestic loans are competitive. The 
model is completed with a description of the fiscal and monetary authority.  
In order to provide a rationale for monetary stabilization policy, three sources of 
inefficiencies are included in the model: (a) monopolistically competitive retail 
market; (b) sluggish price adjustment in retail sector and (c) capital adjustment costs. 
In addition sluggish interest rate adjustments and bank capital adjustment costs are the 
other sources of inefficiencies in the model. While relatively simple, the framework 
captures many of the rigidities which previous studies have found are important to 
describe the dynamics in the data and serves as a useful starting point for developing a 
credit and banking model for India. Figure 3.3 provides a visual representation of the 
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model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Flow Chart of the Model 
3.3.1 Household 
The economy is populated with a continuum of infinitely lived households with 
preferences defined over consumption, )( jCt  and labor effort )( jLt . The objective of 
household is to maximize the expected value of a discounted sum of period utility 
function given by 
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where   is the discount factor and U is a period utility function. We include the habit 
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persistence according to the following specification 


 )())(ln()1())(),(( ,1, jLbCjCbjLjCU ttLtttcttt      (2) 
where 1tC   is lagged aggregate consumption and )1,0(b . tC ,  and tL,  are 
preference shocks to the marginal utility of consumption and the supply of labor 
respectively. Note that in symmetric steady-state 1)(  tt CjC , the marginal utility of 
consumption is independent of the habit persistence parameter b. The aggregate 
consumption bundle )( jCt  consists of domestically produced goods, )(, jC tH  and an 
imported foreign good, )(, jC tF and is given by 
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where )(, jC tH is an index of consumption of domestic goods given by the constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function 
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where ]1,0[s denotes the variety of the domestic good. Parameter ],0[   is the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and 1t  is the 
elasticity of substitution between the verities produced within the country. ]1,0[  
can be interpreted as a measure of home bias. 
We assume that households have an access to foreign financial markets or nominal 
contingent claims that span all relevant household specific uncertainty about future 
income and prices, interest rates, exchange rates and so on. As a result each household 
face the same intertemporal budget constraint 
  134
tdiiPjDPi
jLWdssijBejDPjPjBejCP
b
tt
b
tt
d
t
tt
rf
t
f
tttttt
f
tttt t






,)()1()(                                                               
)()()()()()()(
1
0
111
1
0
11


(5) 
Where ftB is the net holding of foreign currency one period bond that matures in 
period t, paying a gross interest rate of fti . Households make deposit tD with financial 
intermediary. Deposits pay the gross interest of dti set by deposit banks between t and 
t+1. dssr
t
)(
1
0
  represents nominal profit from the ownership of domestic retail firms 
and  1
0
1)1(
b
tt
b P  is the dividend earned from the ownership of banks. (1- b ) is the 
exogenously set dividend rule. t  is the lump sum tax in the economy and tW  is the 
nominal wage rate. tP  is the CPI index given by 
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where tHP , is the domestic price index given by 
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and  tFP , is the price of the imported goods.
69 
Households choose the paths of   01 )(),(),(),( ttttt jBjDjLjC to maximize 
expected lifetime utility given by equation (1) subject to the sequence of constraints 
given by equation (5) and the initial value of ftB .  
Ruling out Ponzi type schemes, we get the following first order conditions 
tt
tt
tC P
bCjC
b  

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,
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)1(
        (8) 
ttttL WjL   1, )(         (9) 
where t  is the lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. The first 
order conditions are given by 
                                                 
69 We assume that the price of imported goods is set in the same manner as the domestic prices in the 
exporting country i.e. the price of imports adjust sluggishly and is given by an equation similar to 
equation (46). 
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 is the stochastic discount factor.  
Up to a log-linear approximation equations (10) and (11) imply,   ftdtttt iieeE  /ln 1 .  
The optimum allocation of expenditure between domestic and imported goods is given 
by 
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and the demand for each variety of domestic goods is given by 
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3.3.2 Banks 
Banks intermediate all financial transactions between the agents in the model. We 
model banks as monopolistically competitive at the retail level. They hold some 
market power in conducting their intermediation activity, which allows them to set 
deposit rates and lending rates. This set up allows us to study how different degree of 
interest rate pass-through affects the transmission of shocks. We can think of each 
bank ]1,0[i  in the model as composed of three parts - two retail branches and one 
wholesale branch. The retail branches raise differentiated deposits from the household 
and provide differentiated loans to entrepreneurs. The wholesale unit manages the 
capital position of the group and in addition raises wholesale loans and wholesale 
deposits in the inter-bank market. 
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Following Gerali et al.(2010) we assume that units of deposit and loan contracts 
bought by households and entrepreneurs are a composite CES basket of slightly 
differentiated products – each supplied by a branch of a bank i – with elasticities of 
substitution equal to dt and lt , respectively. We assume that each household 
(entrepreneur) has to purchase a deposit (loan) contract from each single bank in order 
to save (borrow) one unit of resources.70 This assumption is similar to the standard 
Dixit-Stiglitz framework for goods markets.  
Given the Dixit-Stiglitz framework, demand for an individual banks’ deposit 
contract depends on the interest rate charged by the bank relative to the average rates 
in the economy and is given by 
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where tD is the aggregate demand of deposits and )(ii
d
t is the deposit interest rate 
faced by each deposit bank ]1,0[i .71 dti  is the aggregate (average) deposit rate and is 
defined as 
  1
1
1
0
1)(




 
d
tdt diiii dt
d
t
        (16) 
Similarly the demand for loans facing bank i is given by 
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where dtL is the aggregate demand of loans and )(ii
l
t is the loan interest rate faced by 
                                                 
70 Though this assumption may seem unrealistic, it is just a useful modeling device to capture the 
existence of market power in the banking industry. A similar approach has been adopted by Benes and 
Lees (2007). Arce and Andres (2009) set up a general equilibrium model featuring a finite number of 
imperfectly competitive banks in which the cost of banking services is increasing in customers’ 
distance. Mandelman (2009) set up a model with segmented banking sector where collusive pricing 
decisions give rise to the market power. 
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each lending bank ]1,0[i .72 lti  is the aggregate (average) lending rate and is defined 
as 
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3.3.2.1 Retail Banking 
Retail banking takes place in a monopolistically competitive setting. There is a 
continuum of two types of retail branches – deposit branch and loan branch. 
3.3.2.1.1 Deposit Branch 
Each deposit branch collects deposit )(iDt  from households and passes it on to the 
wholesale branch which pays them a rate sti . Also, we assume that there is a quadratic 
adjustment cost of intertemporally varying the deposit interest rate. This rigidity 
allows an interest rate spread that evolves over the cycle. We assume adjustment costs 
á la Rotemberg (1982), given by 
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where di > 0 is a cost adjustment parameter. The optimization problem of the saving 
bank is to choose the retail deposit interest rate )(iidt to maximize  )()()()(
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In symmetric equilibrium, the first order condition of this optimization problem gives 
the optimal deposit interest rate 
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Thus, the deposit rate is a mark down of the wholesale deposit rate and expected 
future gain of adjusting the deposit rate. With fully flexible rates, dti  is determined as a 
static mark-down over the wholesale deposit rate –  
s
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3.3.2.1.2 Loan Branch 
Each retail branch obtain wholesale loan )(iLdt  from the wholesale unit at the 
rate bti . We assume that there is a quadratic adjustment cost of intertemporally varying 
the lending rate. This rigidity allows an interest rate spread that evolves over the cycle. 
We assume adjustment costs á la Rotemberg (1982), given by 
d
tl
t
l
tii
t Lii
iiiAd l
l
t
2
1
1
)(
)(
2
)( 


 


 
where li > 0 is a cost adjustment parameter. The optimization problem of the lending 
bank is to choose the retail lending rate )(iilt to maximize  )()()()()(
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In symmetric equilibrium, the first order condition of this optimization problem gives 
the optimal deposit interest rate 
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Thus, the lending rate is a mark up over the wholesale loan rate and expected future 
gain of adjusting the lending rate. With fully flexible rates, lti  is determined as a static 
mark-up over the wholesale loan rate –  
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3.3.2.2 Wholesale Branch 
Wholesale branch get the deposits from the deposit branch. In order to study the 
effect of non-traditional monetary policy interventions we introduce two such tools. 
We assume that wholesale branch meets the cash reserve ratio (CRR) and the statutory 
liquidity ratio (SLR) imposed by the central bank.73 Central bank varies these 
requirements to control credit supply by changing the availability of resources 
available with the banks to make loans. Let st is the CRR and dt is the SLR 
requirements. Then wholesale branch keep )(iDt
s
t in the form of cash and keep 
)(iDR t
d
t
b
t  in the form of government securities.74 It earns an interest of tti  on the 
government securities. The wholesale branch combines net worth or bank 
capital )(iZt with the remaining available deposit )()1( iDt
d
t
s
t   and inter-bank 
loans, )(iBIBt , to make wholesale loans )(iL
d
t .  
Since wholesale branch can finance their loans using either deposits or bank 
capital they have to obey a balance sheet identity 
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As two sources of finance are perfect substitutes from the point of view of the 
balance sheet, we introduce some non-linearity (i.e. imperfect substitutability) in order 
to pin down the choices of the bank. We assume that there exists an (exogenously 
given) capital-to-assets (i.e. leverage) ratio b for banks. In particular, the bank pays a 
quadratic cost whenever the capital-to-assets ratio ( )()( iLiZ dtt ) moves away from 
b . This modeling choice provides us a shortcut to study the implications and costs of 
                                                 
73 CRR is the portion of deposits that banks are required to keep in the form of cash. SLR is the portion 
of bank holdings kept in the form of liquid government securities.  
74 Since CRR does not earn any profits and SLR earns a lower profit than lending in the market, banks 
optimally choose them at its minimum level defined by the central bank. 
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regulatory capital requirements and also gives bank capital a key role in determining 
the conditions of credit supply.  
Bank capital is accumulated each period out of retained earnings according to 
t
b
t
b
t
b
t miiZiZ   )()()1()( 11       (24) 
where )(1 i
b
t is overall bank profits made by the three branches of bank i  in nominal 
terms, (1- b ) summarizes the dividend policy of the bank, and b measures resources 
used in managing bank capital and conducting overall banking intermediation activity. 
tm  is a mean zero shock to the bank capital. Since we assume that bank capital is 
accumulated out of retained earnings, the model has in-built feedback loop between 
the real and the financial side of the economy. As macroeconomic conditions 
deteriorate, banks profits are reduced, weakening their ability to raise new capital. 
Depending on the nature of the shock, it may result in the reduction of amount of 
loans banks are willing to give, thus exacerbating the original contraction.  
The dividend policy is assumed to be exogenously fixed, so that bank capital is not 
a choice variable for the bank. The problem for wholesale branch is to choose loans 
)(iLdt , deposits )(iDt , and interbank borrowing )(iB
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t  so as to maximize profits 
subject to the balance sheet constraint given by equation (23) and )(iDR t
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where sti  - the wholesale deposit rate and 
b
ti - the wholesale loan rate are taken as 
given.75 Z  is the cost of bank capital adjustment parameter. In a symmetric 
equilibrium, the first order condition gives 
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75 Banks value the future stream of profits using the households discount factor since they are owned by 
households. 
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The above equations state a condition that links the rate on wholesale loans to the 
policy rate ti  and the leverage of the banking sector (
d
tt LZ ) and wholesale deposit 
rate to the policy rate, t-bill rate and reserve requirements, st  and dt  . 
It highlights the role of bank capital and reserve requirements in determining the 
credit supply conditions. As long as there is a spread between lending and the policy 
rate - the bank would like to make as many loans as possible, increasing the leverage 
and thus profit per unit of capital. On the other hand, when leverage increases, the 
capital-to-asset ratio moves away from b  and banks pay a cost, which reduces 
profits. So, banks problem is to choose an optimal level of loans such that the marginal 
cost of reducing the capital-to-asset ratio exactly equals the spread between 
(wholesale) deposit and lending rate. 
The spread between the wholesale lending rate and the policy rate is inversely 
related to the overall leverage of the banking system -  in particular, when banks are 
scarcely capitalized and capital constraints become more binding (i.e. when leverage 
increases) margins become tighter. 
Overall profits of bank i, are the sum of earnings from the wholesale unit and the 
retail branches. After deleting the intra-group transactions, profits is given by 
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3.3.3 Production Sector 
3.3.3.1 Entrepreneurs 
We model the behavior of entrepreneurs as proposed by Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1999). We follow the modeling framework of Gertler, Gilchrist and 
Natalucci (2007) and Elekdag, Justiniano and Tchakarov (2005) while introducing 
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financial accelerator in an open economy context. Entrepreneurs combine labor hired 
from households with capital purchased from the capital producers, to produce 
intermediate goods in a perfectly competitive setting. They are risk neutral and have a  
 
finite horizon for planning purposes. The probability that an entrepreneur will survive 
until the next period is t , so that the expected live horizon is 
t1
1 .76  
The number of new entrepreneurs entering the market each period is equal to the 
number of entrepreneurs exiting, implying a stationary population. To get started, new 
entrepreneurs receive a small transfer of funds from exiting entrepreneurs.  
At the end of each period t, entrepreneurs purchase capital 1tK  , to be used in the 
subsequent period at a price tq . They finance capital acquisition partly through their 
net worth available at the end of period t, 1tn , and partly through borrowing 
domestically and through raising foreign currency denominated debt.  Total borrowing 
tB is given by  
11   tttt nKqB         (28) 
where tq is the real price per unit of capital. Fraction of loan raised domestically 
d
tB is 
exogenous to the model and is given by . Thus, )( 11   tttdt nKqB   and 
))(1( 11   tttat nKqB  where atB is the amount of loans raised abroad. 
Entrepreneurs use units of tK capital and tL  units of labor to produce output 
W
tY  , 
using a constant returns to scale technology 
  1tttWt LKY ,  )1,0(      (29) 
where t  is a stochastic disturbance to total factor productivity. Entrepreneur 
maximizes profits by choosing tK  and tL  subject to the production function given by 
equation (29). First order conditions for this optimization problem are 
                                                 
76 This assumption ensures that entrepreneur’s net worth (the firm equity) will never be enough to fully 
finance the new capital acquisition. 
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where WtHP , is the price of the wholesale good and tKr ,  is the marginal productivity of 
capital.77 The expected marginal real return on capital acquired at t and used in t+1 
yields the expected gross return )1( 1
k
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and  is the rate of depreciation of capital and 1, tKr  is the marginal productivity of 
capital at t+1. 
Following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), we assume that there exists an 
agency problem which makes external finance more expensive than internal funds. 
While entrepreneurs costlessly observe their output, which is subject to random 
outcomes, banks can not verify output outcomes costlessly. After observing the 
outcome, entrepreneurs decide whether to repay their debt or to default. If they 
default, banks audit the loan and recover the outcome less the monitoring costs. This 
agency problem makes loans riskier and banks charge a premium over the lending 
rate. Thus, enterpreneurs’ marginal external financing cost is the product of the gross 
premium and the gross real opportunity cost of funds that would arise in the absence 
of capital market frictions. 
Therefore, the expected marginal cost of borrowing, 1tt fE  is given by 
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0'  and 1)1(   
where   is the gross finance premium which depends on the size of the borrower’s 
                                                 
77 Since the firms are perfectly competitive, Wt
W
tH MCP , . 
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equity stake in the project (or, alternatively, the borrowers’ leverage ratio). t  is the  
shock to the cost of borrowing ,
1

t
t
t P
P ,  is the gross domestic inflation 
and *
*
*
1

t
t
P
P
t  , is the gross world inflation. tRER is the real exchange rate defined as 
t
tt
t P
PeRER
*
 .78 
We characterize the risk premium by  by 
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, where   represents the 
elasticity of external finance premium with respect to a change in the leverage position  
of entrepreneurs. As 

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


1
1
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t
Kq
n falls, entrepreneur relies on uncollateralized borrowing 
(higher leverage) to a larger extent to fund his project. Since this increases the  
incentive to misreport the outcome of the project, the loan becomes riskier and the cost 
of borrowing rises. Entrepreneurs’ demand for capital depends on the expected 
marginal return and the expected cost of borrowing. Thus, demand for capital satisfies 
the following optimality condition 
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Above equation provides the foundation for the financial accelerator. It links 
entrepreneurs’ financial position to the marginal cost of funds and, hence to the 
demand for capital. Also, movements in the price of capital, tq , may have significant 
effects on the leverage ratio. In this way the model captures the link between asset 
price movements and collateral stressed in the theory of credit cycles (Kiyotaki and 
Moore, 1997).79 At the beginning of each period, entrepreneurs collect their returns on 
capital and honor their debt obligations. Aggregate entrepreneurial net worth evolves 
                                                 
78 We assume that law of one price holds for each of the differentiated goods. 
79 Though the behavior described above is true for an individual entrepreneur, we appeal to the 
assumptions in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) that permit us to write it as an aggregate 
condition. See Bernanke et.al. (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) for details. It implies that gross 
finance premium may be expressed as a function of aggregate leverage ratio, i.e. it is not entrepreneur 
specific. 
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according to 
ttttt HVn )1(1           (35) 
where tV  is the net worth of the surviving entrepreneurs carried over from the 
previous period, t1  is the fraction of new entrepreneurs entering and tH (which is 
exogenous in the model) are the transfers from exiting to newly entering 
entrepreneurs. tV  is given by 
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As equations (35) and (36) suggest, the principal source of movements in net worth 
stems from unanticipated movements in returns and borrowing costs. In this regard, 
unforecastable variations in asset prices, tq , is the main source of fluctuations in 
)1( ktr . On the cost side, unexpected movements in inflation and exchange rates are 
the major sources of fluctuations in the net worth. An unexpected deflation or 
depreciation, for example, reduces entrepreneurial net worth, thus enhancing the 
financial accelerator mechanism. Entrepreneurs going out of business at time t 
consume and transfer some funds to new entrepreneurs out of the residual 
equity tV)1(  . Thus consumption by entrepreneurs are given by 
 ttet HVC  )1(          (37) 
3.3.3.2 Capital Producers 
Capital producers combine the existing capital stock, tK , leased from the 
entrepreneurs to transform an input tI , gross investment, into new capital 1tK using a 
linear technology.80 We assume that capital producers face a quadratic adjustment 
                                                 
80 This set up follows Bernanke et al. (1999) and assumes that capital producers rent the capital stock 
from entrepreneurs and use it to produce new capital. Since this takes place within the period we 
assume that the rental rate is zero. 
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costs given by  
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where  is the capital adjustment cost parameter. The aggregate capital stock evolves 
according to 
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where tI , is a shock to the marginal efficiency of investment (Greenwood et al. 1988).  
Gross investment consists of domestic and foreign final good and we assume that it is 
the same aggregation function as the consumption basket 
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Optimal demand for domestic and imported investment is given by 
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Price of investment is the same as the domestic price index given by equation (6). 
Capital producing firms maximize expected profits 
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and the first order condition for the supply of capital is given by 
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3.3.3.3 Retailers 
There is a continuum of retailers ]1,0[s . They purchase wholesale goods at a 
price equal to the nominal marginal costs, WtMC (the marginal cost in the 
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entrepreneurs’ sector) and differentiate them at no cost.81 They sell their product in a 
monopolistically competitive domestic and export market. Final domestic good, WtY , is 
a CES composite of individual retail goods 
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Corresponding price of the composite consumption good, tHP , , is given by equation 
(7). Demand facing each retailer can be written as 
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For simplicity we assume that the aggregate export demand function is given by 
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where tHtX ePP ,,   is the price of exports, *tP is the world price index and XtQ is the 
total exports. t , is the price elasticity of exports. 
3.3.3.4 Price Setting by Retailers 
Following Ireland (2001) and Rotemberg (1982), there is sluggish price adjustment 
to make the intermediate goods pricing decision dynamic. This ensures that monetary 
policy has real effects on the economy. Following Julliard et al. (2004), we assume 
that retailers face an explicit cost of price adjustment measured in terms of 
intermediate goods and is given by 
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where dtQ is the total domestic demand, 0d is the parameter determining the cost of 
                                                 
81 Entrepreneurs sell their goods in a perfectly competitive market so Wt
W
tH MCP , . Retail sector is 
defined only to introduce nominal rigidity into the economy. Since they differentiate goods costlessly, 
the marginal cost of producing final goods is same as WtMC . 
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price adjustment relative to last period’s price level and   is the steady state inflation. 
Following Saxegaard (2006b), real profits are given by 
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where te is the nominal exchange rate, expressed as the domestic currency price of 
foreign currency.82 Note also that we allow for a shock to the elasticity of substitution 
between differentiated goods t , which determines the size of the markup of 
intermediate good firms. Alternatively, the shock to t can be interpreted as a cost-
push shock of the kind introduced into the New Keynesian model by Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler (1999). 
The optimal price setting equation for domestic good (non-tradable good) can then 
be written as83 
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where 1,,,  tHtHtH PP , is the domestic price inflation. 
We have used the fact that all retailer firms are alike to impose symmetry and we 
assume that the law of one price holds in the export market so that ttHtX ePP ,,  . 
Above equation reduces to the well known result that prices are set as a markup over 
marginal costs if the cost of price adjustment, 0d . In general however, the goods 
price will follow a dynamic process and the firm’s actual markup will differ from, but 
                                                 
82 An increase in te  implies depreciation of the domestic currency. 
83 We assume that price of imported goods are set in the similar function. So the price setting equation 
for the price of imported good is given by a similar expression with 
. of placein   and  of placein  inflation, priceimport  , ,, dmtHtM   
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gravitate towards the desired markup. Profits from retail activity are rebated lump-sum 
to households (i.e. households are the ultimate owners of retail outlets). 
3.3.4 Central Bank and Government 
3.3.4.1 Central Bank 
We assume that the central bank adjusts the interbank rate, ti  in response to 
deviations in inflation and output from their steady state values. The monetary policy 
evolves according to the following Taylor-type-policy rule 
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where    and Y  are  the weights on inflation and output gap assigned by the policy 
makers.84 i  represents the Central Banker’s preference for interest rate 
smoothing. iY  and ,  are the steady state values of output, inflation and nominal 
interest rate. ti,  is a monetary policy shock to capture unanticipated increase in the 
nominal interest rate. 
3.3.4.2 Government 
The fiscal authority is assumed to purchase an exogenous stream of the final 
good tG , which is financed by a levying lump-sum tax on households, and issuing 
securities held by the banks. For simplicity we assume that the fiscal authority has no 
access to international capital markets. Its period by period budget constraint is given 
by 
                                                 
84 We include an interest rate smoothing parameter in our monetary policy rule as the benefits of such 
smoothing are well documented in the literature (see, e.g., Lowe and Ellis, 1997; Sack and Wieland, 
1999). Various authors have argued that moving interest rates in small steps increases its impact on the 
long-term interest rate; it also reduces the risks of policy mistakes and prevents large capital losses and 
systemic financial risks. Mohanty and Klau (2004) find that all emerging market central banks put 
substantial weight on interest rate smoothing. Clarida et al. (1998) find that central banks of advanced 
economies also put a large weight on interest rate smoothing. 
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Government buys both domestic and foreign final goods and we assume that it is the 
same aggregate function as the consumption basket 
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Optimal demand for governments’ domestic and imported consumption is given by 
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3.3.5 Market Clearing and Aggregation 
Domestic households, exiting entrepreneurs, capital producers, government and 
rest of the world buy final goods from retailers. The economy wide resource constraint 
is given by85 
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The national income accounting equation is given by 
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where MtQ is the total imports and tZZ  is the real GDP. 
Markets for loan and deposits clear –  
d
t
d
tt BLD           (54) 
Funds in the inter-bank market mush implicitly balance at the end of each period: 
                                                 
85 Following Bernanke et al. (1999) we ignore monitoring costs in the general equilibrium. 
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The model allows for non-zero holdings of foreign currency bonds by households 
and foreign currency denominated debt by entrepreneurs. In particular, it is well 
known (see inter alia Schimtt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003) that unless adjustments are 
made to the standard model, the steady state of an small open-economy model with 
foreign currency bonds will depend upon initial conditions and will display dynamics 
with random walk properties. In particular, if the domestic discount rate exceeds the 
real rate of return on foreign currency bonds, then domestic holdings of foreign 
currency bonds will increase perpetually. Beyond the obvious conceptual problems of 
such an outcome our analysis is constrained by the fact that the available techniques 
used to solve non-linear business cycle models of the type considered here are only 
valid locally around a stationary path. 
Fortunately, a number of modifications to the standard model are available which 
enable us to overcome this issue. In this paper, we follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
(2003) and specify a foreign debt elastic risk-premium whereby holders of foreign 
debt are assumed to face an interest rate that is increasing in the country's net foreign 
debt. In particular, fti , the interest rate at which households and entrepreneurs can 
borrow foreign currency equals the exogenous world interest rate plus a spread that is 
a decreasing function of economy's net foreign asset position: 
         *** PLBPLBii fftftftdtft   (56) 
where d is a parameter which captures the degree of capital mobility in the market 
for foreign-currency borrowing and lending by households and Ω is the steady-state 
value of exports. As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) we include the steady-state 
level of debt so that the risk-premium is nil in steady state. Note that under perfect 
capital mobility ( d =0), the country would face an infinite supply or demand of 
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foreign capital and the model would not have a well-defined steady state. As 
Kollmann (2002) points out, the model in this case becomes a version of the 
permanent income theory of consumption, with non-stationary consumption and net 
assets. 
3.3.6 Specification of the Stochastic Processes 
Our model includes fifteen structural shocks: three shocks to technology and 
preferences ( t , tC , , tL, ), three foreign shocks to world interest rates, world inflation, 
and the price elasticity of exports ( t* , *ti t ),  two shocks to investment efficiency and 
firms' markup ( tI , , t ), two financial shocks to the cost of borrowing by entrepreneurs 
and the survival rate of entrepreneurs ( t , t ), a monetary policy shock, a government 
spending shock ( ti, , tG ), a shock to CRR ( st ), a shock to SLR( dt ) and a shock to 
back capital ( tm ). Apart from monetary policy shock, i , which is a zero mean i.i.d. 
shock with a standard deviation i , the other structural shocks follow AR(1) 
processes: 
xttxxt xxx   1)1(        (57) 
where  ttdtsttItttttttLtCtt mGix ,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,**,,   , 0x is the steady-state 
value of tx , )1,1(x , and xt  is normally distributed with zero mean and standard 
deviation xt .  
3.3.7 Calibration 
Parameter selection for the model is a challenging task. There is no consensus on 
the values of some parameters, and for the banking parameters no corresponding 
estimates are available in the literature. Moreover, most of the parameters used in the 
literature are based on micro data from advanced countries. Hence, our approach is 
three pronged. We calibrate the parameters in the model that determine the steady 
state based on findings from previous studies and the data. For calibrating the 
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parameters which determine the dynamic properties of the model away from the 
steady state we use the values estimated in Anand et al (2010) for the Indian economy. 
While for banking sector parameters we calibrate them to match historical averages. 
Parameters are calibrated to capture features of Indian economy for the period of 
1996Q2 - 2007Q4.  
The discount factor , is set to 0.9964 to match the historical average of nominal 
deposit interest rate. The appropriate value of the Frisch elasticity ( 1 ) is both 
important and controversial. The range of values used in the literature goes from 0.25 
to 1.86 For our benchmark case we assume it to be 0.66 ( =1.5). The substitution 
elasticity between imported and domestically produced goods is set at 1.5 (Saxegaard, 
2006a), while the elasticity of substitution of exports,  , is set to 4.89, a value 
consistent with the steady state export to GDP ratio. With the share of non-tradables in 
the WPI, , set at 0.8, this corresponds to a steady state export to GDP ratio of 19 
percent and a steady state import to GDP ratio of 21 percent. The share of government 
expenditure in GDP is set at 11 percent as in the data. The capital share in the 
production   and the capital depreciation rate, , are set to 0.33 and 0.025, 
respectively; values commonly used in the literature. The steady-state markup factor is 
set to 9 percent so that  =12. Share of domestic loans to total loans, , is set to 0.8 
(IMF country report, 2009).  
We set the steady-state annual nominal interest rate at 7.4 percent which 
corresponds to the annualized average quarterly rate of bank rate for the period we 
have data on. Similarly, steady-state inflation is set equal to 4.5 percent which 
corresponds to the average seasonally adjusted quarterly WPI inflation over the period 
on an annualized basis. We set world inflation equal to 2.5 percent on an annual basis 
                                                 
86 Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) estimate it to be 0.25 while Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1997) estimate it to be 0.40. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) estimate the intertemporal elasticity of 
labor supply to be in the range of [0.5, 1]. 
  154
which implies a steady-state depreciation rate of the nominal exchange rate of 2 
percent on an annual basis and a world interest rate of 5 percent per annum.  
Following Christensen and Dib (2006), the steady state leverage ratio of 
entrepreneurs, K/N, is set to 0.5. The probability of entrepreneurial survival to next 
period, , is set at 0.98.  Following Anand et al. (2010) we set elasticity of external 
finance premium with respect to firm leverage   equal to 0.0566.87 
 For calibrating parameters which determine the dynamic properties of the model 
we follow the estimates of Anand et al. (2010). The habit persistence parameter, b, is 
set to 0.4986. Price adjustment costs of domestic goods and price adjustment costs of 
imported goods are set to 118.22 and 100.043 respectively. Capital cost adjustment 
cost is set equal to 23.008. Monetary policy parameters are chosen as i = 0.8,  = 2, 
Y = 0.01 which are in the range of values commonly used in the literature.  
For the banking parameters, no corresponding estimates are available in the 
literature. The parameters d and l that measure the degree of monopoly power of 
deposit and lending banks are set equal to 31.12 and 2.51, respectively. These values 
are chosen to match the historical averages of deposit and loan rates, di and li . The 
parameter b  is set at the value 0.035, that ensures that the steady state value ratio of 
bank capital to total loans is exactly 0.09.88 We follow the estimates of Gerali et al 
(2010) for setting the adjustment cost parameters for interest rates and bank capital to 
loan ratio. Cost of adjusting interest rates, di and li are set equal to 20 while the cost 
of bank capital adjustment, Z is set equal to 10. Table 3.3- Table 3.5 shows a full set 
of calibrated parameter values and the steady state ratios. 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 This is slightly below the estimate of 0.066 for Korea in Elekdag et al. (2005) and somewhat higher 
than estimate in Dib et al. (2008) for Canada. 
88 Steady state capital to loan ratio is set to 0.09 which is consistent with the regulatory capital 
requirements for banks (slightly higher than imposed by Basel II). 
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Table 3.3: Parameter Calibration: Based on Literature and Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameters Definitions Values 
  Subjective discount factor 0.9964 
  Inverse of Frisch elasticity 1.5 
  Price elasticity of non-tradable and 
imports 1.5 
  Elasticity of substitution between different domestic goods 12 
  Share of non-tradable in CPI 0.8 
  Price elasticity of exports 4.89 
  Share of capital in production 0.33 
  Quarterly depreciation rate of capital 0.025 
  Share of domestic loans in total loans 0.8 
  Probability of entrepreneurial survival 0.98 
H Transfer from exiting to new entrepreneurs 0.01 
  156
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Parameter Calibration: Based on Parameter Estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameters Definitions Values 
b Habit persistence parameter 0.50
  Elasticity of external finance premium 0.057
d  Cost of domestic goods price adjustment 118.22
m  Cost of imported goods price adjustment 100.04
  Capital adjustment cost 23.00
d  Elasticity of substitution between different type of deposits 31.12
l  Elasticity of substitution between different type of loans 2.51
di  Deposit rate adjustment cost 20
li  Lending rate adjustment cost 20
Z  Bank capital to loan ratio adjustment cost 10
i  Weight on interest smoothing in Taylor rule 0.8
  Weight on inflation gap in Taylor rule 2
Y  Weight on output gap in Taylor rule 0.01
d  Degree of capital mobility 0.002
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Table 3.5: Steady-State Values and Ratios 
 
Steady-state values 
Parameters Definitions Values 
  Domestic inflation 4/1045.1  
*  World inflation 4/1025.1  
i Policy rate 4/1074.1  
di  Deposit rate 4/106.1  
li  Lending rate 4/1125.1  
ti  Government t-bill rate 4/107.1  
*i  World interest rate 4/105.1  
e Nominal exchange rate depreciation 2 % 
s  Cash reserve ratio (CRR) 0.07 
d  Statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) 0.25 
1- b  Bank dividend paid to households 0.8 
b  Cost of running banks 0.035 
b  Bank capital to asset ratio 0.09 
Steady-state ratios 
Variables Definitions Values 
G/Y Government spending to GDP 0.11 
YQ X  Exports to GDP 0.19 
YQM  Import to GDP 0.21 
K/N Capital to entrepreneurs’ net worth 2 
Z/L Bank capital to loan 0.09 
 
We calibrate the shocks’ process parameters using values estimated in Anand et al. 
(2010). The parameter of credit tightening process is calibrated using the estimated 
values in Gerali et al. (2010). Since there are no parameter estimates available in 
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literature on non-monetary policy interventions, we choose the values of AR(1) 
coefficients at 0.99.89 Calibrated values of shock processes are presented in Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.6: Parameter Calibration: Stochastic Processes 
 
Parameters Definition Steady-state value Persistence 
Standard 
Deviation 
t  Productivity 1  = 0.808  = 0.010 
tC ,  
Preference shock to 
marginal utility of 
consumption 
1 C = 0.810 C = 0.015 
tL,  Preference shock to marginal utility of labor 1 L = 0.806 L = 0.010 
*
t  World inflation 4/1025.1  * = 0.785 * = 0.001 
*
ti  World interest rate 4/105.1  *i = 0.831 *i = 0.001 
t  Export elasticity shock 2.4  =  0.857  = 0.320 
tG  Government spending 0.264 G = 0.640 G = 0.068 
t  Mark up shock 12 t = 0.860 t = 1.198 
tI ,  Investment efficiency 1 I = 0.785 I = 0.048 
s
t  Cash reserve ratio 0.07 s = 0.950 s = 0.005 
d
t  Statutory liquidity ratio 0.25 d = 0.950 d = 0.005 
ti,  Monetary policy shock   i  = 0.010 
t  Survival rate of entrepreneurs 0.98  = 0.805  = 0.002 
t  Cost of borrowing 0  = 0.809  = 0.002 
tm  Bank capital shock 0 m = 0.750 m = 0.030 
 
 
                                                 
89 We do a simple OLS to get this co-efficient.  
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3.4 Impulse Response 
The objective of this paper is to study the monetary transmission mechanism in the 
presence of financial frictions and financial intermediation. We are also interested in 
understanding how shocks in the financial sectors are transmitted to the real economy 
and to study the transmission mechanism of non-standard monetary policy policies.  
In comparison to traditional DSGE models, our model has two additional channels 
for the transmission of shocks – the financial accelerator channel (credit demand 
channel) and the banking channel (credit supply channel). Our aim is to study how 
these channels affect the transmission of shocks. 
A useful way to illustrate the importance of financial accelerator is to consider the 
impulse response functions when the financial accelerator is present and when it is 
not. Therefore, we analyze the impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to 
the structural shocks in two models: (1) the full model with banking sector and 
financial frictions (baseline hereafter), and (2) a model with only banking sector (no-
FA model, hereafter).90  
In order to understand the role of banking sector, we compare our baseline model 
against a number of models where we shut down one feature of the model at a time: 
(1) a model where we shut down the bank capital channel; i.e. a model with a 
simplified balance-sheet for banks, including only deposits on the liability side (no-
BK model, hereafter) 91; (2) a model where we also remove stickiness in bank interest 
rate setting and allow for flexible rates (no-BK-FR model, hereafter)92; and (3) a 
                                                 
90 no-FA model is obtained by setting the elasticity of the external finance premium with respect to firm 
leverage , equal to zero, but keeping all other parameters same as in the baseline model. 
91 To obtain no-BK model, we set the cost of bank capital adjustment, Z equal to zero and rebate the 
banking profit to households in a lump-sum fashion.  
92 To get the no-BK-FR model, we set the costs to change rates di and li equal to zero in the no-BK 
model model. 
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model with perfectly competitive banks, i.e. a single interest rate model with financial 
frictions (no-B model, hereafter). 93 Strictly speaking even though we can not compare 
the impulse responses of our baseline model with that of no-B model, it is instructive 
to plot them to understand how the presence of banks affect the business cycle.  
We use monetary policy shock and productivity shock to explore the effects of 
financial frictions and financial intermediation on the transmission of shocks. We then 
look at a shock to bank capital (which can be considered as reflecting tightening credit 
conditions) to understand how shocks originating in the credit market affect real 
variables. To analyze non-standard monetary policy transmission mechanism we focus 
on shocks to cash reserve ratio and shocks to the statutory liquidity ratio. 
3.4.1 Monetary Policy Shock 
The transmission of monetary shock is studied by analyzing the impulse responses 
to a 100 bps increase in the policy rate ( ti ). Due to the presence of multiple channels, 
the overall effect on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy could in principle 
be ambiguous (Gerali et al. 2010).  In order to understand the importance of financial 
frictions we plot the responses of baseline and no-FA model in Figure 3.4. Figure 3.5 
plots the responses of baseline, no-BK, no-BK-FR and no-B model to see how the 
presence of banking sector impinges on the transmission of shock. Each variable’s 
response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state, with the 
exception of rate variables, which are in percentage points. 
In all these models, increase in the nominal interest rate raises the cost of domestic 
borrowing for consumers and therefore leads to a contraction in consumption. It also 
                                                 
93 We set s = d =0 in the no-BK-FR model. Then we set the elasticities of loan and deposit, l  
and d  equal to infinity. The steady state values of the two models differ as the effective lending rate 
and deposit rate faced by the agents are not the same. Also, absence of banks implies that there is no 
CRR or SLR requirement. 
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raises the demand for domestic bonds, and thus appreciates the domestic currency, 
while the net worth of entrepreneurs declines because of the declining return to capital 
and higher real interest costs associated with existing debt (debt-deflation effect). 
Output contracts both as a result of decreased domestic demand and a result of 
decreased competitiveness following the appreciation of the real exchange rate. The 
contraction in demand in turn leads to a fall in inflation. In the baseline model, bank 
loan rates and deposit rates increase less than the policy rate reflecting the imperfect 
pass-through of lending rates.  
As evident from Figure 3.4, presence of financial frictions results in the 
amplification of the shock. Reduction in output, consumption, investment, net worth 
and capital is much larger under the baseline model as compared to the no-FA model. 
In the presence of a financial accelerator, the external finance premium increases as a 
result of the decline in the net worth and rising leverage. This pushes up the real 
borrowing cost for entrepreneurs, putting downward pressure on investment and the 
price of capital which further reduces the net worth. This reduction in net worth leads 
to a further increase in the cost of borrowing (the premium goes up), thus reducing 
capital, investment and output further (second round effects). This mechanism 
amplifies the magnitude and the persistence of transitory monetary policy shocks as 
evident from the impulse responses. 
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Responses to 100 Bps Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock 
(Baseline model and no-FA model) 
Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state 
level. Interest rates are shown as absolute deviation from steady state. Baseline model 
represents the complete model with financial frictions and banking sector. no-FA model 
is obtained by setting the elasticity of the external finance premium with respect to firm 
leverage , equal to zero, but keeping all other parameters same as in the baseline model. So 
it represents a model without financial frictions. 
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Figure 3.5 gives an indication of how the presence of banking sector may affect 
the transmission of monetary shock. Comparing no-B model with no-BK-FR model 
highlights the role of imperfect competition in the credit market.94 As we can see, 
market power of banking system increases the volatility of real variables. Market 
power of banks result in higher lending rates (as lending rate is a mark-up over the 
policy rate) increasing the cost of borrowing for the firms. Due to financial 
accelerator, external finance premium goes up, reducing the net worth further and 
forcing the firms to borrow more from banks at an increasingly higher cost. This 
mechanism results in the amplification of the monetary shock. Our result is similar to 
Mandelman (2009), where market power of banks result in the amplification of the 
shocks.  
However, when we compare the baseline model with no-B model, we find that the 
presence of banking sector attenuates the response of monetary shock. This result is 
driven by the stickiness in interest rate setting, which prevents banks to fully pass on 
the policy rate increase to retail rates. Borrowing costs faced by the firms is lower than 
no-B case and therefore response of output, investment and capital is muted. Thus, the 
presence of banking sector with sticky interest rates has a dampening effect of policy 
shock on output, investment, capital and net worth. Gerali et al. (2010) has also found 
similar attenuating effect of the banking system in the presence of sticky bank rates.  
 
                                                 
94 As no-BK-FR model add a simplified banking sector to the no-B model. In no-BK-FR model, only 
bank’s market power channel is present (as both the bank capital channel and sticky interest rates 
channel are shut). 
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Responses to 100 Bps Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock 
(Baseline model, no-BK model, no-BK-FR model and no-B model).  
Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state 
level. Interest rates are shown as absolute deviation from steady state. Baseline model 
represents the complete model with financial frictions and banking sector. In no-BK 
model we shut down the bank capital channel. We set the cost of bank capital 
adjustment, Z equal to zero and rebate the banking profit to households in a lump-
sum fashion. no-BK-FR model, also shuts down the sticky interest rate channel. It is 
obtained by setting di and li equal to zero in the no-BK model model. To obtain no-B 
model, we set s = d =0 and the elasticities of loan and deposit, l  and d  equal to 
infinity. no-B model is a single interest rate model with financial frictions but no 
banking sector. The steady state values of the two models differ as the effective 
lending rate and deposit rate faced by the agents are not the same. Since the steady-
state under the two models is different, this plot is only instructive. 
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Presence of bank capital in our model seems to have virtually no effect on the 
dynamics of the real variables. This partly reflects the use of rather small value of the 
capital cost adjustment parameter in this exercise. As an example, our calibration 
implies that a reduction of the capital-to-asset ratio by half (from its steady state value 
of 9%) would increase the spread between wholesale loan rates and the policy rate by 
only 20 basis points. 
3.4.2 Technology Shock 
The transmission of a technology shock is studied by looking at the impulse 
responses coming from the same set of models described in the pervious subsection. 
Figure 3.6 plots the responses of baseline and noFA model. Figure 3.7 plots the 
responses of baseline, no-B and no-BK-FR model to see how the presence of banking 
sector impinges on the transmission of shock.95 Each variable’s response is expressed 
as the percentage deviation from its steady state, with the exception of rate variables, 
which are in percentage points. 
In all these models, negative technology shock decreases the return to capital and 
thus leads to decrease in investment and output. At the same time, negative 
productivity shock increases firms’ marginal costs and thus increases inflation. The 
lower return to capital, and higher inflation, has opposite effects on net worth, but in 
our model the negative impact of the lower capital return to capital dominates. Higher 
inflation and domestic interest rates result in real appreciation thereby decreasing the 
demand for exports, which lead to further output contraction. Monetary policy 
accommodates the increase in inflation by raising the policy rate, and therefore 
decreasing loans, aggregate demand and output.  
 
 
                                                 
95 Similar to monetary policy shock, bank capital have virtually no effect on real variables, so we do not 
present the impulse responses. 
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Figure 3.6: Impulse Responses to a 1% Negative Shock to Technology 
(Baseline model and no-FA model).  
Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state 
level. Interest rates are shown as absolute deviation from steady state. Baseline model 
represents the complete model with financial frictions and banking sector. no-FA model 
is obtained by setting the elasticity of the external finance premium with respect to firm 
leverage , equal to zero, but keeping all other parameters same as in the baseline model. So 
it represents a model without financial frictions. 
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Figure 3.6 shows that the financial accelerator has less of an impact following a 
negative shock to technology. When the financial accelerator is active, the fall in net 
worth pushes up the risk premium faced by entrepreneurs and leads to a larger 
response of investment and capital. While output is somewhat more volatile when the 
financial accelerator is present, the impact is significantly less than following a shock 
to monetary policy.  
Figure 3.7 gives an indication of how the presence of banking sector may affect 
the transmission of productivity shock. Comparing no-B model with no-BK-FR model 
indicates that the presence of monopolistic banking system amplifies the propagation 
of the shock. Similar to monetary policy shock, market power of banks result in higher 
lending rates (as banks apply a mark-up to the inter-bank rate) resulting in higher 
borrowing costs for the firms which in the presence of financial accelerator leads to a 
an increase in external finance premium, thus reducing capital, investment and output 
further. This mechanism results in the amplification and persistence of the negative 
shock. Again our result is similar to that of Mandelman (2009).  
However, in the presence of sticky interest rates, banking sector attenuates the 
response of the technology shock (comparing baseline with no-B model). Since bank 
rates are sticky, increase in the retail rates are much less than the policy rate. Thus the 
borrowing cost for firms increase by less in the presence of sticky interest rate setting 
banks. Thus, the presence of banking sector with sticky interest rates has a dampening 
effect of policy shock on output, investment, capital and net worth. 
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Figure 3.7: Impulse Responses to a 1% Negative Shock to Technology 
(Baseline model, no-B model and no-BK-FR model) 
Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state 
level. Interest rates are shown as absolute deviation from steady state. Baseline model 
represents the complete model with financial frictions and banking sector. To obtain 
no-BK-FR model first we shut down the bank capital channel. We set the cost of bank 
capital adjustment, Z equal to zero and rebate the banking profit to households in a 
lump-sum fashion. Then we also shut down the sticky interest rate channel. It is 
obtained by setting di and li equal to zero in the no-BK model model. To obtain no-B 
model, we set s = d =0 and the elasticities of loan and deposit, l  and d  equal to 
infinity. no-B model is a single interest rate model with financial frictions but no 
banking sector. The steady state values of the two models differ as the effective 
lending rate and deposit rate faced by the agents are not the same. Since the steady-
state under the two models is different, this plot is only instructive. 
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3.4.3 The Effects of a Tightening of Credit Conditions 
Starting in the summer of 2007, financial markets all across the globe fell under 
considerable strain. The initial deterioration in the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market 
quickly spread across other financial markets. Banks, in particular, suffered losses 
from write-offs and reported increasing funding difficulties. A number of them were 
forced to recapitalize and improve their balance sheets. In addition financial 
intermediaries tightened credit standards for the approval of loans. Against this 
background policymakers have been particularly concerned with the impact that a 
restriction in the availability and cost of credit might have on the real economy. Our 
model is well suited to analyze the effects of a tightening in credit conditions on the 
real activity. We carry out this exercise by implementing a persistent contraction in 
bank capital z.96  The shock is calibrated in a way such that it determines a fall of bank 
capital by 5 percent on impact. In the exercise we assess the role of the adjustment 
costs on the bank capital/asset ratio by computing the impulse responses under 
different calibration of the parameter Z . We consider as benchmark a value of 10, and 
then a higher one, corresponding to 15, and a lower one equal to 5. Figure 3.8 presents 
the impulse response of macro variables to a negative shock to bank capital z. 
By construction, the credit tightening brings about a fall in bank capital. In order to 
compensate for the loss in equity, banks increase the rate on deposits to attract them 
and increase their liability. At the same time, they increase the rates on loans to 
increase profits. This pushes up the costs of borrowing for entrepreneurs, reducing 
their net worth, which in turn decreases the demand for capital, leading to a decline in 
investment and output. Since banks try to re-build their capital, the spread increases. 
 
                                                 
96 Similar to Gerali et al. (2010) we model the credit condition tightening as a simple negative shock to 
the bank capital. We realize that this is a very simplified depiction of the present crisis but we carry out 
this exercise to demonstrate the propagation mechanism of a shock originating in the credit markets. 
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Figure 3.8: Impulse Responses to a Negative Shock to Bank Capital 
(Baseline model with different bank capital adjustment costs) 
Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state 
level. Interest rates are shown as absolute deviation from steady state. Low BK cost 
model has bank capital adjustment cost, Z  = 5 while High BK cost model has bank 
capital adjustment cost, Z  = 15. 
 
Higher the cost of adjusting the bank capital ratio, the larger is the increase in the 
lending rates, resulting in larger decline in net worth, demand for capital, investment 
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and output. Output contracts on impact only when the adjustment cost is sufficiently 
large. With high adjustment costs, spread between wholesale loan and wholesale 
deposit rates increase; bank profits increase and compensates for the fall in equity. The 
bank capital-loan ratio converges faster to its steady state. Response of consumption 
depends on the size of the adjustment cost. Gerali et al. (2010) have also found similar 
results. 
Next we analyze the monetary transmission mechanism associated with non-
monetary tools generally employed by the central banks in emerging markets. 
Policymakers resort to this tool for generally two reasons – to control inflation by 
soaking up the liquidity (or decreasing aggregate demand), and to fund the 
government deficit. While analyzing the effect of these non-monetary policy tools, we 
assume that the central bank keeps the policy rate unchanged. 
3.4.4 Shock to Cash Reserve Requirement 
We present the impulse response of macroeconomic variables to a positive shock 
in CRR (increase in CRR by 50 bps) in Figure 3.9. The policy achieves its intended 
objective of reducing inflation. Since banks have less credit available to lend, they 
increase the lending rate. This results in higher borrowing costs for entrepreneurs, 
causing net worth to decline. Also a decline in inflation results in higher debt 
repayment which also reduces the net worth of the firms. It puts downward pressure 
on the demand for capital, resulting in the decline of investment and output. The 
financial accelerator mechanism results in further reduction in investment and output. 
Since banks are left with less credit to meet the loan requirements, they have to tap 
additional deposits and also use bank capital. Deposits go up. Since the bank’s 
profitability goes down they use their bank capital to meet the demand for loans, 
resulting in a worsening of their balance sheet. Lowered economic activity results in 
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lower wage income and lower dividend income for the households. This reduces their 
consumption demand. Also as households shift to deposits, their current consumption 
demand is further reduced.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Impulse Responses to a Positive Shock to Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) 
Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state 
level. Interest rates are shown as absolute deviation from steady state. We assume that 
the central bank does not change the policy rate while changing the reserve 
requirements i.e. 1 tt ii . 
3.4.5 Shock to Statutory Liquidity Ratio 
We present the impulse response of a positive shock to SLR (increase in SLR by 
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50 bps) in Figure 3.10. Increase in the SLR requirement forces the banks to lend to 
government at a rate lower than the market rate (since they only earn the t-bill rate). In 
order to maximize their profits, banks raise the lending rates. Higher lending rates and 
declining inflation leads to an increase in the borrowing costs for the firms. Thus even 
though the policy rate is unchanged, borrowing costs for the firms go up. This sets in 
the financial accelerator mechanism, leading to contraction in output, investment and 
consumption. Since in our model the government has a balanced budget, increased t-
bill holdings in each period result in lowering of t-bill rates, which further reduces the 
profits of banks. Lowered economic activity results in lower wage income and lower 
dividend income for the households. This reduces their consumption demand. Also as 
households shift to deposits, their current consumption demand is further reduced. 
Even though the non-traditional monetary policy tool is able to achieve its 
objective, it results in a larger contraction of the economy as compared to traditional 
monetary tightening (see Figure 3.4).  
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Figure 3.10: Impulse Responses to a Positive Shock to Statutory Liquidity Ratio 
(SLR) 
Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady state 
level. Interest rates and spread are shown as absolute deviation from steady state. We 
assume that the central bank does not change the policy rate while changing the 
reserve requirements i.e. 1 tt ii . 
 
We have examined monetary and productivity shocks to understand the role of the 
banking sector and financial frictions in the transmission of shocks and their effect on 
the real economy. Results are similar to those of Mandelman (2009) in terms of 
amplification of shocks when the interest rates are flexible. However, when rates are 
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sticky, our results are comparable to Gerali et al (2010), where the presence of 
banking sector attenuates the shocks. A similar attenuator effect arises also in Andres 
and Arce (2009) and Aslam and Santoro (2008). Our model also suggests that using 
non-traditional monetary tools may result in larger volatility than using a traditional 
monetary tightening.  
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
The present crisis has amply demonstrated that financial shocks can have a 
significant effect on the real economy, and fixing financial markets may hold a key to 
recovery and stability. Macro-financial linkages have become the focus of attention in 
both academia and central banks. This crisis has also highlighted the need of 
introducing banking sector (credit supply channel) in a standard DSGE model with 
financial frictions (credit demand channel) to study and analyze shocks emanating in 
the credit markets.  
The aim of this paper has been to develop a small open economy model with 
financial frictions and a banking sector to understand the role of financial 
intermediation in the transmission of shocks, and to analyze the effects of credit 
market shocks on the real economy. The model includes a financial accelerator 
mechanism similar to that proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999). Banks are modeled as 
monopolistically competitive optimizing units. They combine deposits with the bank 
capital (accumulated out of retained earnings) to make loans while meeting the 
capital-asset requirement. We have introduced cash reserve ratio (CRR) and statutory 
liquidity ratio (SLR) in the model to study the non-monetary policy tools used by the 
central bank in India. 
Our analysis suggests that the presence of financial frictions result in the 
amplification and persistence of shocks, while the presence of monopolistic sticky 
  176
interest rate setting banking sector attenuates the effect of shocks. However, if interest 
rates are flexible, market power of banking system results in the amplification of 
shocks. Other results suggest that tightening of credit markets (a negative shock to 
bank capital) have substantive effects on the economy, and when the central bank 
resorts to using non-monetary tools, there is a larger contraction in output and 
consumption as compared to traditional monetary tightening (operating through 
nominal interest rate changes). 
The results are driven by the fact that we have two channels through which the 
financial sector interacts with the real economy.  The banking sector affects the real 
economy through the credit supply channel.  Presence of banks creates a wedge 
between the policy rate and rates which are relevant for the decision making of each 
agent in the economy, modifying the response of real variables. The financial 
accelerator mechanism works by altering the cost of borrowing faced by the firms.  
The model developed in this paper can be used extensively to analyze several 
issues related to financial sector and financial stability. Since the model includes bank 
capital channel, our model is well suited to study the effects of bank recapitalization 
program being undertaken in India. Also, it is suited to analyze the effects of bank 
capital regulatory changes. 
Our model with reserve requirements can be used to study the macro-economic 
consequences of using different policy tools and to rank them as well as to study the 
welfare costs of various financial frictions and financial under-development. It can 
also be extended to study the welfare costs of various rigidities in the financial 
markets. One such possible extension is to study the welfare implications of the 
presence of floor on deposit rates in India. This non-zero lower bound on deposits is 
created by government administered interest rates on small savings schemes. These 
schemes compete with banks for deposits and thus prevent the banks from reducing 
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deposit rates below these administered rates (which are significantly higher than 
market determined rates on debt papers of corresponding tenures). This non-zero 
lower bound on deposits in turn prevents banks from decreasing lending rates even 
when the policy rates are lowered to infuse liquidity in the economy. 
By estimating the parameters of the model we can use it to study the optimality of 
current monetary policy in India. Also, it can then be used to assess the relative 
importance of shocks in explaining the business cycle fluctuations in India.  
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